PE041
(distributed by the Session of St. Paul
Presbyterian Church, Jackson, MS, 1978), Covenant Media Foundation,
800/553-3938
Rev. Greg
L. Bahnsen, Th.M., Ph.D.
The editor
of the Presbyterian Journal is to be
thanked for introducing to his readers two vital theological questions relevant
to the modern church: the questions of ethics and eschatology. Such matters bear directly on the lifestyle
and hope of believers and, thus, are a concern to us all. In two lead articles and two main editorials
which spread over three issues in volume 20 of the Journal (9-6, 9-13, 9-20)
the editor has cordially and charitably given his own view of a particular
outlook in eschatology (postmillennialism) and in ethics (theonomy), both of
which I espouse. As a teacher of
theology I rejoice at such healthy interaction and criticism regarding our
doctrinal commitments. We must, in the
Berean spirit (Acts 17:11), “prove all things, hold fast that which is good” (I
Thes. 5:21).
I will
begin by discussing the theonomic outlook in ethics, responding to the editor’s
understanding and critique, and then later turn to the question of
postmillennial eschatology, again offering an answer to the editor’s remarks.
The most blessed
teaching of God’s word and the central joy of my life is that God sent His
only-begotten Son to save sinners such as myself. When I became a Christian, it was with a sense of my sin and
misery before God. Because of the
Spirit’s work in my heart I recognized that “every sin . . . being a
transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its
own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath
of God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death” (Westminster
Confession of Faith VI.6; hereafter “WCF”).
Hereby I saw my need of the Savior freely offered to me in the gospel
and embraced Him in faith. Accompanying
this saving faith in Christ there was a repentance unto new life in Him. “By
it, a sinner, out of the sight and sense not only of the danger, but also of
the filthiness and odiousness of his sins, as contrary to the holy nature, such
as are penitent, so as grieves for, and hates his sins, as to turn from them
all unto God, purposing and endeavoring to walk with Him in all the ways of His
commandments” (WCF XV.2). Such
repentance gave meaning to my “accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ
alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life”; in terms of this
conception of saving faith I found myself “yielding obedience to the commands,
trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises of God for this life
and that which is to come” as they were found in God’s inspired word (WCF
XIV.2).
Because I
came to Christ in this fashion it was only natural that, upon reflection, I
would take a theonomic approach to ethics – seeing the binding validity of
God’s commandments in my life today.
The conviction of my sin, which was prerequisite to coming to Jesus as
Savior, was possible only because of God’s holy law. “Sin is lawlessness” (I Jn. 3:4); “I had not known sin except
through the law” (Rom. 7:7). John
Murray said, “The word ‘ought’ can have no meaning apart from a rule or
standard of right, that is apart from law . . .. Sin then is moral evil because it is a contravention of that
which by its own right, apart from any extraneous considerations, binds and
demands . . .. The law that sin
violates is the law of God” (Collected
Writings II, pp. 77, 78). Without
God’s law there would be no sin, and thus no need for the Savior; the gospel
would be expendable. The fact that
Christ had to die to satisfy the law’s demand is dramatic proof that God’s
commandments cannot be laid aside, changed, or ignored.
My
salvation is not grounded in my own law-obedience, but rather in that of Christ
(Gal. 3:11; Rom. 5:19). The Pharisees
had made a religious show of adhering to the law, but it was a mere façade –
vain hypocrisy (Matt. 15:7-9). In
actual fact the Pharisees avoided the internal demand of the law, avoided its
weightier matters, and perverted its teaching (Matt. 5:21-48; 22:23-24). They were, like many teachers today, blind
guides who trimmed down the requirements of God’s la so as to make it fit into
their own cultural tradition (Matt. 15:3-6, 14). Their form of obedience was a self-serving way of justification
(Luke 16:15; 18:9-14) that left them full of iniquity, despite appearances
(Matt. 23:27-28). Accordingly their
trimmed down, self-centered righteousness could not ever bring entrance into
the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 5:20). If
they had genuinely upheld the integrity and demand of the law, they would not
have been driven to legalism but to the Savior. J. Gresham Machen put it well: “A low view of law always brings
legalism in religion; a high view of law makes a man a seeker after grace. Pray God that the high view may again
prevail” (What is Faith?, p. 142).
So then,
the law which convicted me of my ungodliness and my need of God’s Son was a
reflection of God’s own perfect, holy character (Ps. 19:7; Matt. 5:48; Rom.
7:12; Rev. 15:4). Those who despise and
break that law, then, can have no fellowship with God; the law can no more be
put aside than God himself can be. “The
law of God is simply the expression or transcript of his moral perfection for
the regulation of thought and life consonant with his perfection . . .. Herein appears the perverseness of the idea
that the moral law may be abrogated and is superseded by love” (Murray, II, p.
78). If God never meant for us to
comply with this law, His wrath and curse would have been an arbitrary and
instrumental play-acting. So Dabney
maintained, “Everywhere, the law which we are still required to obey, is the
same law which, by its perfectness, condemned us” (Systematic Theology, p. 633).
Those who know Jesus Christ as their Savior from sin cannot, therefore,
deny the validity and place of God’s law today.
After I
came to Christ in faith and repentance, experiencing thereby the pardon of God
for my transgressions of His holy law, the natural question became, how should
a Christian live? I praise God for my
reformed church training which taught me that those who have a new heart “are
further sanctified, really and personally, through the virtue of Christ’s death
and resurrection, by His Word and Spirit dwelling in them . . . strengthened in
all saving graces, to the practice of true holiness, without which no man shall
see the Lord” (WCF XIII.1). For this
reason I was taught to obey the commandments of God, looking to Scripture for
my guidance rather than to myself as a sinner who was attuned to a fallen
culture. Dabney insisted, rightly I
believe, that “the preaching and expounding of the Law is to be kept up diligently,
in every gospel Church” (S. T., p. 354).
Such an emphasis is far from incompatible with a religion of free grace
held Dabney: “the view I have given of the Law, as the necessary and unchanging
expression of God’s rectitude, shows that its authority over moral creatures is
unavoidable . . .. It is therefore
simply impossible that any dispensation, of whatever mercy or grace, could have
the effect of abrogating righteous obligation over God’s saints” (p. 353).
A.A. Hodge
agreed that this was the outlook of our Confession. While Christ fulfilled the law for us, the Holy spirit fulfills the law in us, by sanctifying us into complete conformity to it. And in obedience to this law the believer
brings forth those good works which are the fruits though not the ground of our
salvation” (The Confession of Faith,
p. 251). Samuel Bolton a participant at
the Westminster Assembly wrote: “We cry down the law in respect of
justification, but we set it up as a rule of sanctification. The law sends us to the Gospel that we may
be justified; and the Gospel sends us to the law again to inquire what is our
duty as those who are justified” (The
True Bounds of Christian Freedom, p. 71).
Because Christ is not simply my Savior, but simultaneously my Lord, it
is incumbent upon me to live in obedience to His commandments (Heb. 5:9).
In
sanctification I am to imitate the holiness of God, expressed in His law. “Sanctify yourselves, therefore, and be ye
holy, for I am the Lord your God. And
ye shall keep my statutes and do them” (Lev. 20:7-8; cf. 19:2 and I Peter
1:15-16). To attempt to be sanctified
apart from this standard is to challenge the Lordship of God my Savior. Murray explains that “every depreciation of
the law of God as the pattern in terms of which sanctification is fashioned
invariably leads to the adoption of patterns which impinge upon the unique
prerogatives of God” (II, p. 307). In
sanctification I strive to live according to the example of Christ, who kept
the law perfectly (I Jn. 2:5-6; Jn. 15:10).
In sanctification I live by the power and leading of the Holy spirit who
conforms me to the law. Christ
“condemned sin in the flesh in order that the ordinance of the law might be
fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit” (Rom. 8:4). Therefore, whether we consider the holiness
of God, the life of the Son, or the work of the Spirit, sanctification finds
its blueprint or pattern in God’s
law. The basis for sanctification, however, is not the law (as the editor
portrays my view, 9-13, p. 9b) but the dynamic ministry of God’s indwelling
Spirit (Gal. 3:3) – as indicated by the Confession of Faith cited above.
What the
above discussion indicates is that since Christians, living under the Lordship
of Christ the Savior, are to avoid sinning (I Jn. 2:1), they must be concerned
to obey the law of God (cf. Rom. 3:20).
