PA016(1974), © Covenant Media Foundation -- 800/553-3938.

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A Critique of the Evidentialist Apologetical Method of John Warwick Montgomery
By Dr. Greg Bahnsen

By means of three parables J. W. Montgomery attempts to supply some reason for drawing back from presuppositional apologetics.[1] After examining his critique of Van Til's position, we shall turn to a (non-parabolic) analysis of Montgomery's own.

A. A Non-Telling Parabolic Critique

It is quite important when one is defending his position against criticism which comes in the form of a parable to make sure, at the outset, that the parable is not in fact a parody which counterfeits his position. That is, quite simply, the argumentative parable must be appropriate to the question at hand; it must accurately reflect the point of view being criticized. For instance, one gets himself into a very misguided tangle if he, when confronted with John Wisdom's parable of the gardener as used by Antony Flew, does not begin by pointing out that, contrary to the terms in which the story is told, the evidence for God's existence is far from ambiguous or vague. The Christian contention is in fact that the evidence for God's existence is unavoidable and clear, so much so that all men are without excuse for rebellion against the truth about God. Now that puts things in a much different light than the parable would suggest. Thus one must not be deceived by clever stories into arguing a modified form of his position. Parables are not themselves to be ruled out as argumentative instruments, but as with any such instrument, they must be properly and appropriately used.

1. Seeing Through Tlon

This brings us to the first parable used by J. W. Montgomery against Van Til. It is an interesting story, but after all inappropriate and, thereby, inconsequential as an argument against presuppositionalism. In the first place, unlike Montgomery's story, the non-Christian does not, in fact, have the ability systematically to falsify the world as it reveals the living and true God. In his suppression of the truth every unbeliever is inconsistent (and it he were not, this would be the crack of doom); thus in actual practice the non-Christian escapes what, in principle, would be his total inability to interpret things properly according to his espoused presuppositions. Secondly, contrary to Montgomery's allegation, in the presuppositionalist outlook the "facts" are indeed powerful to stop the non-Christian's falsifying interpretation - that is, no one can make "reality yield." However, the state of affairs in the world (even as revelatory of God) does not deprive man of his freedom to rebel against God. The process of suppressing the clear truth and attempting to substitute a different outlook (an attempt always mitigated by the power of God's revelation in the "facts") is precisely such rebellion; even though the unbeliever knows better in his "heart of hearts," he nonetheless has been granted the ability to oppose the truth. Thirdly, Montgomery's parable overlooks the fact that, as presuppositionalists maintain, common grace restrains the sinful rebellion of the unbeliever (and hence his falsifying interpretations of the "facts"). Therefore, the "facts" are a clear revelation of God, the non-Christian is free to attempt suppression of the truth, that suppression is never completely successful (due to the power of revelation and common grace), and yet the rebel thinker can stubbornly remain with his espoused presuppositions (avoiding an outward admission of the truth by various intellectual maneuvers and emotional patterns of coping, none bringing him genuine satisfaction). Montgomery's parable, then, fails to distinguish between what the non-Christian actually knows and what he pretends to know, between what happens in his system in practice and in principle. The unbeliever is always the image of God who lives on borrowed capital, as Van Til has continually stressed, and thus sinners can be reasoned with on a presuppositional level. Their "Encyclopedia of Tlon" is never a match for the revelation of God in creation and Scripture.

Coming to his actual point, Montgomery asks how the non-Christian interpretation of things is to be distinguished from reality.[2] Although he has not established why this should be a problematic matter for Van Til, the presuppositionalist can oblige him with an answer. Both Christian and non-Christian recognize the difference between their descriptions and interpretation of reality (on the basis of linguistic terms and behavioral responses, if nothing else). Both are God's creatures and suited to receive His revelation. Natural revelation constantly bears in upon them both, showing them the truth about God; this is supplemented with God's verbal revelation of the truth. The non-Christian's suppression of the truth (i.e., his reading things through colored glasses) is an ethical (not metaphysical) state of affairs; he distorts the truth by willful choice and willfully persists in his rebellion (i.e., cements the glasses to his face). Therefore, the unbeliever is able (though unwilling) to distinguish the sinful interpretation of things from reality, and God's revelation ably distinguishes the two. The unbeliever can be shown to be wrong, for the choice of world-views is not a subjectivist's guessing game but a matter of submission to or rebellion against the truth of God's revelation. But perhaps Montgomery has more than this in mind when he asks his question; maybe he wants to know how we get the unbeliever overtly to distinguish between a sinful interpretation and reality (i.e., to admit that he is wrong). If so, it is likely that Montgomery forgets how complex a matter it is to bring a man to change his mind on fundamental or important issues; people alter their beliefs for various reasons, and these various factors combine in different ways and have different effects from individual to individual (this is true even outside of specifically religious questions). A man can genuinely be shown the truth, be given justification for believing, and yet refrain from seeing it as the truth; what amounts to justification or sufficient reason for belief will (both in theory and effect) differ between people. However, keeping that complexity in mind, we can broadly indicate an answer to the extension of Montgomery's question posed above. First, we need to notice how the unbeliever attempts to escape the truth about God; by apostate presuppositions fostered in an unrighteous way of life (these are used to "naturalize" God's revealed truth or pervert it into false religious systems). Second, notice why the unbeliever does this; inherited depravity, a stone heart, and guilt-induced flight from God. Now if we intend to change the unbeliever's mind we should, realizing that he is God's image and that he depends upon God's revelation to know any truth at all, press his espoused presuppositions to foolishness - that is, work on those glasses which falsely "color" the facts. Appealing to the unbeliever's guilt (violation of God's moral law) and his better knowledge (for the "facts" or actual state of affairs do reveal God to him) we call on him responsibly to turn from rebellion against God to submission and obedience to the truth, looking to the Holy Spirit to change his heart in order that he might submit to the authority of God's redemptive word (Scripture). That realistically is how we get the unbeliever to distinguish Tlon from reality.

If the facts were "neutral" they would not provide the revelation necessary to distinguish sinful interpretations of the world from reality; all interpretations would then be autobiographical impositions of meaning. Thus it is actually the non-presuppositional viewpoint which endangers the possibility of meaningfully criticizing one another's positions, the ability to distinguish error from reality, and the prophylaxis against successful myth-making. Moreover, by recognizing the sinner's ability to suppress the truth and see things through colored glasses which he cements to his face, the presuppositionalist acknowledges that "facts" or the state of affairs do not automatically determine the outworking of a man's life in some pre-established pattern; the sinner is accounted as able to rebel against the truth or to submit to the truth, to live in antagonism or obedience to God's revelation. Thus the presuppositional position reckons with the freedom of men and the complexity involved in the conversion of their thinking; the issues of guilt and authority are influential in presuppositionalism, while a non-presuppositional approach may not take proper account of the human condition and the factors accounting for man's attempts to twist the facts (i.e., may not explain the very plot of Montgomery's parable). Also, the presuppositionalist recognizes that the "facts" will only have argumentative effect when the disputants are working upon the same presuppositions; otherwise the unbeliever will use a paradigm which enables him to reinterpret all the evidence. Thus it is the non-presuppositionalist who would obliviously jeopardize the feasibility of the believer and unbeliever criticizing each other's positions in any significant sense. All in all it would seem that Montgomery's parable is really putting the pinch on his own position, not that of a presuppositionalist.

But let us supply even further attenuation for Montgomery's question. We have seen that the point of his parable ("how is Tlon to be distinguished from reality?"[3] against presuppositional apologetics is far from trenchant in two suggested senses for the question (i.e., how are erroneous world-views and reality distinguishable in general principle, and how do we get the unbeliever overtly to distinguish them?). However, perhaps Montgomery's question amounts to: how can Mr. X adjudicate between the claim of the Bible and the claim of secularism ("which is the devil's city and which the civitas Dei?"[4]). Now the question assumes that Mr. X is either a neutral bystander, a self-sufficient unbeliever, or a convicted unbeliever. If Mr. X is taken to be a neutral bystander who is considering two hypotheses, there is no practical need to answer the question, for such a situation is never instantiated (no one is ever neutral, but is always caught up in the process of either opposing or obeying God's truth). If Mr. X considers himself autonomous in his unbelief, his search for independent standards by which he can pass judgment upon God's revelation (i.e., as God, determining good and evil) is a form of rebellion; hence he needs conviction of his waywardness as usual (this case has been discussed before). Why should such a person as this believe the Bible as opposed to some other alternative? Well, there are many "factual" and logical books on the market, so a "factual" and logical demonstration of the Bible need not sway him as to its significance or uniqueness, and his sinful outlook will cause him to reinterpret the "facts" and arguments about the Bible. Therefore, the foundational reason he should believe that the Bible is true is because God (a genuine and unavoidable authority) says so; if he refuses to bow to the self-attesting word from God, then he is led to moral and epistemological futility. It is this futility which we presuppositionally work on (so that the "evidence" will really count and be given the correct interpretation). However, getting to the kernel of our attenuated sense of Montgomery's question, if Mr. X is not proceeding in an autonomous attitude but has a true desire to find God (i.e., has come under conviction) without being deceived by false religious options, then we need simply point him to Scripture; for only the Bible's teaching on justification will suit the moral conviction of God's law, and only God's revelation will be a suitable relief to his epistemological despair. There are no other answers once the right problem has been realized! Everything else smacks of irrelevance except God's truth and grace. If Mr. X is under conviction he does not need "evidential" arguments, he needs God's sure word.

Therefore, having seen the inappropriateness of Montgomery's parable ("The Universe of Tlon") in a critique of presuppositionalism and the fact that his commentary upon the parable presents un-telling questions for a presuppositional apologetic, we are forced to deny Montgomery's conclusion. People can criticize each other's spectacles (presuppositions) and New Jerusalem is not interchangeable with Tlon for anyone[5]! If anything, the parable puts the pinch on Montgomery's own non-presupposistional method. The presuppositionalist points out the clarity and authority of God's revelation as well as the knowledge which each man eradicable has of God. Even in rebellion the sinner cannot escape the truth about God. The final outworking of his autonomous presuppositions and their end will be hell, and there God shall be clearly known! So no matter where a man may be along the way, the as-yet-unconsummated attempt to escape God is itself a testimony to God. Whether the sinner lets the light of God's revelation through in a conscious fashion, whether he attempts to block it out, or whether he inconsistently does a little of both, he knows the truth about God. Whether in submission of rebellion the man confronted by the presuppositionalist is seen as "knowing God."[6] This is the answer Van Til would begin with in reply to Montgomery's misleading parabolic criticism, not the answer that Montgomery puts into his mouth[7] - an answer which is insufficient precisely because it is incomplete.