“He that saith, I know Him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar,
and the truth is not in him” (I Jn. 2:4; cf. 3:24). A.A. Hodge wrote in his commentary on the Confession: “In respect
to regenerate men, the law continues to be indispensable as the instrument of
the Holy Ghost in the work of their sanctification. It remains to them an inflexible standard of righteousness, to
which their nature and their actions ought to correspond” (p. 258). In his 1841 Lectures on the Shorter Catechism, Ashbel Green declared that
believers are fully under the law of God “as a rule of duty; and they account
it their happiness and privilege to be so” (II, p. 16); such language merely
reflected the commentary edited by Erskine and Fisher in 1765. In a similar vein Herman Bavinck wrote that
“the moment we have learned to know that other righteousness and holiness which
God has given in Christ and which through faith He makes our own, our attitude
towards the law and our sense of its significance changes entirely . . .. We let the law stand in its exalted
sublimity, and make no effort to pull it down off its high pedestal. We
continue to honor it as holy and righteous and good . . .. We delight in it according to the inner man. And we thank God not for the gospel only but
also for his law, for His holy, righteous, perfect law. That law too becomes to us a revelation and
a gift of His grace. How love I Thy
law; it is my meditation all the day” (Our
Reasonable Faith, p. 490).
There is no
evidence adduced by the editor from my book, Theonomy in Christian Ethics, to warrant his bald claim that I give
a different content to the Psalmist’s words, “O how love I Thy law,” than
originally intended (9-13 p. 18b). The
meaning of that exclamation is expounded above, in harmony with my book. The implication of that teaching, again as
reflected in my book, can be stated in the words of John Murray, from his
article “The Christian Ethic”: “Do we recoil from the notion of obedience, of
law observance, of keeping commandments?
Is it alien to our way of thinking? If so, then our Lord’s way is not
our way. That is the issue and it is
surpassingly grave. It is the issue of
our day and it is aimed at the center of our holy faith. It is aimed at the Savior’s self-witness and
aimed at his supreme example. Anew,
therefore, may we appreciate the ethic that is derived from him who said: ‘I
delight to do thy will, O my God: yea, thy law is within my heart’ (Psalm
40:8), and that follows in the train of a psalmist who said: ‘O how love I thy
law! It is my meditation all the day’ (Psalm 119:97), and of an apostle: ‘I
delight in the law of God after the inward man . . . So then with the mind I
myself serve the law of God’ (Rom. 7:2, 25)” (Collected Writings I, p. 181).
From this
quote we can also see how fallacious is the editor’s remark that from the very
fact that Theonomy was published and
argues against other views of law in relation to grace, its author intends to
say something different and obviously
thinks he is proposing something new
(9-13, p. 10c); otherwise, says the editor, the Westminster Confession would
suffice and Theonomy would be
superfluous (9-13, p. 18b). These
remarks are neither materially true nor reasonably inferred. As Murray points out, a supremely grave
issue of our day that threatens the heart of our Christian faith is the current
antagonism expressed to obedience to God’s law. This antagonism calls us to appreciate anew the biblical ethic of
God’s law. That is why I penned Theonomy:
not to go beyond the Confession, but to uphold and defend the position of the
Confession regarding Christian ethics.
The editor’s remarks notwithstanding, I did not intend to present a viewpoint which was new and different, but
simply to argue biblically and consistently for the Confessional viewpoint I
have always known and loved. It is not
any inadequacy in the Confession’s position but rather the current crisis in
Christian ethics that solicited the publication of a book like Theonomy.
(The same could be said, obviously, for any number of books
published after the Confession of Faith in exposition and defense of a reformed
viewpoint in many areas of theology).
We have
observed in the previous discussion that because Jesus is my Savior, the
validity of God’s law must be upheld; and because Jesus is my Lord, it is
imperative to strive to obey the law of God as the pattern of my
sanctification. As saved, I have become
the disciple of Christ and aim to live a disciplined life under His direction. The law which I was formerly obligated to
obey, but failed as an unbeliever to do so (thus necessitating the work of the
Savior), is still the proper rule for my life as a believer indwelt by the Holy
Spirit. In light of this, I do not understand the editor’s exposition of Theonomy as teaching that once someone
is saved the law takes on a different
dimension wherein obedience becomes a must,
and wherein the law is now both the pattern and
the rule of life (9-13, p. 10a). The
distinction between pattern and rule needs explanation. But more importantly, obedience to the law
is a “must” for all men, saved or unsaved; it does not become a “must” after
salvation. Failure to obey the law
defines that sin which calls for the alien and imputed righteousness of Christ
– a righteousness in perfect obedience to the law – if one is to be justified
by faith; subsequently, in the power of Christ’s Spirit, the believer attains
personal righteousness in some measure by obeying the very same required law. Moreover, since our justification and our
sanctification are both according to God’s grace, I fail to see the “different
dimension” of the law referred to by the editor. Thus I doubt that he was there expounding accurately my own
views.
Well then, we
have said that the Christian life is one disciplined by the law of God. The editor has said, to the contrary, that
the disciplined life is a matter of proper motivation and direction – not a matter of a written code or a
catalogue of specifics for behavior (9-20, p. 10b). The necessity and place of God’s written code in the believer’s
sanctification has been explained and vindicated already in our discussion of
Scripture and the Confession, I believe.
Let me go on to observe, then, that the misdirection of the editor’s
remark is perhaps to be found in his pitting of the goal (direction) and motive
(motivation) of Christian ethics against the standard (written law) of
Christian ethics. In reality the three
perspectives require each other (cf. C. Van Til’s Christian-Theistic Ethics).
We are to have God’s glory and kingdom as the goal of our behavior (I
Cor. 10:31; Matt. 6:33). In all our
thoughts, words, and deeds we are to be motivated by faith and love (Rom.
14:23; Matt. 22:37-40). However, please
note that such moral considerations are delivered by the Author of the law;
indeed, they are given themselves as commandments by the Author of the law;
indeed, they are given themselves as commandments from God. They do not stand over against the law of God,
as though we are to choose between them and the commandments. After all, God is consistent with Himself
and has not revealed divergent paths of morality in the Bible. As things actually are in life, we cannot
determine which of our actions seeks
the glory of God and is consonant with love unless God’s law guides us into the
paths of righteousness. Obedience to
God’s righteous law is the way to glorify Him (Phil. 1:11), and it is the
specific form of Christian love (Jn. 14:15; I Jn. 5:3). Therefore, the disciplined life of the
believer is one of obedience to the written law of God (note how “disciplining”
is connected with “teaching to observe whatsoever I have commanded” in the
Great Commission, Matt. 28:18-20). In
that case the editor has set before us a false antithesis and choice.
Jesus, as
both Savior and Lord, does not dispense with the law of God, as we have seen
above. According to the Confession, He
does not dissolve it in any way in the Gospel but rather much strengthens its
obligation (XIX.5). Bavinck said, “the
gospel does not make the law of no effect, but restores and establishes it . .
.. The righteousness of the law, that
which the law asks in its commandments, is fulfilled precisely in those who do
not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit (Rom. 8:4) . .
.. For Jesus and for the apostles the
will of God . . . continues to be known from the Old Testament . . .. The moral laws retain their force . .
.. Hence again and again that Old
Testament is quoted in order to cause the Christian church to know the will of
God . . .. In other words, the moral
law is, so far as its content is concerned, quite the same in the Old and the
New Testament” (Our Reasonable Faith,
pp. 484, 485). Likewise, Dabney wrote
with respect to Christ and the law; “we deny that He made any change or
substantial addition . . .. Christ
honored this law, declared it everlasting and unchangeable . . .. The moral law could not be completed,
because it is as perfect as God, of whose character it is the impress and
transcript. It cannot be abrogated or
relaxed, because it is as immutable as He” (S.T.,
p. 357).
When God
delivered His law in the Old Testament He indicated that it was not to become
outmoded or invalidated. “Whatever I
command you, you shall be careful to do; you shall not add to nor take away
from it” (Deut. 12:32). Ashbel Green
comments “that all the requisitions of the moral law are immutably binding on man, unless he have an express dispensation in
regard to positive precepts, from the lawgiver, God himself . . .; in no
possible case, can they be altered, changed, or abrogated by man, without this
appointment.” He goes on to add, “the
moral law is a perfect rule of life
and manners – so perfect that it admits neither addition, nor diminution” Lectures on the Shorter Catechism, II,
pp. 14-15). Thus the Psalmist declared,
“Every one of Thy righteous ordinances is everlasting” (Ps. 119:160), and “all
His precepts are trustworthy; they are established forever and ever, to be
performed with faithfulness and uprightness” (Ps. 111:7-8).
God is not
wavering with respect to right and wrong; He does not operate on a
double-standard of morality. Whatever
was evil according to the Old Testament law is also evil in the perspective of
the New Testament. For example, God’s
law explains that, as an application of the seventh commandment, homosexuality
is abominable and prohibited (Lev. 18:22); as expected, the New Testament
upholds this case-law requirement (Rom. 1:26-27, 32), seeing homosexuality is
contrary to “the ordinance of God.”
Similarly, the Old Testament law outlawed marrying your father’s wife
(Lev. 18:8), and as expected the New Testament endorses this moral perspective
(I Cor. 5:1). Those who feel that there
is a discontinuity between the moral standards of the Old and New Testaments,
or who feel that the New Testament ethic is limited to only the Ten
Commandments, must be challenged as to whether they feel that it is permissible
today to commit homosexuality or incest; they must be challenged to give a
credible account of why, if only the Decalogue binds us today, the New
Testament inconsistently departs from that artificial restriction and supports
– without apology or explanation – details of the Old Testament law. The Biblical answer is that every one of
God’s laws is righteous and unchanging; what was wrong yesterday cannot become
right today. This is the Reformed
perspective in ethics (and accounts for our belief in infant baptism): God’s
word is valid and binding until He alone says otherwise. It cannot be broken (Jn. 10:35). And because God delivers only righteous
laws, He does not alter them. Dabney
put it this way: “the idea that God can substitute and imperfect law for one
perfect, is derogation to His perfection.
Either the former standard required more than was right, or the new one
requires less than is right; and in either case God would be unrighteous” (S.T., p. 633).
We must
conclude with Dabney, then, “that the Old Testament teaches precisely the same
morality with the New” (p. 402). This
perspective is well-grounded in the word of God, being explicitly promulgated
by Jesus Christ our Lord. “Do not think
that I came in order to abrogate the Law or the prophets; I came not to
abrogate, but to confirm. For truly I
say unto you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one jot or tittle shall in
any way pass away from the law, until all things have come to pass” (Matt.
5:17-18). This passage, as the editor
notes, is the foundational authority for my book, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (9-13, p. 9c); it should be noted,
however, that it is not the sole foundation, nor a uniquely necessary one. The same premise is and can be verified from
other passages and teachings of God’s word.
Also, while I take the word ‘fulfill’ in the sense of ‘to conform’ (this
is argued, not for forty pages – as the editor claims, 9-13, p. 10a – but only
half as many), this is in no sense necessary to the thesis of my book. The salient point for Christian ethics is
that Jesus forthrightly denies that His coming has the effect of abrogating the
Old Testament law; He twice states this denial in v. 17, and thus whatever
‘fulfill’ might mean, it cannot imply abrogation of the law without making the
verse self-contradictory. In v. 18
Jesus explains that not the slightest stroke of the law will cease to have
binding moral force until heaven and earth pass away. If Jesus does not remove our obligation to any law from God, what
right has any man to do so? Those who
oppose the continued use of any Old Testament precept without warrant from
God’s own word oppose the teaching of our Lord and Savior. Usually they attempt to “explain away” the
clear and forceful declaration of Jesus, where He shows us how the New
Testament gospel age interprets the Old Testament law as abidingly valid,
through maneuvers that appear to be exegesis-by-embarrassment. Such tactics cannot overcome Christ’s own
application of His teaching: “Therefore, whatsoever shall break one of those
least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the
kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 5:19). Anyone
who presumes to demote any of God’s law will be demoted in God’s kingdom, and
that according to the word of the King himself.
Dabney
wrote, “To what extent, then, does the consistent Reformed theologian hold the
old covenant to be abrogated? . . . God’s law being the immutable expression of
His own perfections, and the creatures’ obligation to obey being grounded in
his nature and relation to God, it is impossible that any change of the legal
status under any covenant imaginable, legal or gracious, should abrogate the
authority of the law as a rule of acting for us” (S.T., p. 636). Paul
understands by the fact that we live under grace and not under law that sin (law-violation)
shall not have dominion over us (Rom. 6:12-18); God’s grace in the New Covenant
empowers us to keep the law (Titus 1:11-14).
The law of the Old Covenant is still binding, therefore, in the New
Covenant – even as God declared, “My covenant I will not violate, nor will I
alter the utterance of My lips” (Ps. 89:34).
Can the law be deemed contrary to the promises of God? Paul answers, “May it never be!” (Gal. 3:21). When God promised and instituted the New Covenant of promise
which we enjoy today He did not institute a new law or moral outlook. To the contrary, He declared “This is the
covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days . . .: I
will put my laws into their minds and I will write them upon their hearts”
(Jer. 31;33; Heb. 8:10). The New
Covenant enables obedience to the Old Covenant’s law-code; whereas the letter
brought spiritual death for disobedience, the Holy spirit brings life and
obedience (2 Cor. 3:6). “I will put My
Spirit within you and cause you to walk in My statutes, and you will be careful
to observe My ordinances” (Ezek. 36:27; cf. Rom. 8:4).
“Do we then
make void the law through faith? God
forbid; nay, we establish the law” (Rom. 3:31). Given the preceding study, I cannot agree with the editor when he
says that life under God’s grace is not
conscious of the law (9-20, p. 10c).
“I of myself with the mind, indeed, serve the law of God” said Paul, and
“I delight in the law of God after the inward man” (Rom. 7:22, 25). We are to look carefully at how we conduct
ourselves and to understand what the will of the Lord is (Eph. 5:15, 17),
having God’s word in our mouths and in our hearts – as the law called us to do
(Deut. 30:14) along with Paul (Rom. 10:8).
Indeed, our moral decisions must be weighed in terms of the law: (e.g.,
I Cor. 9:9; 14:34). We must pay
attention to the commandments as a standard by which to judge our relationship
to God (I Jn. 2:3) and our love for the brethren (I Jn. 5:2). Thus the law of the Lord surely has a
conscious place in the believer’s life.
Righteous living in obedience to God’s law is not, as claimed (9-20, p.
10c), simply feeling right and being comfortable with compliance; it calls for
mental attention to the written word (Jn. 17:17; Col. 3:16; I Thes. 4:1-2) and then
subsequent action (Jas. 1:21-25).
Nevertheless, it is still true, as the editor begins by saying, that
there is a qualitative difference between law obedience under law and law obedience under
grace (9-20, p. 10b). It is not the
difference between utter inability to
obey the law and Spiritual enablement
to do so (Rom. 8:2-10; cf. 6:1-22).
That is, because we are not under law but under grace, sin no longer has
dominion over us (Rom. 6:14).
Our present
obligation to keep the law of God is plain and evident from the New Testament’s
exhortation to love, for “love is the fulfillment of the law” (Rom.
13:10). According to the editor, under
grace the believer’s relationship to the law is not a relationship to a list of
specific stipulations but only to a generality summed up in two precepts, “Love
God and love neighbor” (9-20, p. 10c).
Jesus said that on these two commandments (which, by the way, were
quotations from the Old Testament law at Deut. 6:5 and Lev. 19:18) hang all the
law and the prophets (Matt. 22:37-40).
Yet these love commands did not, according to Christ’s thinking,
dispense with the laws of God. John
Murray points out that “If the law hangs on love, it is not dispensed
with. That on which something hangs
serves no purpose and has no meaning apart from that which hangs on it . .
.. Love does not devise the norms of
exercise nor the ways of expression” (I, p. 179). Love does not take the place of the law of God, it merely
summarizes it. Commenting on Paul’s
word that love fulfills the law, Murray says elsewhere: “if they are summarized
in one word, the summary does not obliterate or abrogate the expansion of which
it is a summary. It is futile to try to
escape the underlying assumption of Paul’s thought, the criteria of that
behavior which love dictates” (Principles
of Conduct, p. 192). And in turn
the decalogue does not stand alone but “summarily comprehends” the entire moral
law of God (Larger Catechism 93,
98). Love summarizes our duty, but law
gives it specific definition. “Love is
not an autonomous, self-instructing and self-directing principle. Love does not excogitate the norms by which
it is regulated"”(Murray, II, p. 78).
Otherwise a person might reason that love permits adultery with his
neighbor'’ wife. But Christ said, “If
ye love me, ye will keep my commandments” (Jn. 14:15), and John taught that
“this is love, that we walk after His commandments” (2 Jn. 6). Love to God and brother is known,
recognized, and guided by nothing less than the commandments of God (I Jn.
5:2-3). And these commandments are not “a spiritually defined generality,”
to use the editor’s words (9-20, p. 10c).