2. Misleading Quotation

Perhaps this would be the place to make a methodological observation about Montgomery's critique of Van Til. We noted earlier that parables in themselves are not illegitimate vehicles for making a point of criticism - as long as they are appropriate. Now how is it that Montgomery comes up with the parable which he directs against Van Til? The unsuspecting reader is led to believe that the parable is appropriate because it follows a lengthy quotation from Van Til; however, in the way that Montgomery has handled Van Til's materials it becomes apparent that what we really have is subtle straw-man tactics. By not paying attention to the context out of which he lifts the quotes, and by arranging the quotes in a way suited to his intended criticism, Montgomery does not really allow Van Til to speak for himself. Montgomery sets up the problem and then sets up the answer, trimming his opponent's writings to fit the pattern desired. This is why he has ended up with an inappropriate parable in criticism of Van Til. As we see on pages 382-383 in Jerusalem and Athens, what Montgomery (via his parable) wants to make of the quotations from Van Til on pages 380-381 is that, by avoiding an inductive or factual apologetic, Van Til's position loses the objectivity of evidence and the fruitfulness of argumentation. That this does not do justice to Van Til will be clear to anyone who will bother to read the context from which Montgomery takes his quotations[8]. I offer a few examples:

The Aquinas-Butler type of argument...concedes that since historical facts are "unique" nothing certain can be asserted of them,...It is compromising in the first place with respect to the objective clarity of the evidence for the truth of Christian theism...Men ought, says Calvin following Paul, to believe in God, for each one is surrounded with a superabundance of evidence with respect to him.[9]

Van Til criticizes Butler's apologetic for also overlooking that the sinner has an axe to grind, for proceeding as if "they were not anxious to keep from seeing the facts for what they really are."[10] (Here we see that Montgomery's parable proves Van Til's point - men will attempt to falsify the evidence!) The same criticism would apply to modern day followers of Butler's method - e.g., Montgomery. Van Til says that the subjective element (which Montgomery's parable takes to be paramount) comes into the picture in only a restricted sense,[11] and he says of the presuppositional antithesis between believer and unbeliever:

It does not mean that any one person fully exemplifies either system perfectly...So then the situation is always mixed. In any one's statement of personal philosophy there will be remnants of his old man...In the case of the non-believer this keeps him from being fully Satanic in his opposition to God...in principle there are two mutually exclusive systems, based upon two mutually exclusive principles of interpretation.[12]

Moreover the discussion from which Montgomery takes his quite had been used by Van Til in order to show what was necessary in the argument between believer and unbeliever was to be "really fruitful"[13]. Consider further samples from the immediate context of Montgomery's quotations:

The objective evidence for the existence of God and of the comprehensive governance of the world by God is therefore so plain that he who runs may read. Men cannot get away from this evidence...Whether men engage in inductive study with respect to the facts of nature about them or engage in analysis of their own self-consciousness they are always face to face with God their maker.[14]

Van Til makes a point that "Every bit of historical investigation...is bound to confirm the truth of the claims of the Christian position", and he affirms that the falsifying interpretations of the facts by the unbeliever is not something unavoidable which the sinner cannot help doing: "...it is evident that by the sinner's epistemological reaction I mean his reaction as an ethically responsible creature of God."[15] As before Van Til asserts of the non-Christian that "they oppose God's revelation everywhere. They do not want to see the facts of nature for what they are"; and yet he also says further, "It is asked what person is consistent with his own principles. Well I have consistently argued that no one is and that least of all the non-Christian is...Neither do I forget that no man is actually fully consistent in working according to these assumptions."[16] Montgomery has simply not taken all the factors into account when he selects certain quotations from Van Til; those quotations must be understood in their context. When they are, it is manifest that they cannot be used as raw material for the type of parable Montgomery contrives. Van Til's assertions, properly read in context, certainly do not lead to the outlook of Montgomery's parable - which is precisely why it is deficient as a critique of Van Til's position. It has nothing to do with Van Til's position, despite the misleading appearance created by tendentious proof texting of Van Til's publications. Indeed, the problems which are evident in the parable (to whomever they may apply) are themselves vanquished by Van Til's teachings in the very places from which Montgomery quotes him!

3. Collision With Credibility

Montgomery now turns from the spurious to the outlandish; having misrepresented Van Til parabolically, Montgomery next alleges that Van Til's position is threatened with "solipsistic collapse."[17] Here Montgomery evidences that he fails to understand either solipsism or Van Til, or both. Nowhere in Van Til's publications will anyone find teachings that even remotely approximate the idea that he alone exists in a fundamental sense and that everything else exists only in a secondary sense as his perception or thought; indeed one cannot find grounds for even vaguely associating Van Til with the root phenomenalism (e.g., Esse est percipi) that leads to solipsism. The ironic thing is this: while Montgomery has outlandishly charged Van Til with having a position that reduces, of all things, to solipsism, in fact philosophers have usually seen solipsism as a threatening implicate of positivism[18] and methodological solipsism has been correlated with the ego-centric predicament - which two things are much closer to (if not virtually homogeneous with) Montgomery's own inductive epistemology! Not only is it outlandish for Montgomery to charge Van Til with solipsism, but the parable which Montgomery produces[19] to go along with his charge contains an alleged example of presuppositional apologetic encounter which itself is outlandish. If Montgomery expects to render an effective critique of his opponents he is going to have to learn that ground rule one is to represent them in credible and responsible fashion - and the encounter between the Shadok and Gibi[20] is far from that. While Montgomery would have his reader falsely think that presuppositionalism advocates an unreasoning, sheer authoritarian, apologetic argument that requires unreserved commitment on the part of the unbeliever before evidence can be presented, anyone who will read Van Til in a responsible Christian fashion and in (at least) academic honesty will easily discover that he holds:

It must always be remembered that the first requirement for effective witnessing is that the position to which witness is given be intelligible...The second requirement for effective witnessing is that he to whom the witness is given must be shown why he should forsake his own position and accept that which is offered him.[21]

With regret we recall that presuppositionalism was given the same blatant misrepresentation by Pinnock[22] and that Pinnock is of the same school as Montgomery (ideologically and institutionally); we exhort that school to realize that neither trustworthiness nor erudition are supported by this kind of critique. The presuppositionalist is willing to listen to constructive critique as long as the critic will at least give a fair representation of the position; outside of that there would be no reason to listen.

To oblige Montgomery let us briefly respond to the parable, "Worlds in Collision." Is it possible that a religious stalemate could be generated if an unbelieving position responded to the presuppositional position with exactly the same line of argumentation? No. To show this we need only look at Montgomery's story. The Shadoks and Gibis come from different planets; now the parable either envisions a monotheistic or polytheistic framework. If the latter, there is no practical need to respond. Now in a monotheistic framework if the Shadoks and Gibis really say exactly the same things to one another (with the exception of formal labels for God, etc.), then they are endorsing the same religion and need no longer argue at all! That is, if the Christian presuppositionalist met someone who held to a Triune God who is clearly revealed in nature, who created and sustains all things, who sovereignly decrees the course of history, who sent the Son to die for the sins of the elect (who, being born in the sinful race of the first and representative man, are totally unable to propitiate God's eternal wrath), who authoritatively revealed Himself in Scripture and who sends the Holy Spirit to regenerate and sanctify His people, etc. - if he met someone holding such a view who carried it out with the same responses and implications, then the only kind of argument he could have would be a merely linguistic one. You see the problem with Montgomery's parable (beyond the fact that it does not exemplify the actual transcendental argumentation a real presuppositionalist wold use) is that he does not give any reason why "The two positions are logically incompatible...";[23] the rest of the story (e.g., each disputant repeating exactly the same assertions as the other) is not consonant with that foundational premise or condition. Now if we instead take that premise seriously and say that the positions to be described in the story are and must be incompatible, then (not only is the story wrong-headed, but) the type of argument put into the presuppositionalist's mouth (whether Shadok or Gibi, take your pick) would not be that which appears at all. Instead the presuppositionalist would seek to find out if the opponent has a theoretically justified epistemology (e.g., could answer the one and many dilemma, substantiate the assumptions of non-contradiction and uniformity, etc.); he would attack at that fundamental level, bringing in the moral culpability of the unbeliever (i.e., law violations), and showing the strength and justification for his own world-view. If the opponent had the same approach in every respect, then we are back to the more linguistic dispute already mentioned.

Montgomery's parable would only be telling against someone who endorses a bare authoritarian apologetic, someone who holds to only a formal authority for his religion, someone who does no more than demand unthinking deference to a contentless claim to dominion; two people with such an approach surely would have no evidence to appeal to in a dispute with each other! However, Dr. Van Til's arguments have never seen that impasse, and the reason is simply that his apologetic is nothing like that portrayed by Montgomery. Van Til is a Biblical Christian (who derives a presuppositional defense of the faith from Scriptural teaching; Cf. II.E above), not a Moslem. Montgomery should know the difference. And because Van Til is not a Dooyeweerdian (even of the Toronto I.C.S. brand), Montgomery's example of the instantiation of the Shadok-Gibi impasse[24] is irrelevant as a critique of Van Til (since the illustration deals with a Toronto Dooyeweerdian). Montgomery should also know the difference between these two - at least he should have indicated that while a Dooyaweerdian does not think presuppositions can be analyzed or argued for in any way, Van Til does. This noted, we would go on to caution that Montgomery's own alternative to the Zylstra-Marcuse impasse should not be identified with Van Til's nor should it be considered very telling (e.g., R.M. Hare's parable of the insane blik would be far from discomfited by Montgomery's inductive marshalling of the "facts"![25]).