Three basic
Reformed commitments have been rehearsed to this point. As my Savior, Christ shows me the necessity
of the law. As my Lord, Christ directs
me to live in obedience to the law. And
this law of the Lord is just as binding in the New Testament as in the Old, not
being invalidated by the institution of the New Covenant or by the principles
of faith, grace, and love. To these can
be added a fourth distinctive: Christ is Lord over all of life and over all
mankind.
No area of
a person’s life is a safety zone from God’s control and demands. The Lord will not tolerate a dichotomy of
life into sacred and secular. He
requires holiness throughout all the areas of life, “Like as he who called you
is holy, be ye yourselves also holy in all manner of living” (I Peter 1:15). Nothing in our lives can be withheld from
Him. “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment”
(Matt. 22:37-38). The first commandment
of the decalogue requires us to glorify God by “yielding all obedience and
submission to him with the whole man; being careful in all things to lease him”
(Larger Catechism 104; hereafter
“LC”). Thus nothing pertaining to my
attitudes and behavior – whether they pertain to myself, my family, my church,
my employment, my social relations, my society or state – is immune from the
Lord’s direction. In repentance I turn
from all of my sins in all relations, “endeavoring to walk with Him in all the
ways of his commandments” (WCF XV.2; cf. LC 76), and thus sanctification “is
throughout, in the whole man” (WCF XIII.2; cf. LC 75). Accordingly the law of the Lord guide, not
simply my private and religious life, but every facet of my walk as a servant
of God – in recreation, economics, friendships, culture, family, and all
things. Wishing to please my Lord, I
recognize that “sin is any want of
conformity unto, or transgression of, any
law of God” (LC 24). It is my
reasonable and spiritual service to offer my body as a living sacrifice to God
and my mind to be transformed completely by His perfect will (Rom.
12:1-2). Christ is Lord over all. This is essential to a Reformed
world-and-life-view.
John Murray
put it this way: “The law of God extends to all relations of life. This is so because we are never removed from
the obligation to love and serve God.
We are never amoral. We owe
devotion to God in every phase and department of life. It is this principle of all-inclusive obligation
to God, and of the all-pervasive relevance of the law of God, that gives
sanctity to all of our obligations and relations” (II, p. 78). As Bavinck said, “this law governs all the
relationships in which man finds himself, whether to God, whether to his fellow
man, to himself, or to the whole of nature” (p. 489). Sanctification according to the pattern of God’s law must be throughout life, seven days a week, in
every aspect of behavior. Christ is not
simply my Savior, He is likewise my Lord – in every department of life, from
private to public. He has given me a
new heart on which is engraved the law of God (Ezek. 11:19; 36:26-27; Jer.
31:33; Heb. 10:16), and out of that heart flow all the issues of life (Prov.
4:23). Everything I think and do should
be governed, then, by God’s law (Deut. 6:8).
I have thus come to agree with Murray that “No one factor has been more
prejudicial to the Christian ethic in the home, the church, and society, than
contempt for the negatives of God’s law” (I, p. 177).
Not only is
Christ Lord over all of life, but He is Lord over all men as well. He owns this universal Lordship in virtue of
being Creator, Redeemer, and Judge. All
things were created by Him and thus for His service (Col. 1:16). As Redeemer He expects all nations to be
discipled to Him and taught to observe whatsoever He has commanded (Matt.
28:18-20). This same Creator and
Redeemer will one day judge all men according to their every deed (2 Cor. 5:10;
2 Tim. 4:1). Christ is both the divine
and messianic King; in the former capacity He is ruler over the nations (Ps.
22:28) who chastens them out of the law (Ps. 94:10, 12), and in the latter
capacity He is head over all things (Eph. 1:20-22) who punishes all who act
lawlessly (Matt. 13:42).
Therefore
the Christian cannot deny that God’s law binds all men in all places, for to do
so would be to detract from Christ the Creator, Redeemer, Judge, and King. In this light we can turn to our confession
and Catechisms, where we learn that “The duty which God Requireth of man
(without distinction or qualification) is obedience to his revealed will” (LC
91). In the scriptures “the whole
counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s
salvation, faith and life” can be found (WCF I.6). The moral duty of all men in all areas of life is contained in
God’s inspired word. Of God the
Confession says, “He is most holy in all His counsels, in all His works, and in
all His commands. To Him is due from
angels and men, and every other creature, whatsoever worship, service, or
obedience He is pleased to require of them” (WCF II.2). No creature is in a position to resist doing
what God directs him to do in any area of life, then, for “reasonable creatures
do owe obedience unto Him as their Creator” (WCF VII.1). Moral obligation,
that is, does not rest upon a saving relationship to God; as Creator He demands that His law be
observed by all men. By the law of God
the Lord bound Adam “and all his
posterity, to personal, entire,
exact, and perpetual obedience” (WCF
XIX.1); “the moral law doth for ever bind all, as well justified persons as
others, to the obedience thereof; and that, not only in regard of the matter
contained in it, but also in respect of the authority of God the Creator, who
gave it” (XIX.5). Whether we consider
the content of the law or its Author, we must conclude that all men are bound
to it. As the exalted King Christ has
all power over all things in heaven and earth (LC 54), and as such He corrects
believers for their sins and brings vengeance upon unbelievers for their sins
(LC 45). No person is given permission
to violate the law of God in any respect.
All men will give an account
to Christ, as judge, for every aspect
of their lives (WCF XXIII.1), and this fact should “deter all men from sin”
(XXXIII.3).
A good
summary of the implications following from the fact that Christ is Lord over
all – over all areas of life, and over all mankind – is provided by the
Catechism. “The moral law is the
declaration of the will of God to mankind, directing and binding every one to personal,
perfect, and perpetual conformity and obedience thereunto, in the frame and
disposition of the whole man, soul and body, and in performance of all those
duties of holiness and righteousness which he oweth to God and man” (LC
93). “The moral law is of use to all
men, to inform them of the holy nature and will of God, and of their duty,
binding them to walk accordingly” (LC 95).
“The law is perfect, and bindeth every one to full conformity in the
whole man unto the righteousness thereof, and unto entire obedience for ever;
so as to require the utmost perfection of every duty, and to forbid the least
degree of every sin . . .. What God
forbids is at no time to be done . . ..
What is forbidden or commanded to ourselves, we are bound, according to
our places, to endeavor that it may be avoided or performed by others” (LC
99). Given such teaching, I do not see
why it should have struck the editor as somehow a “unique thesis” in Theonomy that every bit of God’s law is
equally binding upon believers and unbelievers (9-13, p. 10b-c). This is but an expression of that classic
Reformed thought found in the Westminster Standards. Consistent application of these premises may be unusual and
unpopular today, but the premises are lifted straight from the historic
Reformed position on ethics.
Reformed
thought, consistent with the teaching of Scripture, has seen the law of God as
having a “political use” in man’s government; that is, God’s law binds the
sate, whether pagan or “Christian.”
Carl F. H. Henry summarizes in this way: “Even where there is no saving
faith, the Law serves to restrain sin and to preserve the order of creation by
proclaiming the sill of God . . .. By
its judgments and its threats of condemnation and punishment, the written law
along with the law of conscience hinders sin among the unregenerate. It has the role of a magistrate who is a
terror to evildoers . . .. It fulfills
a political function, therefore, by its constraining influence in the unregenerate
world” (Christian Personal Ethics, p.
355). Because Christ is “the ruler of
the kings of the earth” (Rev. 1:5), all magistrates in the state ___? Him
obedience to His law. That law was
specifically _______?, says Scripture for the restraint of those who are unruly
in society (I Tim. 1:9-10). This is the
New Testament perspective as much as the Old’s.
All men,
Jewish and Gentile alike, are responsible before the law of God; this is Paul’s
teaching in Romans 1-3. Indeed all men,
including pagans, have God’s specific laws testifying in their hearts (Rom.
2:15) so that God says they know His ordinance, for instance, against
homosexuality (Rom. 1:32). Evidently
all men know the entire law of God as it defines and punishes, sin, then, and
not simply the ten commandments. Thus
Sodom could be destroyed for its homosexuality even before the special
revelation of God’s law to Israel on Mount Sinai, and the New Testament
identifies _________? Sodom’s judgment as “lawless deeds” (2 Peter 2:6-8). So there can be no mistake: God’s law (even
outside the strictly summary statement of the decalogue) is binding on all
mankind (even apart from redemptive, special revelation). God does not have a double-standard of
morality; what was sinful within the borders of Israel was not condoned just over the state line. Homosexuality is just as forbidden today in
the United States as in ancient Israel (see my book, Homosexuality: A Biblical View, available from Covenant Media
Foundation). Up until the twentieth
century, if you had asked any Reformed theologian, he would have told you as
much, for God’s law has international civic relevance. In the giving of the law God made clear that
He had only one standard of ethics for the native as well as the stranger in
Israel (Lev. 24:22; cf. Eccl. 12:13).
Accordingly God severely punished the Canaanite tribes, in exactly the
same way that He would punish Israel, for their violations of His law (Lev.
18:24-27).
In
revealing His law God intended it to be a model for surrounding cultures to
follow (Deut. 4:5-8). Consequently
David would speak God’s law before kings (Ps. 119:46) – obviously referring to
other kings outside of God (Ps. 18:43-50).
The kings of the earth belong to God (Ps. 47:9); thus righteousness and
justice must characterize their thrones (Prov. 16:12; 29:4) even as it
characterizes God’s throne (Ps. 97:2).
It is axiomatic that those who rule over men must do so righteously, in
the fear of God (2 Sam. 23:3). In the
second Psalm David calls upon the kings and judges of the earth to serve the
Lord with fear (Ps. 2:10-12), and he warns them of retribution from God if they
do not. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that all nations – even in their social and political morality – are
bound to the standards of God’s law.
“Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is a disgrace to any people”
(Prov. 14:34). Accordingly it is an
abomination for kings to commit wickedness, for their thrones are to be
established on righteousness (Prov. 16:12).
God’s law was taken by the Old Testament prophets as a light of justice
for all peoples (Isa. 51:4; cf. Matt. 5:14), and for that reason the prophets
condemned pagan states for their infractions of God’s holy law (e.g., Hab.
2:12, which is precisely the indictment brought against Israel herself in Micah
3:10). God’s law was impartially and
universally binding on mankind. Hence
Ezra praised the Lord for having a pagan emperor enforce God’s law (even the
penal sanctions) in all the area surrounding Israel (Ezra 7:11-28). Consistent with this Old Testament
perspective, Paul taught that civil magistrates in the era of the New Testament
perspective, Paul taught that civil magistrates in the era of the New Testament
were to be ministers of God who avenge His wrath against evildoers (Rom.
13:4) – which is to say, against violators
of God’s law (cf. v. 10); to that end “they bear not the sword in
vain.” When the magistrate does not
rule in terms of God’s law but replaces it with his own law (Rev. 13:16-17; cf.
Deut. 6:8), he is then considered a blasphemous “Beast” or “man of lawlessness”
(cf. 2 Thes. 2:3, 7). So it is clear
that all kings owe allegiance to “the King of Kings,” and none are immune from
the stipulations of His holy and just law.
In
accordance with this the Westminster Confession and Catechisms taught that
magistrates, for the glory of God and the public good, have the right to punish
evildoers (WCF XXIII.1); in this the law of God was to be their guide (LC
129-130, with Scripture citations, all of which pertain to civil rulers). The Confession teaches, consequently, that
those who maintain practices which are contrary to the light of nature (God’s
law revealed in creation and conscience), the principles of Christianity, or
the power of Godliness may be lawfully
punished by the civil magistrate (WCF XX.4); the Scripture proofs include God’s
law against seduction to idolatry and the command to have Ezra enforce God'’
law, even with its penal sanctions. The
authors of the Confession cited Isaiah 49:23 (at XXXIII.3) to show that
magistrates were to be nursing-fathers to the church, seeing to it that God’s
ordinances are observed; biblical texts were thus adduced which instruct the
magistrate to execute blasphemers and idolaters. Elsewhere the magistrate is held accountable to rule according to
the wisdom of God found in His law, which if slackened leads to unrighteous
civil judgments (see LC 129-130, 145 with Scripture texts). In this light we can understand the
assertion of Baillie and Gillespie, two prominent participants in the
Westminster Assembly, when – at the appointment of the Church of Scotland – they
subsequently wrote: “The orthodox churches believe, and do willingly
acknowledge, that every lawful magistrate, (is) by God Himself constituted the
keeper and defender of both tables of the law” (Proposition 41). So then, it is hard for me to comprehend why
the editor maintains – totally without supporting premises or evidence – that
“there is a great leap” from the outlook of the Westminster Standards to the
view of Theonomy that the entire
Mosaic law is binding today, even on pagan states (9-13, p. 18b). There is no
gulf between the Westminster outlook and Theonomy which needs to be “leaped”. It is the modern, neutralist or secular outlook on the state
(which emancipates it from the specific directives of God’s law in Scripture)
that is at odds with the Puritan approach to the state – as almost anyone must
acknowledge if he will but recall that embarrassment he initially felt when a
modern instructor critically described the political ethic of his Calvinist
forefathers (e.g., Puritan New England).
That political ethic is no embarrassment to me any longer, having
researched and carried out the biblical study that went into the writing of Theonomy in Christian Ethics. I fully endorse the Westminster Standards
now. (The outlook of the Westminster Assembly and that of Puritan New England
is expounded in Appendices 2 and 3 of my book).
My
obligation to observe the law of God is evident from the fact that Jesus is my
Savior and my Lord. The law of the Lord
is unchanging from Old Testament to New, and it is binding in every department
of life (including society and politics) for all men (even unbelieving nations)
because Christ is Lord over all. What
do these emphases, as rehearsed above, imply as to the extent to the law’s
validity today? They imply that God
directs political morality today by His law as much as He directs my private
morality by His law; every stroke of that law has relevance for my actions and
thoughts. The details of the law cannot
be expunged or ignored by the New Testament Christian who desires to live under
the pervasive Lordship of Jesus Christ.
If I am to sanctify and transform all areas of life to the glory of God,
then it must be according to the directions of His holy law and not my own
wisdom and imagination. To that end I
pray, “Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth even as it is
in heaven.” In such a petition we all
pray “that the kingdom of sin and Satan may be destroyed . . . , that (Christ)
would be pleased so to exercise the kingdom of his power in all the world . . . , that God would by his Spirit take away
from ourselves and others all blindness, weakness, indisposedness, and
perverseness of heart; and by his grace make us able and willing to know, do,
and submit to his will in all things”
(LC 191-192). No area of life in any
area of the world is a safety zone from the Lord’s direction, and thus we must
pay attention to the whole law of God as found in the inspired word of the
Lord. In this way we can obey the
apostolic injunction to “abstain from every
form of evil” (I Thes. 5:22).
Ashbel
Green wrote that “it is the deep sense which the believer has of . . . his
infinite obligation for redeeming mercy, which makes him earnestly desirous to
obey all God’s commandments . . .. He
loves the whole law of God, and loves it because it is a perfect law. If he could have a mitigated law, which some
vainly talk of, it would only, on that very account, be the less amiable to
him” (Lectures on the Shorter Catechism,
pp. 10-11). That is, the believer ought
not to settle for a “spiritually defined generality” that is indifferent to
God’s list of specific guidelines (as suggested by the editor, 9-20, p.
10c). Paul taught that “every
scripture” of the Old Testament is “profitable for instruction in righteousness
. . . in order that the man of God may be perfectly furnished unto every good
work” (2 Tim. 3:16-17). To ignore some
of those specific scriptures is to live by an incomplete and inadequate ethic,
for without them one cannot be thoroughly equipped for righteous living. James taught that if we stumble at even one point in the law we are guilty of
violating the entire law (Jas.
2:10). The details are just as binding
as the whole, and they can be pushed aside only at the expense of disobedience
to the Lord. So I cannot agree with the
editor that after Christ some details of the law “might never again matter at
all” (9-20, p. 11a). Every point of the
law as found in every Old Testament scripture is profitable for ethical living
today and is a measure of our obedience to the Lord; such is the united
testimony of Paul and James. In this
they were not echoing the teaching of Jesus Christ himself.