So then, we have seen two parables generated by Montgomery go by the boards; the first was inappropriate, the second was outlandish. What they had in common was a lack of basic understanding of Van Til's presuppositionalism. That deficiency is also evident in the commentary offered by Montgomery between his second and third parables.[26] Besides being misguided on Van Til's attitudes toward facts, evidence, aprioristic circularity, and positive demonstration just as Pinnock was,[27] Montgomery fails to see that Van Til's apologetic claims that use of facts and logic is not simply directed in a different direction on non-Christian presuppositions, but is in principle impossible. Thus Van Til's opponents could not (contrary to Montgomery's idea[28]) "employ his own two-edged sword against him"; the question is not that of mere personal volitions and commitments ("...right reason...begins with commitment to my presuppositional starting point"), but which presuppositions will support the use of induction and deduction for anybody who wants to reason at all. The unbeliever cannot turn Van Til's apologetic around, for that apologetic shows all world-views except that of Biblical Christianity to be founded on presuppositions of an untenable rational-irrational nature; non-Christian thinking is inherently self-defeating, while Scripture grounds rationality and factuality as well as their fruitful interaction. Van Til does not merely show the unbeliever to be in a different volitional tower of personal commitment, he shows the unbeliever stranded in epistemological futility; he then goes on to show the strength of Christian presuppositions as founded in the authoritative revelation of God. Montgomery has really missed the point if he thinks the unbeliever could use Van Til's presuppositional apologetic against him! We do not arrive at religious stalemate with presuppositionalism (although the hardness of the unbeliever's heart can prevent him from turning to the truth), we see revealed wisdom showing the folly of worldly foolishness. A world-view as treated in presuppositional apologetics is not merely a matter of personal choice, it is also a matter of clear truth. Only a presuppositional apologetic gets to the bottom of the sinner's thinking and rebellion; only a presuppositional approach can effectively deal with both vain science (and its supposed factual foundations) and insane bliks (with their self-defeating presuppositions). Against Montgomery, then, the Christian must insist that when world views collide, the stakes are simply too high to operate anything but presuppositionally; this is the only preservative from having our witness absorbed into the rationalist-irrationalist schemes of religious anarchy.

4. The Underlying Error

We would pause, before going on to Montgomery's third parable, to point out that in the two preceding parables Montgomery erroneously assumes that, on a presuppositional outlook, there is no essential difference between the believing and unbelieving moral-epistemological condition. What we mean is this: in the first parable it is assumed that believer and unbeliever have jaundiced vision in the same way or respects, and in the second parable it is assumed that the believer and unbeliever are both making irrational, unthinking choices as to the truth. The moral condition and the epistemological quandary have been taken as identical between Christian and non-Christian. On that misleading assumption Montgomery has misjudged that one could criticize presuppositionalism by simply reducing it to the problems of its opponents, by simply turning its approach around and directing it at Christianity itself. Thus Montgomery would have the devil's city indistinguishable from the city of God (since everyone has jaundiced vision) and would have the Shadok hopelessly encounter the Gibi (since everyone makes an ungrounded personal commitment to a metaphysic on bare authoritarian grounds). Yet Montgomery's parables fail to draw certain necessary distinctions and thereby render his criticism pointless; as noted earlier, Montgomery has simply been jousting with a straw-man that he set up. Van Til's position is not subject to Montgomery's criticism because Van Til does not maintain that the believer and unbeliever are in essentially the same moral-epistemological condition (making it impossible to distinguish or argue for the truth).

Let us see where Montgomery has gone astray. His critical commentary on the first parable begins with the assumption that there are no exceptions to jaundiced vision since sin is a universal condition.[29] There is a far-reaching, though subtle, error here. It is unquestionable that if any man says he has not sinned he is a liar;[30] however, there is a principial difference between the sinning of a believer and the sinning of the unregenerate[31] Montgomery does not draw that distinction and so is mislead into thinking that believer and unbeliever are morally incapacitated to the same degree, as if neither could see the kingdom of God;[32] the teaching of God's word is to the exact opposite effect, saying that the unbeliever cannot discern the things of the Spirit[33] while that very Spirit of truth teaches the believer all things.[34] The vision of the sinner is jaundiced, but in principle the vision of the believer is transparent. Therefore, we must reject whole-heartedly the subtle but drastic error which conditions Montgomery's critical commentary. Not only is the conditional premise of Montgomery's criticism untrue to Scripture, it is untrue to Van Til's position. Montgomery has set up things in his parable and in his critical commentary so that both believer and unbeliever would, to use Van Til's metaphor, have colored glasses cemented to their faces; however, had Montgomery read Van Til's metaphor in its literary context he would have seen that Van Til maintains, while they both have the facts in common, it is the sinner (not the saint) who has colored glasses on his nose[35]. Montgomery's quote from Van Til[36] picks up immediately after Van Til makes this essential distinction; I hate to have to say this, but it appears as if Montgomery is willfully deceiving his reader as to what Van Til's position is. I hope, contrary to appearances, that this is not the case. But the fact remains that Montgomery's criticism (error cannot be distinguished from reality if you are a presuppositionalist since there are no exceptions to jaundiced vision) is pointless since the presuppositionalist does not hold to what Montgomery alleges.

The same criticism can be made with respect to Montgomery's second parable. There he portrays the believer and unbeliever in the same epistemological quandary, being forced to a voluntaristic rationalism that cannot argue primary truths since they are arbitrarily and irrationally chosen. This is not what Scripture teaches,[37] nor is it an implication of Van Til's position. Montgomery would have his reader think that Van Til simply accepts that the difference in outlook between Christianity and its opponents is a matter of irrational choice; however, one should note the "..." in Montgomery's quotation from Van Til[38]. The excised material is far from insignificant. It refers Van Til's reader to a dilemma he has been formulating throughout the book: one must accept either the "scientific method" as his epistemological authority and thereby trim down or distort the Christian message, or he must accept the Christian Scriptures as his epistemological authority and use science appropriately without compromising the Bible's message. Van Til has demonstrated what the outcome is if one chooses to follow the first option; the method which appeals to facts as if they were "brute" renders predication impossible[39] and cannot talk about "facts" at all.[40] It is now evident what accepting the "scientific method" at all costs entails according to Van Til; it entails epistemological futility which can be avoided on Christian presuppositions. Hence the difference of choice between the Christian and his opponent is more than a mere matter of differing and arbitrary volitions; it involves the very salvaging of the epistemological enterprise. That is why Van Til says "we need not worry too greatly" if the opponent intimates that Christianity is simply a matter of irrational choice; that hint or suggestion overlooks the outcome of the unbiblical choice and thus the dilemma facing the unbeliever (as well as inductivist apologist), a dilemma which gives sufficient reason for affirming Christianity. When Montgomery quotes from Van Til he conveniently omits Van Til's reference to that dilemma, making it appear (contrary to fact) that Van Til would make a rootless choice of Christianity at all costs. One must recognize the value of Van Til's formulated dilemma before he goes on to see Van Til's further distinction between the notice of choice itself of the positivist and of the Christian, differing as to their respective presuppositions of autonomy or election. Montgomery cites the second distinction but edits the first one out, and only in this way can it seem plausible to turn the presuppositionalist's apologetic in on itself. Thus again Montgomery's criticism (Christianity cannot successfully argue with unbelief if you are a presuppositionalist since the hopeless circularity of an arbitrary faith commitment is seen at the base of both positions) is pointless since the presuppositionalist does not hold to what Montgomery alleges (and intimates by editing his quotations). Montgomery has gone far afield by trying, in this manner, to reduce presuppositionalism to the problems of its opponents; the presuppositionalist's sword is not two-edged in Montgomery's sense at all (cutting against unbelief and belief equally well). By depending upon the self-attesting truth of Scripture for its directives, presuppositionalism attempts to embody the power of that word of God which is sharper than any two-edged sword!

5. An Ancient Apologetic Problem for Whom?

Having seen that Montgomery's first two parables and commentary have no critical strength since they are built up from misrepresentations and erroneous assumptions and since they pose no problematic questions for presuppositionalism, we move on to look at his third and final parable. It embodies the same syndrome of misrepresentation and false accusation as the previous two (Van Til is called an "aprioristic apologist" who sends one into "the cloud-cuckoo land of fideism" because he requires the unbeliever to accept Christianity before evaluating evidence and thus cuts off all opportunity to determine its truth value prior to a mere volitional commitment[41]) and, therefore, requires and deserves no further comment (the reader is again directed to III.A.1, especially numbers 9,10,11,12,14, 16,19,20,21). This much ought to be said: Christ our Lord delineated a very effective apologetic saying that the world would know that He had been sent by the Father when it saw the love expressed among believers.[42] How effective does Montgomery's apologetic then seem if he does not speak the truth in love[43] about his brother in Christ but is so quick to think evil[44] that he bears false witness about him? Can't a Christian critic treat his Christian opponent with fairness and respect what he actually stands for? Such mutual treatment is required if the world is to know that we are disciples of Christ.[45]

Although Van Til does not represent the position attacked by Montgomery under his third parable, we shall oblige the critic with a response lest it be thought that the above exhortation is merely a cloak to cover up problems with presuppositionalism. In reciting "An Ancient Apologetic Parable"[46], Montgomery aims to criticize Van Til for forgetting that the religious situation is pluralistic and (by cutting off evaluation of the various religious remedies before commitment to the true one) does not render the non-Christian "without excuse." Is the presuppositionalist caught in such a plight? Not hardly. He knows that the unbeliever is the image of God and created to receive and know his Creator's voice. He knows that there is abundant objective evidence in creation to leave man without excuse for disbelief and improper worship of God. He knows that the Bible is the self-attesting word of God which leaves the unbeliever more culpable for continued rebellion because it clearly and sufficiently reveals God the redeemer. Thus the presuppositionalist fears no competition from apostate religions. He alone has God's truth, the truth which all men have been created to receive and the only message bearing convicting power. The presuppositionalist knows the power of the Holy Spirit's operations in man's sinful heart. The presuppositionalist knows that all who deny God's word have built their houses on foundations of sand. He knows that the foolishness of unbelief can be demonstrated and contrasted to the wisdom of God. Hence he puts himself on his opponent's position for the sake of argument, proceeding then to show where the presuppositions of that position take one (to folly; epistemological suicide, skepticism, and the failure of all meaningful predication or understanding). The rationalism-irrationalism dialectic, the lack of theoretical justification for methods and assumptions, the breakdown of all ethical structure, and numerous other handles present themselves to the presuppositionalist as ways to drive the unbelieving position to futility; the upshot will be that the unbeliever cannot meaningfully go to the facts or use reason based upon his presuppositions. How then could he know anything? How then could he refute the Bible? How then could he entertain an understanding of alternative religious revelations? Then the presuppositionalist asks the opponent to place himself upon the Christian position for the sake of argument, proceeding then to show where revelational epistemology takes one (to wisdom, knowledge, and understanding). He shows the unbeliever why he can actually know God, how Scripture explains his rebellion, and what the way of salvation is; the gospel hope is defended upon the authority of God's word and with appropriate discussion of the unbeliever's sin. The Lordship of autonomous man is contrasted to the Lordship of Christ, thereby showing the sinner to be without excuse and culpable for rebellion (epistemological and ethical). While the Christian position grounds proper science and philosophy, accounts sufficiently for its knowledge of God and the unbeliever's attitude, and carries the convicting power of word and Spirit, the unbelieving position is sheer foolishness which accounts for nothing and carries no genuine conviction. This account is highly abbreviated and generalized, but it does show that a presuppositionalist would not cut off evaluation of competing claims or leave the unbeliever free to follow his subjective whims; genuine argument and comparison would take place, giving ample warrant for the unbeliever's change of mind, yet without forsaking the Lordship of Christ in the noetic realm. Having been presented with life and death, truth and error, blessing and curse, the unbeliever is called upon to submit his life and thinking to God. Therefore, the presuppositional apologetic, while demonstrating the only context which can give meaning to man's thought, does not expect a blind leap of faith of the unbeliever; no, rather the presuppositionalist presents the only adequate ground for belief at all, a ground which is completely sufficient, authoritative, clear and necessary; God's revelation in creation and word. The height of credulity is unbelief, not belief, if you follow out the presuppositionalist's case, for he does not simply give probable grounds for belief (thereby justifying the sinner's response; "well, then, there is possibility and reason to believe that Christianity is wrong" - leaving him with an excuse for unbelief) but grounds which show belief to be necessary (for the epistemological enterprise as well as for salvation since both depend upon a proper covenant relationship to God wherein He is Lord and we are His servants). Montgomery's parable is certainly not disquieting to a presuppositionalist. If the Christian presuppositionalist were set for the defense with a Moslem, he would not (contrary to Montgomery's suggestion) be reduced to demanding personal commitment to Christ before the evidence could be weighed or the positions compared. Although the Christian knows that the Moslem is in fact working on borrowed capital (resting in God's revelation despite espoused rejection) he does not expect or demand immediate, unequivocating, admission of that fact at the very first move, the primal outset of the conversation! The whole procedure of each opponent putting himself on the position of the other is calculated to bring the unbeliever to a realization that he must be (and indeed has been) reliant upon God's revealed truth to know anything; the authority of God's word as presented by the Christian is not simply formal, but bears its own evidence inherently as part of its content. Thus the Moslem and Christian would not be reduced to urging blind authorities at each other; they could genuinely debate with each other, even though it is at a transcendental level that the presuppositionalist is driving home his argument. For instance the presuppositionalist might choose to show the irrationalism-rationalism polarity in Islamic faith and then explain the Scriptural account for man's ability to receive clear and authoritative word from God, giving this as the basis for thinking and argumentation (even that which is taking place between the Christian and Moslem). The Christian could point to the Islamic doctrine of "mukhalafa" which claims that God is so different from His creatures that it is impossible to postulate anything of Him; then it could be added that the Moslem affirms the doctrine of "tanzih" as well, stripping God of all qualities of impermanence and thereby rendering Him unable to be affected by the actions and attitudes of His creatures. God, then, for the Moslem is far removed from man and unknowable (the irrationalist pole). Yet on the other hand the Moslem claims to know God by means of the Koran, and he claims that by ecstatic enlightenment man can so fan his inner spark of divinity so as to be fused in union with God's being. Hence God for the Moslem is completely drawn into the cosmos (man himself) and made known in a book (the rationalist pole). Hereby we see how hopelessly dis-integrated the Moslem's presuppositions are; he claims that nobody can know God but that the Moslem knows Him! He refutes himself out of his own mouth. The Moslem's troubles are only beginning however. He expects men to submit to Allah, yet endorses a doctrine of fate (wherein volition is meaningless). He sees a unity for history which destroys particularity, while the basis for any historical variations (the arbitrariness of God's decree) undermines the unity itself. No wonder the Moslem renounces philosophy and logic when it comes to the Koran! The Moslem is an irrationalist-rationalist who can actually know nothing or even understand a divine revelation (his obligation is to simply recite the traditions). On the other hand the Christian entertains a view of God such that He is sovereign Creator and Lord over the cosmos and history; while He cannot be directly identified with anything in creation, He can come right into the world with a clear revelation of Himself. He created man to receive that revelation; He redeems man from rebellion so as to receive and obey it. His sovereign plan provides coherence to history, and His creating and guiding hand gives reality to particulars; revelation is the foundation of meaningful thinking within God's creation, calling us to think His thoughts after Him. Etc. Thus the case would be broadly developed, showing that there is every reason to accept the Bible (not the least of which is true guilt and alienation from God which the word of Christ takes care to remedy, a cure the sinner inwardly knows that he needs) while there is no reason at all to accept the Koran. Foolishness and death are set over against wisdom and life; autonomy is contrasted to the Lordship and authority of God which is clearly expressed in His self-attesting revelation.

Much more could (and would) be said in an actual setting in life, but this much is given to indicate how non-problematic religious plurality is to a presuppositional apologetic. The unbeliever, whether secular or pseudo-religious, is prevented from any escape at all on the presuppositionalist approach; the unbeliever is shown that Christianity, far from being irrational, is the only basis for rationality at all. Further, the presuppositionalist can distinguish systematic theology from apologetics (contrary to Montgomery's allegation), but he does not believe that there are separate and different epistemic authorities in the two! Moreover, just because he views all thinking as necessarily under the Lordship of God, the presuppositionalist does not thereby fail to distinguish believer from unbeliever (as Montgomery claims); he simply recognizes that all who are without saving faith nevertheless know (and hence believe in) God in an unrighteous fashion - that is, they suppress the truth rather than submitting to it. All men know God (though in two ways; in grace and in curse), and all thinking rests upon God's revelation (though in two ways; consciously and obediently or hypocritically and rebelliously); guided by the same authority which governs His dogmatics the presuppositional apologist would attempt to move men from the latter class (damning knowledge of God and disobedience) to the former (saving knowledge and obedience). Thus the presuppositionalist distinguishes the Christian from the non-Christian without improperly separating the authority inherent in his dogmatics from the authority inherent in his apologetics; he comes in the self-attesting authority of God's word and points out that the unsaved sinner is living on borrowed capital (which he is forced to do in the nature of the case). So once again we see that Montgomery's parable and critical commentary present no problematic questions which the presuppositionalist cannot navigate.

Before leaving the third parable, however, we must note that Montgomery's own proposal for encountering the religious plurality of the world is far from suited for the task of Christian defense of the faith. He says the apologetic alternative we should follow is that of the apostles and of Christ, offering objective evidence and "many infallible proofs."[47] This incredibly suggests that we are to perform miracles and in the way that they did! However, in the next paragraph Montgomery becomes a bit clearer and explains that we are to present evidence of the truthfulness of Christianity for examination so that unbelievers will be without excuse under the pressure of the historical facts.[48] Of course Montgomery completely fails to take into account that the Pharisees living during earthly ministry of Jesus had far more than historical accounts; they saw the very miracles performed and yet did not believe in Him! And Montgomery fails to realize that an inductive apologetic by itself is unconvincing (note Pinnock's failures above, for instance) as well as inadequate to distinguish Christianity from other religions claiming past miracle-workers (the arguments for accepting the Bible's accounts and rejecting others all reduce to arbitrariness or question-begging of inductive premises alone). Moreover, false faiths have been known to be granted Satanic miracle-working powers (e.g., the sorcerers and magicians of Pharaoh's court); yet this does not prove that they are the road to religious truth! A historical basis, accounts of miracles, or even the actual miracles themselves are insufficient guides to the true religious remedy of man's ailments. And even where the miracles were those of the true God, the whole audience was not led to belief. So where has Montgomery gotten us in this religiously pluralistic world? Nowhere. And then even if his arguments were said to establish probable truth (a premise which is unfounded) in Christianity, we would be left with mere probability - which, again, leaves the sinner an excuse for his unbelief (i.e., there is some reason and basis to call the Bible into question)! The sinner can legitimately "excuse" himself from whole-hearted commitment to Christ for eternity if the inductive, historical apologetic proposed by Montgomery gets us anywhere at all (which it does not in the face of alternative religious remedies). If it were not a mistake of tragic import because of the stakes involved one might be slightly amused at Montgomery's impulsive yearning to "compare alternative interpretations of fact and determine on the basis of the facts themselves which interpretation best fits reality."[49] What "facts" should the unbeliever consider in order to be dissuaded from his process theology, from his animistic interpretations of natural phenomena, from his transmigration-of-souls interpretation of death, or even from his avatar-interpretation of the facts about Jesus? "Facts" as objective, empirical, historical events cannot by themselves affect any of these (or many other) religious outlooks, for those outlooks would be willing to agree with Montgomery on the simple eye-ball inspection or historical examination of the phenomena; however, different interpretations are still being offered for those agreed upon phenomena. Montgomery's apologetic has not gotten off the ground. Moreover, let us assume for Montgomery's benefit that this world were not religiously pluralistic after all. In an imaginary world where only Christianity offered religious interpretations for the 'facts' (in Montgomery's inductivist sense) the secularist would be the only opponent of true faith. Now Montgomery goes to town, whipping out all the flashy research, adducing exquisite probability arguments, appealing to nothing but what are accepted inductive procedures in all sciences (since these have to be used to retain meaningful knowledge of the past and operating existence in the future). To his dismay he would find that an educated critic could whittle down the impressiveness of that apologetic in short time; in terms of probabilities and inductive procedures alone the case, for instance, of Christ's resurrection is most unlikely, and there is nothing of any telling strength in the evidentialist's considerations to make one abandon the well documented evidence and reasonable inference that cadavers do not revive (see the outcome of Pinnock's arguments above in III.A.1). If you follow simple inductive apologetics out, the evidence is weak indeed; all the crucial factors can receive very plausible explanations by the open-minded, yet "scientifically" honest, critic. But let us assume (to pursue our imaginary world a bit further) that the evidentialist apologist could show the probability of Christ's resurrection to the secularist (and not be encumbered with Hindu or any of the other religious interpretations); after all that argumentation, and after all the leeway granted Montgomery in this imaginary world, still the unbeliever could justify his non-Christian stance by means of his (salient) starting point or presuppositions. The world could be viewed as less than locked into a natural uniformity of causes and subject at freak points to indeterminacy, in which case the resurrection is highly unusual but scientifically neutral; or the only laws which might be cautiously taken into one's inductive outlook might be statistical summaries, in which case the resurrection is simply one more (albeit odd) statistic for the calculator. Or (taking another tack) the inductivist could be quite pragmatic and refuse to be affected by the resurrection at all; after all, how does that strange occurrence in the past help me solve the practical problems of the present (and the oddities of the past, says the pragmatist, do not infer anything about apple pie in the sky for the future). Any number of other premises could be used to neutralize or naturalize Montgomery's sheer "fact" of the historical resurrection (although it's really not "fact," just probability). Therefore, in the long run it seems that Montgomery's third parable is actually destructive of his own apologetic approach. Montgomery does not take seriously the religious plurality of the world and their various interpretative enterprises; he overestimates the power of inductive procedures to adjudicate between interpretations on the basis of the facts and nothing but the facts, and he allows the unbeliever to justify his continued rebellion of mind even after the facts have been demonstrated. Whether in the real world or in the imaginary world (to oblige Montgomery) the unbeliever is not left "without excuse" if we take Montgomery's approach to apologetics.