In Matthew
5:17 our Lord expressly taught that His coming did not abrogate the Old
Testament law. In vv. 18-19 following
He said, “For truly I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away not one iota or one stroke shall in any
wise pass away from the law, until all things take place. Therefore whoever shall break one of these
least commandments and shall teach men so shall be called least in the kingdom
of heaven.” Until the end of history
not the slightest detail of God’s law will become invalid, and thus teachers
are warned by Christ himself from depreciating the details of the law. To say, as the editor does, that Christ’s
fulfilling of the law suggests nothing about a check list of specifics (9I-20),
p. 11a) is to fly directly in the face of the Lord’s teaching in Matthew
5:17-19. That He “fulfills” the law
implies – according to His own reasoning – that nobody has the right to ignore
the specifics of God’s holy law. In commenting upon Matthew 5:17-19, John Murray had this to say:
“Jesus refers to the function of validating and confirming the law and the
prophets . . .. Jesus is saying that he
came not to abrogate any part of the Mosaic law . . .. If there is anything that is distasteful to
the modern mind it is concern for detail, and particularly is this the case in
the field of ethics. By a lamentable
confusion of thought concern for detail is identified with legalism . . .. ‘One jot or one tittle.’ It is a clear assertion that the law in all
its details must come to fulfillment and be accomplished . . .. Our Lord recognized that the minutiae of the
law had significance. If we do not like
minutiae or insistence upon them, then we are not at home with the attitude of
Jesus. We are moving in an entirely
different world of thought . . .. We
are not to expect an undervaluation, far less disparagement, of the details of
law; and we may as well expect from the outset that, if our perspective is one
that looks for the wood but not the trees, then we shall not be at home in the
teaching of Jesus . . .. Too often the
person imbued with meticulous concern for the ordinances of God and
conscientious regard for the minutiae of God’s commandments is judged as a
legalist, while the person who is not bothered by the gospel. Here Jesus is reminding us of the same great
truth which he declares elsewhere: ‘He that is faithful in that which is least
is faithful also in much, and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in
much’ (Luke 16:10). The criterion of
our standing in the kingdom of God and of reward in the age to come is nothing
else than meticulous observance of the commandments of God in the minutial details
of their prescription and the earnest inculcation of such observance on the
part of others” (Principles of Conduct,
pp. 150-154).
That is the
perspective advanced by Theonomy, and
I believe it to be in harmony with the entire word of God, which consistently
teaches that the whole law is binding today in detail. The specifics of that law, contrary to the
editor (9-20, p. 11a), applied wholesale to Christ, who was tempted in all points
without sin (Heb. 4:15), who perfectly kept the Father’s commandments (Jn.
8:46; 15:10), and fulfilled all righteousness (Matt. 3:15). In this He is our example today, and we
should heed His instruction that, in the midst of keeping the weightier matters
of the law, the minor specifics ought not
to be left undone (Lk. 11:42).
Every jot and tittle is our standard of Christian ethics. As Bolton, the Westminster divine, said:
“Since Christ, who is the best expounder of the law, so largely strengthens and
confirms the law (witness the Sermon on the Mount, and also mark 10:19); since
faith does not supplant, but strengthens the law; since the apostle so often
presses and urges the duties commanded in the law; since Paul acknowledges that
he served the law of God in his mind, and that he was under the law to Christ
(I Cor. 9:21); I may rightly conclude that the law, for the substance of it,
still remains a rule of life to the people of God . . .. If Christ and His apostles commanded the
same things which the law required, and forbade and condemned the same things
which the law forbade and condemned, then they did not abrogate it but
strengthened and confirmed it. And this
is what they did: see Matt. 5:19” (The
True Bounds of Christian Freedom, p. 62).
The detailed specifics of God’s whole law are binding on all men today.
For
convenience the law of God may be considered in three categories, each of which
serves a particular theological or literary function, but all of which are
confirmed by Christ for today. In the
law God gives (1) general precepts, (2) illustrations of how those precepts are
applied in particular cases, and (3) instructions pertaining to God’s covenant
mercy or the way of restoration and redemption for infractions of laws in (1)
and (2). The applicatory illlustrations
are in the same general category with the general precepts, being but an
extension and explanation of them; thus (1) and (2) are thereby reflecting
God’s righteousness. The restorative
laws, reflecting God’s mercy, typify the redemptive economy of Christ (i.e.,
point to the way of salvation) and illustrate the perfection and holiness
required of the redeemed community.
Some
examples can help us to understand these three kinds of law and how they apply to
us in the New Testament age. In summary
statement the law declared, “Thou shalt not steal”; this general principle is
permanently binding (cf. Rom. 13:9).
How does it apply however? God
explained in His law that, among other things, this law meant that it was wrong
to defraud or oppress employees (Deut. 24:14, cf. LXX) and that even an ox is
not to be deprived of its livelihood from the work it does (Deut. 25:4). Such were illustrations of the general
precept; with changed circumstances (or a different culture) the case-law
illustrations or applications might be different, but the underlying principle
remains valid and binding. Thus Christ utilized the Old Testament case-law in
telling the rich young ruler that he ought not to defraud (Mk. 10:19), and Paul
spoke of the church’s obligation to New Testament ministers in terms of the
case of Old Testament oxen, quoting “Thou shalt not muzzle the ox as it treads”
(I Tim. 5:18). Likewise, as an
application of the sixth commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” the law of God
required Israelites to place a fencing around the roofs of their houses. The underlying principle of this law still
applies to us today, even though we may not apply it to entertaining on flat
roofs since this is not part of our cultural experience; instead we might apply
it today by placing a fence around our backyard swimming pools – again, in
order to protect human life and thus obey the general precept of God’s
law. Without these case-law illustrations
or explanations of the summary ethic in the decalogue the ten commandments
would certainly be twisted and applied to man’s own sinful desires. For instance, reading “Thou shalt not commit
adultery.” Men could prefer an
extremely narrow interpretation of sexual purity and exonerate their premarital,
incestuous or homosexual affairs.
However, the case-law specifications of the law prohibit such
activities, and the New Testament reiterates these prohibitions (Heb. 13:4; I
Cor. 5:1-5; I Tim. 1:10).
It should
be clear, then, that the ten commandments or general precepts cannot be read
and understood apart from the explanatory context of all of God’s revealed
law. Bavinck has noted that “the law of
the ten commandments does not stand loosely and independently by itself; it
finds itself, rather, in the middle of a rich environment . . .. In Israel that law . . . was taken up in a
body of rights and ordinances which had to govern the whole life of the
people. Besides, this law was
explained, developed, and applied throughout the history of Israel by the
psalmists, proverb writers, and prophets . . .. The law of the ten commandments may not be separated from this
rich context of the whole revelation of God in nature and in Scripture. Understood in this way, the Ten Commandments
are a brief summary of the Christian ethic and an unsurpassed rule for our
life. There are also many other laws to
which we are bound” (Our Reasonable Faith,
pp. 488, 489). I put it this way in Theonomy: “The case law illustrates the
application or qualification of the principle laid down in the general
commandment"”(p. 313). Or to use
the words of Patrick Fairbairn, A Considerable portion of the statutes and
judgments are . . . a simple application of the great principles of the
Decalogue to particular case of enactments referred to have an abiding value,
as they serve materially to throw light on the import and bearing of the
Decalogue, confirming the views already given of its spiritual and
comprehensive character” (The Revelation
of Law in Scripture, pp. 97, 99).
The case laws outside of the Decalogue (also called “judicial laws” in
Reformed literature) are thus moral in character. Because their details are often communicated in terms of ancient
Israel’s culture these laws are not binding as such on us in today’s culture;
rather, we are now required to keep the underlying principle (or “General
Equity”) of these laws.
Such was
the teaching of the Westminster Assembly as well. The language of this body can be readily understood in terms of
the context of its day. Heinrich
Bullinger, the primary author of the Second Helvetic Confession, had written
that “the substance of God’s judicial laws is not taken away or
abolished.” The English Puritan and
presbyterian, Thomas Cartwright, said a generation before the Assembly that
since some of the judicial laws were “made in regard of the region where they
were given,” those who keep “the substance and equity of them (as it were the
marrow), may change the circumstance of them, as the times and places and
manners of the people shall require.”
Likewise William Perkins spoke of “the law of Moses, the equity whereof
is perpetual.” Another English Puritan,
Philip Stubbs, said that the “law judicial standeth in force to the world’s
end.” So also, George Gillespie, an
important writer of the Westminster Standards, maintained in separate works
that the judicial law of Moses should be the rule of the civil laws of a
commonwealth – an opinion put into practice by John Cotton in New England
during the same decade as the Westminster Assembly. From these brief examples we can underand the Puritan view of
Moses was not binding, but rather the underlying principle, substance, marrow
or general equity was perpetually to
be observed by all. This is what we
read in the Westminster Confession of Faith: in addition to the summary code of
the ten commandments, God “gave sundry judicial laws . . . not obliging any
other now, further than the general equity thereof may require” (XIX.4). In support of that assertion the Confession
cites biblical passages which have also been used above to explain the
interpretation offered in Theonomy. The “equity of a statute,” according to the
Oxford English Dictionary, is “according to its reason and spirit so as to make
it apply to cases for which it does not expressly provide.” The Confession teaches that this equity of
the case laws (e.g., Ex. 21-22) is required as the extent of our present
obligation to God’s commandments. All sins and duties of the same kind are
forbidden and enjoined under the one
sin or duty mentioned in the decalogue (LC 99); the decalogue is but a summary of the moral law (LC 98). Thus the liberty of Christians under the New
Testament is further enlarged, says the Confession, but not by our being freed from the judicial laws of Moses (WCF
XX.1). Instead, the Westminster divines
appealed to God’s commandments outside of the decalogue as elaborating and
explaining the application of the ten commandments – as the proof-texting of
the Larger Catechism at the ten commandments evidences (LC 103-148). If someone does not believe that these
case-laws are currently binding, contrary to the Confession, then the
theonomist could, for example, challenge him to explain why we should
distinguish between manslaughter and first-degree murder today, prohibit
homosexuality and incest, and punish kidnappers who do no harm to their victims
– none of which is clear from the decalogue alone.