6. Failure to Find Scriptural Support

Leaving Montgomery's third parable behind us (devouring its master) we should not fail to observe that his allusions to Scripture fall short of bearing up his apologetic method. Those he mentions are treated above in the evaluation of Pinnock's appeal to Scripture.[50] As explained there, the fact that Christ and the apostles performed miracles does not imply that inductive, historical validation of the Scriptural miracles is our central apologetic thrust. Far from it. God expects us to accept the word and witness of the apostles on their own Christ-given authority. It is a grave thing not to submit to the authority of apostolic proclamation (which is the source of our information, after all, about the miracles and resurrection, etc.), for that proclamation is self-attestingly God's word. It will be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah (with all their inordinate immorality) on the day of judgment than for those who will not receive the words of Christ's commissioned representatives.[51] Because God's word is self-attestingly authoritative and indubitable truth, we see that when God sought fallen Adam in the garden He did not expect that Adam would have to verify His existence, identity and veracity before coming to terms with the Lord. Instead of beginning with raw data that could be fed into Adam's self-sufficient process of making truth judgments and satisfy him autonomously that God's word bore at least a probable level of credibility, God directly addressed him with an indicting question, "Where are thou?" Adam's sin (self-law) and rebellion (casting off God's authority over him, even over his noetic activities) was immediately confronted. It is not God who needs an intellectual defense, but rather Adam! At the outset God demands from Adam an admission of wrong. The question of authority is paramount. Adam had sinned, not by acting contrary to inductive validation of God's hypothesis over against Satan's, but by bringing God's presupposed word into question. Accordingly the Lord does not bow to Adam's pseudo-authority and assumed prerogative to judge; He does not correct Adam's inductive or deductive errors in evaluation and thinking, but rather He forces the matter of authority ("Who told you that you were naked?") and expects self-renouncing admission of guilt for violating the sovereign command of the Lord. You see, the fall had not so altered human nature as to make man other than man (contrary to Flacius). Man was still the responsible image of God who had an irradicable knowledge of God and knew His Creator's word. If we assume that man's condition was now such that he needed autonomous verification of the Lord's word we would (akin to Flacius) overlook man's true humanity and render him less than God's special creation in the full Biblical sense; man would be viewed as fallen, yet not "without excuse" for disbelief and rebellion. Our apologetic must not assume that man's responsible knowledge of God has been lost (thus requiring autonomous corroboration of God's word to satisfy man's intellect). And at the other extreme our apologetic must just as much refuse to assume (akin to Romanism) that man's intellect has been virtually unaffected by the fall, thus granting overextended trust to his verification procedures and noetic abilities. Because the apologetic method set forth by Montgomery tends ironically toward the types of error found in both Flacius and Romanism with respect to man's fallen condition, we must draw back from it and follow the full Scriptural view of man in his actual epistemic and soteric exigency.

B. A Precautionary Word

Our examination of Montgomery's case against Van Til's presuppositionalism brings us to the conclusion that Montgomery's parables misrepresent Van Til's position; furthermore, in his critical commentary Montgomery has throughout failed to present viable considerations against presuppositionalism. Therefore, a presuppositional apologetic has not been shown to possess any telling difficulties. To the contrary it appears that Montgomery's own apologetic stance has been rendered feeble by his parables! The reasons for turning down Montgomery's conception of the apologetic task can be further developed in the remainder of this reply. But just to make sure that there is no misunderstanding of presuppositionalism inferred from the fact that inductive apologetics is criticized, let us take special note of the fact that a presuppositional approach does not exclude the use or appreciation of evidences (otherwise the excellent detail work done by men like Machen, Stonehouse, or Young would be senseless). However, one must not fail to understand the relation between presuppositions and evidence. Everybody has presuppositions and standards for judging; these presuppositions will themselves determine the strength and interpretation of evidence that is presented. However, people are not systems of thought and perfectly consistent in all that they do; therefore, the adequacy of presuppositions is sometimes doubted or examined, and people have been known to change their criteria for judgment. Personal volition, emotion, style of life, and numerous other factors will affect how people get along with their espoused presuppositions. This is quite obvious in the Christian life. For the Christian, God's existence, goodness, veracity and the like are all presuppositional matters; belief in these things is part of the defining characteristic of what it is to be a Christian. To call them into question is to call the genuineness of your profession of faith into question; thus they have a kind of "a priori" status (though based on objective revelation) and determine how we look at the world (i.e., are integral to our world and life view) and how we relate to states of affairs (i.e., interpret and respond to the "facts:). Yet the believer is, in this life, always between the Garden and New Jerusalem; that is, he is not in an unfallen condition, nor has he arrived at the point where he cannot sin. Adam was expected to not call the Lord's word into question; in the consummation state we will in fact not call God's truth into question. However, in this life we struggle in the process of sanctification; as sinners we hold our presuppositions imperfectly. The grace of our God is made ever so manifest in the fact that He is willing to help our unbelief by verifying His word in history; He helps us by giving evidence of His goodness and truth. That a posteriori evidence, however, functions as such only for the believer, that is, within the framework of revealed presuppositions; the evidence God offers in history does not affect the unbeliever, for his presuppositions are such that he suppresses and misinterprets the facts (as revelational of the God with whom he has to do). To encounter unbelief one must understand and work at the root "foolishness" that characterizes the outlook of the non-Christian. This does not mean that evidence is put aside or that the unbeliever's questions (e.g., about the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch or the origin of Paul's religion) are treated unresponsibly in obscurantist fashion. But it does mean that evidence alone (without a change of presuppositional viewpoint) cannot significantly affect the non-Christian who "naturalizes," "rationalizes," and simply reinterprets things when his basic commitment seems in jeopardy. The a posteriori evidence God offers has its significant affect in helping God's people, in aiding their weak faith, in bolstering their religious outlook or commitment; while the evidence is sufficient to condemn the unbeliever, it only has positive results in the thinking of the believer. This is why a scholar such as Dr. J. Gresham Machen, whose historical research and inductive apologetical concerns are akin to Montgomery's field of interest, recognized that his own primary audience was properly the church of Christ; an inductive approach has as its primary function the edifying and encouraging of God's people, not directly the persuasion of the unregenerate.

So I believe in the reasoned defence of the inspiration of the Bible...Its chief use is in enabling Christian people to answer the legitimate questions, not of vigorous opponents of Christianity, but of people who are seeking the truth and are troubled by the hostile voices that are heard on every hand...You see, what I am trying to do in such a lecture is not so much to win directly people who are opponents of the Bible as to give to Christian parents who may be present or to Christian Sunday-school teachers materials that they can use, not with those whose backs are up against Christianity, but with the children in their own homes or in their Sunday-school classes, the children who love them and want to be Christians as they are Christians, but are troubled by the voices against Christianity that are heard on every side. Yes, I certainly do believe in Christian apologetics...Certainly neglect of this work will be to the loss of countless precious souls.[52]

The effectiveness of the evidence is felt by the believer because he is thinking within the context of revelational presuppositions, but the historical evidences are insufficient in themselves (even theoretically) to change the unbeliever's mind because his thinking is guided by apostate presuppositions. If the non-Christian's presuppositions are granted, then he has adequate reason to reject a simple historical apologetic built up from inductive evidences; this is why our apologetic to the unregenerate must be made up of stronger material. However, we do not neglect the historical evidences; they do have their use for the Christian. He uses them to edify other believers and to give honest answers to detail questions from critics. In neither case though should he talk endlessly about facts and more facts without discussing the philosophy of fact or presuppositions which render the facts meaningful. Therefore, understanding the relation between evidence and presuppositions, the presuppositional apologist does endorse the proper use of evidence. We insist that Christian faith, anchored in God, deals with the area of fact which is open to scientific treatment.

C. An Assessment of Montgomery's Apologetic

With the message of the above paragraph fixed securely in mind we would go on to criticize the kind of inductive or evidential apologetic Montgomery thinks should be central in our encounters with unbelief. In The Philosophy of Gordon Clark Montgomery declares that one cannot begin with God without the benefit of "objectively discoverable historical facts" (p. 383); Christianity's "fortunes are thus (for good or ill) bound up with the fortunes of history" (p. 385). When one approaches the word of God he treats it as he would any other historical material;[53] although that would appear to reflect something of an a priori decision (i.e., to refrain from accounting Scripture as the self-attesting divine revelation which is, thereby, extremely different from "any other" historical material), Montgomery tells us that "it is necessary for us to evaluate, without a priori, the particular evidence for each alleged event, no matter how unique it is"[54]. The sort of event he has in mind here is a miracle (e.g., Christ's resurrection) such as would be recorded in the Bible. Montgomery thinks that the historical method is the same for all, irrespective of their religious commitments[55] - however, from the fact that he is continually criticizing the historical methods of other writers (e.g., Dilthey, et. al.) we can see that Montgomery should say instead that the historical method ought to be (not is) the same for all. Using the (allegedly) common and neutral method of historical investigation, Montgomery would ask the unbeliever simply to consider the "facts" with his reasonable use of reason, thereby finding compelling support for the truth of Scripture; making inductive argumentation which is rooted in evidence as foundational to his apologetic witness (rather than confirmatory of Christian faith), Montgomery would demonstrate the resurrection of Christ in attempt to move his opponent from the circle of unbelief by an irrestible case and perseverance of intellectually guided steps into the circle of Christian faith. He putatively offers "factually compelling evidence for the Christian truth-claim"[56] and models his apologetic on "objective evidence" which settles the dispute between the Christian and non-Christian "on the basis of the facts themselves."[57] "Proceeding on the basis of empirical method as applied to history, one can inductively validate the Christian revelation-claim and the Biblical view of total history."[58] As mentioned already, central to this objective and inductive validation of the veracity of God's word is historical argumentation for Christ's resurrection. The resurrection argument is said to be the fundament upon which all other apologetic defenses rest.[59] Not only is it the basis for taking Jesus Christ to be eternally divine, but the resurrection argument is so crucial to Montgomery's thinking in religious disputes and so determinative for locating divine truth that he crassly challenges his opponents, "I'm still calling for a resurrection on your part, or a deferral to the One who did rise from the dead"![60] The attesting value of the resurrection, shown to be as much a "fact" as Columbus' discovery of America, is very great;[61] indeed, Montgomery claims to have "shown that the evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is over-whelming in its force."[62] It should be clear to the reader by now what the basic thrust of Montgomery's apologetic would be. Insisting that we begin agnostically with objective, historical facts, Montgomery would treat the Bible as any other document and, without a priori, validate its truth by using the common empirico-historical method to evaluate the factually compelling, objective, evidence for Christ's resurrection - finding the case for it to have overwhelming force. By what is essentially a positivist method Montgomery would bring religious conviction to the unbeliever.[63] However, there is every reason for us not to anticipate a revival resulting from the use of Montgomery's approach.

1. Defective As an Argument

In the first place, putting aside more basic difficulties, Montgomery's argument for the resurrection is faulty. He claims to set forth "a very precise and confirmable argument,"[64] but on his own basis he offers neither precision nor confirmation. He himself formulates the argument for us and advances it in a number of places;[65] we give the rendering from The Shape of the Past:

1. On the basis of accepted principles of textual and historical analysis, the Gospel records are found to be trustworthy historical documents - primary source evidence for the life of Christ.

2. In these records, Jesus exercises divine prerogatives and claims to be God in human flesh; and He rests His claims on His forthcoming resurrection.

3. In all four Gospels, Christ's bodily resurrection is described in minute detail; Christ's resurrection evidences His deity.

4. The fact of the resurrection cannot be discounted on a priori, philosophical grounds; miracles are impossible only if one so defines them - but such definition rules out proper historical investigation.

5. If Christ is God, then He speaks the truth concerning the absolute divine authority of the Old Testament and of the soon-to-be-written New Testament; concerning His death for the sins of the world; and concerning the nature of man and history.

6. It follows from the preceding that all Biblical assertions bearing on philosophy of history are to be regarded as revealed truth, and that all human attempts at historical interpretation are to be judged for truth-value on the basis of harmony with Scriptural revelation.

When subjected to clear-headed cross examination the above case turns out to be non-telling unless one is predisposed to believe the conclusion anyway. Montgomery's arguments for the above premises are not substantially different from those used by Clark Pinnock, and we have already pointed out how easy it would be for an astute unbeliever to disarm and refute these considerations[66] Montgomery fills out his argumentative skeleton (the six steps just listed) in a number of places throughout his writings;[67] his considerations, just as with Pinnock, are readily dismissed as overstated, inconclusive, or gratuitous. The reader is referred to a discussion of this matter in our analysis of Pinnock. In addition to those observations, however, let us examine Montgomery's six apologetical steps themselves.

a. An Audit of Each Step

The first premise suffers from an inferential hiatus and conspicuous exaggeration. Montgomery attempts to give evidence pointing to the conclusion that we have in the extant New Testament documents an early picture of Christ; from that Montgomery goes on (without any supervening explanation or indication that a huge jump in argumentative development is transpiring) to designate the New Testament documents "an accurate portrait" of Christ and "reliable sources.[68] It should be easy to see, however, that the early character of a document tells us nothing about its positive reliability and accuracy (Joseph Smith's famous "golden plates" have very early authentication, but this fact certainly does not infer their trustworthiness - or even intelligibility for that matter!), or else two morning newspapers which conflict in their reporting of an event would both have to be accounted as reliable. But beyond this Montgomery is found overstating even the results of textual analysis. If he grants non-evangelicals an opportunity to be heard (and he must if he is true to his boast of neutral, common historical procedures) there is very little reason to conclude, as Montgomery does, that the evidence points to first-century, eyewitness accounts of Jesus. From an examination of textual-critical evidence Montgomery claims that "competent historical scholarship must regard the New Testament documents as deriving from the first century"[69] and that they "contain eyewitness testimony to the life and claims of Jesus."[70] However, the concrete evidence certainly does not take one to those conclusions at all. Even as conservative a scholar (relatively speaking) as Bruce Metzger indicates in a widely used, standard discussion of The Text of the New Testament (Oxford, 1968) that the only fragment of the New Testament we possess which predates circa 200 A.D. is papyrus 52, and it dates (based on the probabilities of script style) in the first half of the second century. All competent scholars do not even agree on that early dating. And even if you follow the conservative estimations you can get this fragment (with merely a portion of four verses) into the first century only by agreeing with Deissmann's own evaluation, landing on his indication that perhaps the fragment is even as early as Trajan's reign (although Deissmann's conviction was confident only to the point of Hadrian's reign), and then taking the very earliest years of his reign (98 or 99 A.D.) as your target point. This is far from having a unanimous vote from competent scholars that the New Testament documents are first century, eyewitness accounts! Instead you have one fragment, in one stream of evaluation, with an individual's estimation, taken to its furthest intimation of a period of time, and a choice of the earliest date within that period. But even this does not give eyewitness evidence. However, Montgomery may mean to say that the evidence we do possess (from the first half of the second century and around 200 A.D., etc) should take us in the direction of inferring the earlier, eyewitness sources for these later (presumably) copies (which are supposed to reflect accurately their autographa). Yet even here Montgomery would have to be seen as exaggerating: e.g., no competent scholar late-dates the Gospels, there is no doubt about their authorship, their dates of origin are beyond a shadow of a doubt, there is no present day competent scholarship which denies the Pauline authorship of that corpus of epistles attributed to him, the Dibelius-Bultmann type of criticism is widely recognized as outmoded and wrong, and indeed the divine Christ has withstood critical reconstructions.[71] Now while these evaluations are my own conclusions with respect to the New Testament, it is simply a distortion to say that the scholarly world as a whole is also in agreement with evangelical convictions on these matters; in fact there are men recognized as competent scholars who would dispute with evangelical conclusions. One looks in vain for the indications of support for the conservative viewpoint from a majority of schools of thought. One wonders how Montgomery could make the evaluations which he does in the above references when it is recalled that Thomas Altizier challenged him to the very opposite effect in their dialogue[72] - thereby certainly giving the impression that the vast majority of scholars would not accept the New Testament fully, as Montgomery does. Now I would fully agree that these man ought to agree with Montgomery's evangelical evaluation of Scripture, its documentary reliability, and eyewitness origin, but it is simply improper for Montgomery to represent those men as if they do accept those conclusions! Therefore, on Montgomery's evidentialist platform (calling for common, neutral methodology to confirm historically his argumentative premises), the first premise of his argument cannot be accepted; the range of historical scholarship does not establish the early, eyewitness character of the New Testament, and even if it did this fact would not infer the reliability of the accounts. And if Montgomery wants to restrict recognition of "competent" scholarship to those men or works which come to evangelical conclusions, then he has abandoned his neutrality altogether!

When we turn to examine Montgomery's second premise we see that it contains two basic ideas: Christ's claim to deity, and Christ's prediction of His resurrection. Remembering what was said about the first premise above, we have to see that when probabilistic evidence is weighed, there is some probability that Jesus never made these claims and predictions in the first place (i.e., it cannot be said with neutral, historical evidence that he did). Laying that crucial point aside, we would go on to observe (in simulated unbelieving style) that even the historical accuracy of the gospel records does not establish the authority or deity of Christ on his mere say-so. Moreover, the unbeliever need not be persuaded by Montgomery's argumentative dilemma: i.e., Jesus was either a charlatan or lunatic, if not truly divine, or his disciples were charlatans, lunatics, or naive exaggerators[73]. Now this is a false dilemma since there are other legitimate options (e.g., Jesus was teaching a new concept of God based on modified Eastern ideas, or an adoptionist messianism, etc.), but even accepting the terms of the dilemma the unbeliever can readily choose any of the options, while finding no obstruction in so doing from Montgomery's arguments.[74] Jesus or his disciples could have been deceptive on this one point (in order to achieve a more lasting impression for their otherwise noble ethic), holding to an end-justifies-means viewpoint (but of course prohibiting such leeway to their followers since, if everybody followed the practice, a lasting maximization of good could not result), or they could have done it to shake down either established Judaism (from its dead religious orthodoxy) or messianically imperishable Rome. On the other hand we could view Jesus (or, easier, his disciples) as having mental problems, says the astute unbeliever. Montgomery says we cannot avoid the conclusion that Jesus was a deranged schizophrenic who retreated from reality, and we cannot account for the fact that a psychiatrist sees Jesus' teachings as a blueprint for successful living and mental health, if He is not accounted as actually divine. The unbeliever's reply comes with no difficulty. Montgomery has to get away from his hopelessly outdated conception of mental illness. That a man has a particular mental problem does not necessarily mean he is irredeemably crazy or demented in everything he does or says; Jesus simply had one of many personality hangups expressed in a very unique way (one which certainly needs counsel, but hardly "whitecoats"; after all, his behavior is the key to treatment, and his behavior was far from psychotic). You call him a "schizophrenic"; so what is in a label? Even more, this particular label is so broadly interpreted today in psychiatry that many doctors feel it applies to all of us in one way of another. The same ploy can be directed at Montgomery's second point (the blueprint of mental health). Or from a different evaluative perspective the unbeliever could simply say, "Well that just goes to show you how messed up modern psychiatry is, when they will run after the ideas of Jesus!" On another hand, one could reply that other "experts" would disagree, saying that Christian ethics is unhealthy for effective personality, etc. Well on and on we could go, but the point is that one need not fall back from Montgomery's dilemma if he is an "educated" unbeliever. The possibilities and motives for the disciples being deceptive are explained in the analysis of Pinnock above.[75] They too could have had emotional problems while nevertheless having good intentions (thus taking Jesus teachings to the world, thinking him somehow divine). Or they might have been misled by Messianic expectations, though not of the "purer" strands discussed by Montgomery. Remember the Eastern and Roman worlds were very eclectic, and there was much cross fertilization of messianic ideas (the unbeliever might say); this accounts for the unique blend in the New Testament's messianic concept or confusion, depending on your viewpoint). Now while the writer finds none of the simulated responses of the unbeliever satisfactory to him (and certainly disagrees with them all), the fact remains that Montgomery cannot make any real point based on the claims of Jesus (or his followers) when arguing from a neutral position with an astute sinner. There is very little probability value in Montgomery's arguments if you are not inclined to agree with a Biblical perspective.