The final
category of God’s law which was mentioned above was the restorative law
(traditionally called the “ceremonial law”) which functioned to typify the way
of redemption in Christ and to illustrate the holiness (or “separation”) of the
redeemed community. For instance, Lev.
17:11 taught the necessity of blood atonement if sins were to be forgiven; for
this reason the New Testament says that “it was necessary” that Christ
sacrificially die and shed His blood for our salvation (Heb. 9:22-24). The law was but a shadow of things to come
(Heb. 10:1), for the shed blood of animals was never in itself sufficient to
atone for sins (Heb. 10:4). Those who
were redeemed by blood atonement were to celebrate the passover in the Old
Testament, just as believers saved by Christ’s blood are to celebrate the
Lord’s Supper today (I Cor. 5:7).
Because the redeemed community had been separated out of the nations by
God, it was to remind itself of its holiness by drawing a distinction between
clean and unclean meats (Lev. 20:22-26), by refusing to mingle different kinds
of seed and clothing, and by not plowing with unequal animals (Lev. 19:1-2, 19;
Deut. 22:9-11). These laws are not
observed in this same outward manner today because the Savior has fulfilled the
foreshadows of the Old Testament and established His holy, international,
covenant community in the church; every jot and tittle of God’s word, when
consulted, teaches us today that the system of commandments contained in such
ordinances as created a wall of separation between Gentile and Jew have been
abolished in Christ’s flesh as He reconciles the two into one body through the
cross (Eph. 2:14-19). Consequently the
laws typifying the separation or holiness of Israel are no longer observed in
the manner of the Old Testament today (e.g., laws pertaining to unclean meats,
Acts 10). Nevertheless these laws are
still binding upon the New Testament church insofar as they teach the necessity
of separation from the world and cleanliness before God – that is, the holiness
of the redeemed community. Hence the
New Testament requires that believers not be “unequally yoked” with unbelievers,
that they be separate and “touch no unclean thing” (2 Cor. 6:14-17). Likewise they are to purge out the old
leaven of sin (I Cor. 5:7; cf. Deut. 16:4) and hate even the garment spotted by
the flesh (Jude 23; cf. Lev. 13:47-52).
All such exhortations are patterned after the restorative law of the Old
Testament; the manner of observance is altered today after Christ, but the
point of the commandments is the same.
The Confession thus teaches that to Israel, as a church under age, God
gave ceremonial laws, containing several typical ordinances, partly of worship, prefiguring Christ, His graces, actions, sufferings, and benefits, and partly, holding forth divers
instructions of moral duties”(WCF
XIX.3; note the scriptural passages cited); under the New Testament Christians
are freed from the yoke of the ceremonial law to which the Jewish Church was
subjected (XX.1). Yet Christ confirms
even these laws, being “the permanent and final embodiment of all the truth portrayed
in the Levitical ordinances” (Murray, Principles
of conduct, p. 151).
Therefore,
in submission to the uniform teaching of God’s word as reflected in the
Westminster Standards, we should conclude that, because Jesus is Savior and
Lord, the law of God is binding today
as a moral standard. The law of the
Lord is unchanged from Old to New
Testaments, and because Christ is Lord over all, that law must be obeyed by all men in all areas of life.
Accordingly the Bible teaches us that the whole law of God is valid today, without subtraction of one jot or
tittle. Theonomic ethics does not add without subtraction of one jot
of tittle. Theonomic ethics does not add these jots and tittles to the
“moral law” (in the Westminster sense of that term) but argues that they
categorically are part of the moral
law of God. The ten commandments cover
the entire field – and in that sense are always “enough” to show us our duty –
but in a summary fashion – and thus
are in need of the explanatory application of the details of the whole law.
In the
context of the above discussion we can evaluate the editor’s remarks about and
against the theonomic position in Christian ethics. Misrepresentations of that position have been noted already in
the preceding discussion; a much better summary (and evaluation) of the book
can be found in the book review by the ethics instructor at Westminster
Seminary, published in the Journal on August 31, 1977. In fact, the “Sunday School Lesson” written
by Dr. Scott for the same issue in which the editor comments on Theonomy goes a great distance in
expressing my commitments in Christian ethics (9-13, pp. 14-15). Many of the editor’s remarks, however, will
tend to give an inaccurate conception of the theonomic viewpoint, and at many points
he is simply attacking a “straw man” position that I myself would criticize.
We have
also observed above that the theonomic position is not a recent novelty, as portrayed by the editor. The reader can go back and note how
thoroughly the Westminster Standards and classic Reformed theologians support
the premises, and in many cases the conclusions, of the theonomic
viewpoint. Where the premises are held
by theologians who refrain from the conclusions, I believe we must recognize an
inconsistency that does not characterize the biblical writers or the Puritans
who composed the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. But the relevant point is that the position
of theonomic ethics has healthy historical roots. It is not “the latest approach to the law,” but has strong
precedents in classic Reformed theology.
Theonomic ethics does not ask that something more or new be added to the
best tradition of law are now binding.
Lest we tend toward a pharisaical or Romanist commitment to tradition,
however, I must affirm as a theologian that our only supreme judge by which all
. . . doctrines of men . . . are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are
to rest, can be no other but the Holy spirit speaking in the Scripture” (WCF
I.10). I am glad that Reformed
tradition stands behind the theonomic position, but it is theologically
irrelevant.
The editor,
as seen previously, has also maintained that in an age of grace the details of
the law of God are not of central importance; the Christian, he says, does not
live by a written code of specifics – which, if true, would tend to dismiss the
theonomic outlook. However sufficient
reason has been given from God’s word to disagree with the editor’s remarks
here. The entire preceding discussion
undermines the sufficiency of mere generalities in Christian ethics as taught
in Scripture. God loves us so
thoroughly that He has given us detailed guidance for all areas of our lives;
in love for Him we must pay attention to His entire word and counsel.
The
editor’s criticism that Theonomy has
a “host of ‘missing links’ over which the argument leaps with no apparent
warrant” (9-13, p. 18b) would be, if supported, an important observation and
area for further discussion. However
the editor has not given any indication of what steps in the argument were omitted
by the book at all. The example he
offers is that of moving from Christ’s endorsement of the law for the rich
young ruler to the validity of the Mosaic penal code today. The problem though is that such an argument
is nowhere utilized or even suggested
by Theonomy! Thus the editor is far from proving his
point. At this time I believe that
adequate and complete steps or links in the theonomic argument are expounded in
my book. In reviewing the book
Professor Frame said that it “presents solid arguments which must be soberly
discussed . . .. For those who disagree
with Bahnsen’s position – well, the ball is in their court; they must come up
with an answer” (8-31-77, p. 18c).
A
particularly disappointing aspect of the editor’s own evaluation of theonomic
ethics is precisely its lack of counter-argumentation, biblical exegesis, and
serious analysis of the issues involved in the Christian approach to God’s law
in ethics today. The editor does not
rebut the positive arguments offered by Theonomy,
he does not specify efforts, and he presents no interpretation of his own for
the basic scriptural texts which are enlisted in support of the book’s
thesis. Consequently the reader has no
responsible way of telling whether theonomic ethics carries Reformed principles
too far (stretching the classic view to the point of absurdity) as the editor
says (9-13, p. 19a), or whether it simply and consistently applies those
principles throughout the range of ethical issues. A careful understanding of the theonomic viewpoint has not been
presented, and no reasoned argumentation against it (biblical or otherwise) is
set forth. Thus the discussion of the
book serves little constructive purpose in helping Christians think through their
ethical position in a way pleasing to the Lord; at worst, some readers will
have been misled as to the relevant questions involved and the viable answers
available.