The second element of premise 2 in Montgomery's apologetic six-step was listed as Jesus' prediction of his own resurrection. There are definite problems with this consideration as well. The first is this. Montgomery wants to point out, as part of his demonstration of the resurrection and its significance, that Jesus predicted His own victory over the grave; Jesus rested His very claim to deity and authority on this prediction of His resurrection (further, that prediction would not only set up an interpretative context for the event, but it would serve to dissuade the critic from the idea that the resurrection was merely a weird, unexplainable, biological mishap that nobody expected - least of all Jesus). So this prediction is integral to Montgomery's argument. But Montgomery grants that the gospels were written from 30-65 years after Jesus' death[76]; taking these accounts "as nothing more than historical records"[77], how could we think that these men were able to recall (with precision) the words of Jesus or His predictions? We are talking in the range of half a century for memory lapse, imaginative embellishment, distortion, etc., and remember that the apostles would have been in old age by then (between 60 and 95 years old). Moreover, two of the four gospels were not written by apostles at all! So why should we trust the gospels that Jesus actually made these specific predictions or claims about Himself? Montgomery's answer is that Jesus gave His apostles "the gift of total recall"[78]. In the place where Montgomery says this, he recognizes that this answer assumes the deity and authority of Jesus; but to avoid circular reasoning Montgomery says that Jesus' divine authority is itself established by historical confirmation of His resurrection. That historical confirmation, Montgomery claims, "is accomplished by analyzing the New Testament documents...as nothing more than historical records"[79]. However, we have seen that the prediction of Jesus' own resurrection is itself part of Montgomery's argument for the resurrection and deity of Christ[80]. Thus the prediction is integral to the resurrection argument, but the prediction can only be accepted as credible if the apostles had total recall; yet total recall is an acceptable answer only if Jesus rose from the dead. So Montgomery's argument comes full circle! To avoid question-begging Montgomery must drop either (1) his making Jesus' prediction and claims as recalled by the apostles integral to the argument, or (2) the idea that he is treating the New Testament documents as nothing more than ordinary, common, unspecial records (for "total recall" over 65 years would most definitely be extraordinary!). Any reasonable man would demand this sort of integrity from Montgomery; we must not reason in vicious circles. Now if Montgomery chooses to drop #1, then we need not view the resurrection as having the significance or interpretation given it by Montgomery (that is, Christ's resurrection could be a weird, unanticipated mishap that does not confirm remarkable predictions or claims about himself); yet if Montgomery chooses to drop #2, then we do not have a neutral, historically objective argument! Thus contrary to his claims, Montgomery's "historical and philosophical demonstration" of the truth of Christ's resurrection does not have "an objective foundation which will stand up under the most exacting criticism";[81] his "case for Christianity" fails to demonstrate the deity of Christ in a religiously neutral fashion, for he cannot simultaneously have his neutrality and a deity-attesting resurrection. However, even if we forget all of the above, forget the question-begging and resultant dilemma, there would still be a crucial flaw in Montgomery's use of a prediction by Jesus to validate the Christian position. The problem is this: a fulfilled prediction does not infer deity in any normal sense on unbelieving, methodological assumptions. We would not say a man was God just because he correctly predicted what time he would get to work in the morning (looking at the clock as he goes out the door), or even because he correctly predicted the value of his stock two months in advance; neither proper evaluation of the factors involved in getting to work nor guess-work indicate divine character. But what if the prediction is self-referential? Well we are not inclined to consider Harry Houdini as God are we? Indeed, far from considering his amazing self-predicted escapes as proof of deity, we take them as indications of circus feats or trickery. Moreover, even if someone tried to pre-interpret his self-referential prediction, we properly could question his logic or suspect fraud or consider the prediction a "lucky guess." If some deranged person claimed that because he was a bird he could jump out of the airplane and not die, we would be silly to consider him a bird just because he (as others) did not happen to get killed when he hit the ground (an item for Ripley's "Believe it or not!" but certainly not a validation of deity)! Thus from a neutral standpoint, a fulfilled prediction does not demonstrate deity in itself.

Therefore, we must consider premise 2 of Montgomery's six-step argument as faulty; there is no apologetical value (the astute unbeliever will say) in either the claims of Christ to deity or His prediction of resurrection. Montgomery's argument with respect to the claims of Christ is a false dilemma because (1) the critic has other legitimate options, and (2) even the choices offered by Montgomery pose no real problem to the unbeliever; there is, then, no dilemma. Montgomery's argument with respect to the prediction of Christ fails for two reasons: (1) it involves question-begging taken in the whole context of his apologetic, and (2) even if it did not, it still would not carry the weight of any apologetically significant inference. And to top thinks off, this second premise in Montgomery's argument (with its mention of Christ's claims and prediction) is completely dependent upon the first premise (about the early date, and hence trustworthiness, of the New Testament documents). But that first premise was seen to be invalid due to factual exaggeration and unwarranted inference. So premise 2 is thoroughly debilitated.

When we come to premise 3 and go behind it to Montgomery's demonstration, we find the same faulty arguments utilized by Pinnock above. Montgomery things the unbeliever should affirm the historical resurrection of Christ, for: how do you explain the empty tomb otherwise,[82] how do you account for the growth of Christianity otherwise,[83] and how could the disciples be considered psychologically or ethically capable of lying?[84] All three of these questions are more than satisfactorily answered from the non-Christian perspective in III.A.1, and the reader is merely referred there for refutation of Montgomery. The lack of any historical evidence against the resurrection is mentioned by Montgomery,[85] but this consideration is erroneous and non-telling. In the very documents which Montgomery takes as authentic we find testimony against the resurrection (e.g., the soldiers claimed that the disciples stole the body, the religiously esteemed members of society were unconvinced and opposed the disciples, the Athenian intellectuals scoffed, and many people were not compelled to believe). Moreover, even a genuine lack of evidence can be explained either by the efficiency of the disciples' deceptive activities (i.e., committed the "perfect" crime when stealing the body) or by the suppression of evidence once Christianity gained political leverage in the Roman world (can anyone really doubt that this sort of thing was beyond the corrupt popes?). But all of this is really beside the point. Belief in the resurrection cannot be built on an argument from silence, but rather the burden of proof is on Montgomery to deliver solid evidence and show just cause for thinking that the empirical uniformity of nature has actually been broken in history. He cannot turn the tables and expect his opponent to disprove what appears to be a scientifically ridiculous claim. Thus the lack of contrary evidence is (1) erroneous, (2) understandable, and (3) apologetically insignificant. Montgomery is not beyond question-begging either in his argument for the resurrection. His own predisposition to believe is quite evident when, in light of the fact that he does not think absolute certainty can be arrived at either for or against the resurrection, he dismisses naturalistic explanations of the resurrection accounts in the New Testament as "infinitely more improbable than the Resurrection itself."[86] But those holding to the naturalistic accounts (e.g., the swoon theory) certainly think that a miraculous event is the thing that is infinitely more improbable (and indeed there is far more statistical evidence from history and empirical accountability for men living through execution attempts on rare occasions, especially when it has been a rushed attempt, than there is for men coming to life three days after their death!). But even beyond the fact that Montgomery's arguments all fail to demonstrate a historical resurrection of Jesus (on neutral methodological principles) there is the inferential hiatus which ,is involved in alleging that Christ's resurrection evidences His deity or establishes His truthfulness.[87] The movement of thought, "Resurrection, therefore God" or "Resurrection, therefore total infallibility," simply does not follow. So even if Montgomery could demonstrate the historical resuscitation of a cadaver, his argument would still be logically crippled. Indeed, Montgomery himself has to admit that his inferences could be unfounded;[88] and when he goes on to say about contrary inferences from the evidence that "such probabilities are extremely small", his question-begging is again evident. Montgomery's contention that Jesus' own explanation of His resurrection should be preferred[89] is disputed in our discussion of premise 2 above. If a man happened to be the lone survivor from an ocean liner which went down at sea, the only person who did not drown before rescuers arrived, should we accept his demented conclusion, "well then, I must be in reality a fish"? Or imagine a woman living in Hiroshima and overtaken by surprise with the dropping of the atomic bomb; the next thing she is aware of is being treated in a Red Cross hospital, the doctors telling her that all her neighbors were killed and her city destroyed by the bomb. Now if she should conclude that she must be the Sinto goddess, Amaterasu-omikami, because she survived the blast, would we think that she was "in a better position to explain how this happened"[90] than the doctors? The unbeliever would answer with an unequivocal "no!" Therefore, premise 3 in Montgomery's six-step apologetic must be rejected because: (1) his arguments can be refuted, and (2) even if his arguments stood, the premise involves a breach of logic, an inferential hiatus, which sabotages the train of thought. Moreover, premise 3 completely depends on the acceptability of premise 1, which has been undermined already, and so breaks down altogether.

In premise 4 Montgomery wishes to point out the rationalistic or scientistic presupposition which lies behind any discounting of miracles a priori. To the opponent who argues that no amount of historical study could yield more than a picture of Jesus as a very remarkable man, Montgomery says "This argument rests on the rationalistic presupposition that God could not become man"[91]. But somehow Montgomery has overlooked that his opponent can have exactly the same repudiation of Montgomery's own outlook; "Your argument rests on the mythological presupposition that God could become man! Premise 4 is not going to stop the astute unbeliever. Montgomery offers an example to show why one should reject Hume's a priori dismissal of miracles[92]; if you follow Hume, says Montgomery, you would justify the Lilliputians' (imagined) refusal to believe in Gulliver's existence even though he were right before their very eyes! But by failing to realize the significance of the fact that men today do not see the resurrected Christ before their empirical eyes but must rest belief on written testimony, Montgomery can have his example twisted around and directed at his position. The unbeliever might well point out that his own situation is not akin to that of a Lilliputian who is called upon to believe Gulliver's existence (i.e., the non-Christian does not confront Christ as did Thomas) but that his situation is really much more like that of Captain Pedro de Mendez who was called upon by Gulliver to believe in the existence of the Lilliputians, et. al. (i.e., the non-Christian confronts testimony to the most unusual sort of thing, a resurrection). When looked at from this perspective (which is really what took place in the novel, not what Montgomery has to imagine might have taken place) and remembering how Gulliver argues so strenuously for his veracity in the last chapter of the novel, the tables have really been turned on Montgomery! Jonathan Swift published "Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World, by Lemuel Gulliver" (i.e., Gulliver's Travels as it comes to be known) in the form of an actual autobiographical travel adventure; except for a very few close friends, nobody knew who the anonymous author really was. The "Travels" were accompanied by a testimony from the Publisher, Richard Sympson which corrects all of the errors in the publisher's account of the travels. We have all the trappings of an accurate historical account; historical circumstances (even dates and geography), eyewitness accounts, character witness, an apology for the author's veracity, and even a correction of possible distortions! Now then, the unbeliever asks, is Montgomery prepared to believe in the existence of the Lilliputians, or does he discount them on a priori philosophical grounds? The farce here is painfully apparent to all - because Swift's satire did come to be known as just that: Swift's work (not Gulliver's), and a satire (not eyewitness history). Thus the unbeliever is not disturbed by premise 4 in Montgomery's argument; he had reason (even before Swift's was revealed) not to assume the existence of Lilliputians, and he has reason not to assume the possibility of resurrections. The difference between himself and Montgomery, the unbeliever will say, is the difference between scientific scrutiny and mythological credulity. Montgomery, no less than the sceptic, has his presuppositions of what is possible and what is not. Furthermore, are we to believe that Montgomery would really have affirmed the existence of the Lilliputians had not Swift's secret accidentally got out to the public? If he would not have, then Montgomery's presupposition is seen to be not only unscientific (because it allows resurrections) but biased and inconsistent (because had Swift's secret not been found out Montgomery still would not have allowed for the existence of the Lilliputians). And if Montgomery would have believed in the Lilliputians you can be sure the non-Christian would write off his scholarly credibility altogether! There is one final problem with premise 4. Even if Montgomery could establish that "history and not philosophy must answer" whether miracles have happened[93], even if one could investigate the facts without an a priori and determine objectively whether some alleged event is historical or not, we can still not avoid the truth that it is philosophy, not neutral historiography, which determines what you make of the "brute facts." Thus a demonstration of the resurrection might not be discounted by the willing unbeliever on philosophical grounds, but he still need not interpret the resurrection as having the significance Montgomery attributes to it. Thus premise 4, like the previous three, proves to be unsatisfactory: (1) it can be reversed against Montgomery's own position, (2) it could show him to be tendentious in his conclusions, and (3) it is apologetically non-telling (since it does not challenge the unbeliever's interpretation of history or the "facts").

Little needs to be said with respect to the obvious unacceptability of premise 5 in Montgomery's argument. From the non-Christian's perspective, the assertion that "If Christ is God, then He speaks the truth..." amounts to simple question-begging, for Montgomery's assertion assumes the Christian conception of God (who cannot lie, who is omniscient, and who is inerrant in all His pronouncements). There are plenty of other conceptions of god to choose from, and these conceptions do not include the idea of infallibility and complete honesty! If Christ is god in the ancient Greek sense, then we might well wonder if his assertions are trustworthy or accurate at all. The unbeliever can easily counter Montgomery's fifth premise with the questioning attitude of Plato's Euthyphro. Modifying the question in one respect, but maintaining the same attitude toward the gods, the unbeliever can follow Socrates in wanting to know what the truth is irrespective of whatever the gods may say. Therefore, the simple fact that Christ is formally designated "God" does not imply anything with respect to his truthfulness or reliability about the authority of the Old and New Testaments, the significance of His death, or the nature of man and history. Montgomery's premise begs the very question at hand: whether the Christian teaching about the God situation is true or not. If one is really going to be unbiased in his use of the empirico-historical method, if one is going to be objective in his approach to the simple facts, then he cannot import the Christian idea of God at the presuppositional level. If our assumptions are only methodological in character, not substantive, then we cannot allow a veiled presupposition of the Christian view of God to confer truth on the Old Testament, the New Testament, the interpretation of Christ's death, the Biblical teaching on man's nature, or the Biblical teaching on the nature of history. Montgomery must, in all intellectual honesty, validate each of these items point by point with rigorous and painstaking inductive argumentation. Premise 5 is an illegitimate short-cut. The conclusion of Montgomery's argument comes in premise 6; its main thrust is this: "It follows from the preceding that all Biblical assertions...are to be regarded as revealed truth..." But our analysis of the foregoing argumentation, represented in premises 1 to 5, has shown each one of them to be defective, thus depriving Montgomery of his conclusion altogether. It certainly does not "follow" from these five faulted assertions that the Bible is correct in all that it says. The only thing which follows is the ineffectiveness of a neutral, inductive apologetic in dealing with an astute sinner. One final observation should be made about premise 6 (Montgomery's conclusion to the argument). Even if we put aside the fact that each of the previous five premises is unsatisfactory in itself, it still would not logically follow that premise 6 is true. Montgomery's argument lacks the necessary transitions from premise to premise to produce the sixth assertion by means of logical calculus. However, he admits that his argument does not meet the demands of formal logic.[94] This of course is no credit to his argument! However, even granting him the looseness of argumentation that he desires, the sixth assertion still does not "follow" in any reasonable sense, and this is because of the numerous illegitimate inferences embodied in the previous five premises. The earliness of the New Testament documents does not infer their trustworthiness, and their composition by Jesus' disciples does not infer their reliable recording of His words. The resurrection of Jesus does not infer His deity, and His deity does not infer His truthfulness. Upright, inductive, and objective methodology demands that these assertions be made by anyone who comes to the "brute facts" without substantive presuppositions inclined toward the acceptance of Christianity. Thus premise 6 does not even loosely follow from numbers 1 to 5, even if we forget the various other difficulties already noted in regard to those previous premises! Therefore, at every step along the way Montgomery's apologetical argument is thwarted. It turns out to be neither "very precise" nor "confirmable."[95] (N.B. I would repeat that, while I personally agree with the views expressed in Montgomery's six premises, it is from an unbelieving perspective and based on "neutral" methodology that Montgomery's apologetic argument has to be seen as sterile.)

b. Conceptual Criticism

Having seen that Montgomery's intention is to produce an objective, historical and overwhelming argument for the resurrection of Christ which does not use substantive presuppositions, we went on to examine that argument for the resurrection with respect to its particular steps and backing, finding it not very overwhelming. We turn now to examine that argument more on the level of conception (rather than particular outworking) in order to determine further its effectiveness as an apologetic for the Christian faith.

1. Internal Conflict

The first comment we would make is that it seems Montgomery is unable to distinguish between the historic character of Biblical events and the empirical historical method of ascertaining truth;[96] for example, he fallaciously moves from the fact that the resurrection is objective Historie to a criticism of evangelicals like Ramm and Ladd for not thinking that the resurrection has demonstrable, solid, historical facticity (in the modern sense) which must be established by the searchlight of objective, historical criticism, thereby producing a rational, religious certainty apart from the internal witness of the Holy Spirit! Secondly we note that Montgomery is involved in the troublesome inconsistency of using a method of ascertaining truth which assumes the uniformity of nature (i.e., inductivism) in order to demonstrate an event which proves the non-uniformity of nature (i.e., a miraculous resurrection)! Montgomery is enmeshed in using a principle of continuity (between historical particulars, so that they be linked together in inductive argumentation) to establish the truth of discontinuity (the uniqueness of the resurrection, not naturalistically caused). When Montgomery wants to verify that the resurrection very probably occurred as a unique or miraculous event, he is divided against himself. So we see that Montgomery's conception of apologetics incorporates fallacious inference as well as self-vitiating inconsistency on the methodological level.

The dialectical tension in Montgomery's apologetic procedure is painfully evident. On the one hand he has to assume that the world is such that argumentative probability resting upon inductive examination of evidence can be established, but on the other hand he has to utilize metaphysical assumptions which will allow for uncaused, unique events in history. His historical inductivism leads to probability judgments based upon the assumption of metaphysical determinism (natural uniformity); hence he can objectively argue about historical events. But then the astute unbeliever who also works in the area of historical study tells Montgomery that the uniformity of nature precludes a resurrection from the dead, so Montgomery has to run to the other pole in his thinking and justify the possibility of a miracle by assuming metaphysical indeterminism. But if this appears to deprive the resurrection of its significance as well as our ability to verify it, Montgomery runs back to the former pole in his thinking: natural uniformity and determinism. On and on the pattern continues; every time an opponent renders a crucial attack on Montgomery's position he runs to the opposite corner, waiting for the counter-attack and then running back to the first corner. This rationalism-irrationalism, determinism-indeterminism, continuity-discontinuity runaround might seem to be apologetically valuable, protecting Montgomery from all angles of attack and rendering his position unassailable; since there are contradictory elements in his system of thought he has an answer for anybody! He has his cake (miracles) and can eat it too (probability). But far from being a boon to his apologetic, this dialectical tension in Montgomery's position really renders it doubly weak, open to criticism from both directions, and assailable at both poles. His apologetic is scuttled at the point of his probabilism as well as at the point of his indeterminism. After we see this we will have to conclude that, even at the level of conception, Montgomery's apologetic cannot establish the miraculous resurrection of Christ as a validation of His deity.

aa. Probabilism Faulted

Let us first examine the use of probability in Montgomery's apologetic. He desires to show that Christ very probably rose from the dead. To do this he chooses to follow the empirico-historical method, objectively examine the evidence without any religious commitment one way or the other; hereby he would put a solid empirical base under the Christian world-view. However, he recognizes that taking this route exacts its tolls; one simply cannot have certainty with respect to knowledge of either history or the present[97]. Certainty can only be attained in mathematics and formal logic, says Montgomery; all significant, synthetic knowledge about genuine states of affairs (past, present, or future) must remain at the level of mere probability in the nature of the case. This distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is central to Montgomery's plea for the acceptability of mere probability in historical judgments:

Tillich missed the vital insight offered by contemporary analytic philosophy in its distinction between analytic (purely formal) and synthetic (content) judgments; only the latter, based on experiential investigation of the world, can provide substantive knowledge of reality. If one intends, therefore, to speak of religious or historical meaning, he must offer concrete evidence...Granted, only a high level of probability can ever be adduced in support of such synthetic claims; but to demand absolute certainty is to obtain pure formality and thus no knowledge of the world at all...All our verifiable knowledge of the world, present or past, is based on the sifting of experiential data, and just as in ordinary life we must constantly jump the gap between probability and certainty by faith, so in the religious realm we have no right to demand - much less any expectation of acquiring - a certainty transcending the probabilities of historical evidence.[98]

Absolute truth...is possible only in formal logic...and these formal systems are absolute only because they are so defined and insofar as they stand independent of empirical experience. The moment the realm of experience is introduced, "absolute," "unalterable" results become impossible...[99]

Only deductive logic and pure mathematics provide "apodictic certainty,." and they do so because they stem from self-evident formal axioms...involving no matter of fact. The moment we enter the realm of fact, we must depend on probability...[100]

Only the tautology (if A then A) can be proved true, and proof of its truth is possible only because the tautology makes no statement of fact. In the case of every theory involving statements of fact, proof is impossible...Since this is so, all science and history - indeed all intelligent decision between alternative theories, beliefs, ideologies, must rest squarely upon probability. The rational man, when confronted with a problem of fact, must ask himself two questions: (1) What is the probable validity of the present evidence for and against the notion, (2) What is the probability of future data arising to negate the force of present evidence for or against the notion.[101]

With this analytic/synthetic distinction in mind, Montgomery asks "the rational man" to apply the inductive method to the stuff of experience in order that he might know and affirm the truth of the Bible. But how can he be expected to know and affirm such truthfulness if certainty is out of reach? Montgomery's answer amounts to this, "Who needs certainty?" As Harvard logician Willard van Orman Quine has soundly pointed out, one doesn't need to put supports under every inch of a roof in order to hold it fully and completely up."[102] Now the utterly amazing thing about