Therefore,
although I appreciate the editor opening the door to discussion of Theonomy, in an overall and introductory
sense his approach could be strengthened in a number of places. His remarks misrepresent the book at
important points, overlook its Reformed and Confessional roots, mistakenly
suppress details in favor of ethical generality for New Testament ethics, give
no evidence of gaps in the reasoning set forth in Theonomy, and offer no counter-argumentation or biblical
interpretation of his own. Thus in that
light I would initially respond that the editor’s critique is somewhat crippled
in attaining its proper goals.
Beyond this
preliminary reply to the editor, however, we should consider his primary way of
evaluating and criticizing theonomic ethics.
When all is said and done, the editor directs his appraisal of Theonomy at what he takes to be its
application and consequences. Being
dissatisfied with those alleged implications, the editor casts a negative
shadow over the theonomic position itself.
The editor says that “to evaluate Theonomy
. . . it would be necessary to test it against a ‘jot’ or ‘tittle’” because the
book argues for the validity of every jot and tittle of the Old Testament law
today (9-13, p. 18c). In the opinion of
the editor theonomic ethics must be tested by the details of God’s law as
revealed in the Old Testament.
Accordingly he proposes nine or ten examples of what he thinks would be
applications of those details to life today, telling his readers that such are
“not facetious examples” (9-13, p. 19a).
Because these alleged applications of the theonomic thesis are
disturbing to the editor, he promptly dismisses the position as extreme. But in this he moves too hastily. If his examples are not facetious by
intention, they are nevertheless false in most every case. Readers have thus been seriously misled and
prejudiced against considering the biblical warrant for theonomic ethics.
Secondly,
we must ask by what standard one would carry out such a “test by details”
regarding the law of God. When someone
finds a particular Old Testament law and discerns its proper application to
life today, by what standard does he decide on the acceptability of that
law? If the standard is Scripture
itself, then one is reaffirming the theonomic approach to ethics; every jot and
tittle of God'’ word (including OT as interpreted by NT) determines our ethical
obligations today. Nothing is abrogated or subtracted from the OT law except at
the word of the lawgiver Himself. So
then, by what extrascriptural
standard does the editor propose to “test the details” of God’s law as applied
today (and thereby evaluate the theonomic thesis)? The uniqueness of biblical ethics and the unchallengable
authority of the biblical God make it difficult to see that there could be an
extrascriptural standard by which His law could be appraised. As Murray said: “The Christian faith is distinctive
and the Christian ethic is correspondingly distinctive . . .. There is a new pattern, a new kind of
conformity, eloquently expressed by way of antithesis when Paul says: ‘Be not
conformed to this world (be not fashioned to this age) but be ye transformed by
the renewing of your mind’ (Rom. 2:2) . . ..
In view of the radical distinction (between likeness to God in the sense
of divine creation and recreation, and in the sense of the Satanic temptation),
revelation specifying the respects in which likeness to God constitutes the
pattern of human behavior is indispensable.
Otherwise confusion would be unavoidable . . .. The law of God guards the distinction so
germane to the basic obligation, namely, likeness to God. For the law of God is the will of God for us . . .. When the sanctity of God’s law is maintained and we reverence him
in the prerogative that is his as the one lawgiver, then the likeness to God
demanded by our creation in his image and by the new creation in Christ is
realized” (I, pp. 174-176).
So then,
the standard by which we would judge the acceptability of God’s laws in our
present culture cannot be the ways of this world (Rom. 12:1-2). Nor can it be the standard of revered tradition
(Matt. 15:6), majority opinion (Rom. 3:4), the lifestyle of unbelievers (Eph.
4:17), the desires of sinful men (I Peter 4:1-5), other high-sounding ethical
standards (Col. 2:16-23), the view of religious teachers (I Jn. 4:1), human
wisdom (I Cor. 1:17-31), worldly philosophy (Col. 2:8), human laws (Acts 5;29),
governmental decrees (Rev. 13:8, 16-17; 14:1, 12), public approval (2 Tim. 3:3,
12), personal convenience (Matt. 5:10), financial cost (Matt. 6:24),
advancement in the world (Matt. 19:17, 29), protection of special favors (Heb.
11:25-26), ease of application in the face of the status quo (Acts 17:6), or
simplicity of understanding and applying those laws (Heb. 5:11-14). If the editor wishes to judge Theonomy by a “test of details,” what
standard does he propose for us to use in such an evaluation? The fact is that there is no acceptable standard of evaluation
except the word of God itself – which
is to say that our obligation to the whole law of God can be determined only by
interpreting what the Bible itself says about such an obligation, and not by
asking how acceptable the details appear to us right now. I trust that nobody will think that sola Scriptura is taking Reformed
principles too far. Rather than
allowing our present opinions and attitudes to be the standard by which we
evaluate God’s law, we ought to take God’s law as the standard by which we
evaluate our present opinions and attitudes.
As a third
prefatory remark let me express my uneasiness with the manner in which the
editor treats the details of God’s law that he chooses to mention. These specifics from the law are set forth
as though any reasonable person would see how ridiculous they are; they are
presented as apparent embarrassments to a modern theologian or believer – almost
in a belittling light. How else can we
account for the fact that the editor merely alludes to them – without argument
or commentary – and expects the mere allusion to dissuade readers from
believing that “every jot and tittle” of God’s law is valid today? He seems to think that it will be
self-evident to everybody that these strange, extreme, or horrible laws cannot
be accepted by us in the twentieth century church. This approach to God’s holy law is unworthy of us as believers in
the inspired and infallible word of God; it is unbecoming of us who have
renounced personal self-sufficiency and trusted in Christ, who Himself
delighted in every detail of God’s law.
Every specific Old Testament law came directly from God, and as such
every detail calls for our respect and honor – even if we believe that God has
put certain details out of gear for the present age. Since these laws were to be taken by God’s people as good and
proper in the Old Testament, it cannot
be simply obvious that they are not
good and proper for God’s people today.
What was the delight of the
Psalmist is not an obvious absurdity
to us. Such laws cannot be repudiated
by modern believers without a sufficient, biblical argument to that
effect. Current application of God’s law
cannot be ruled out simply by inspection of the content of the law itself, for
in itself that law is the transcript of God’s holiness. To depreciate those laws for what they say
in themselves is to disrespect the holy character of their Author. We simply must not begin with the assumption
that Old Testament laws are somehow funny or too strict. “The law of God was never too strict; had it
been so, it would have been unjust, and unworthy of its Author. It was always perfectly holy, just, and
good; and of course any mitigation, or change, would abate its excellence, and
make it less worthy of the love and estimation of every holy soul . . .. We never render any acceptable obedience to
God, till we conform to his laws from a
regard to his authority, as the very ground and reason of our obedience”
(Ashbel Green, Lectures in Shorter
Catechism, Vol. 2, p. 11).
Finally,
before looking at the details chosen by the editor, it should be observed that
he has apparently mistaken what the theonomic perspective is when it comes to
interpreting God’s word or law.
According to the editor I attack the spiritualizing and allegorizing of
the law – unlike classic Reformed scholars who sought to “get around” the
details of the Mosaic law by spiritualizing them; thus on the basis of
theonomic ethics the details of that law must be taken “straight” (9-13, p.
19a). This remark is highly misleading,
all the more because it is entirely unclear how the editor is using his words. We can begin, however, by observing that
classic Reformed thought does not
attempt to get around the details of God’s law (as we have seen above), nor
does it advocate an allegorical or spiritualizing approach to Bible
interpretation. God’s word is its own
best interpreter, and it must be understood contextually, according to the
genre of the passage, and in a historico-grammatical fashion. When meant to be taken figuratively, it
should be read literally. Context and
the “analogy of faith” are determinative.
This classic Reformed approach to hermeneutics is precisely the approach
advocated by Theonomy. The Scriptures are neither completely
figurative nor completely literal.
Therefore, contrary to the editor’s comment, there is no place in Theonomy where literalistic
interpretation of God’s law is insisted upon at every point. In fact, at appropriate points the book
argues for a non-literalistic understanding of God’s command (e.g., recognizing
the literary device of hyperbole: pp. 91-92, 97), or endorses a typological
interpretation of some commands (chapter 9). Theonomy does not, moreover, teach that even the literally
interpreted Old Testament laws are to be applied literally in the same way
today. In a culture where entertaining
is not done on the roof of the house (since it is sloped, unlike the flat roofs
in ancient Israel) Theonomy does not
argue that a railing must nevertheless be placed around the roof (pp. 540-541);
it is the underlying principle of appropriate safely precautions that is
binding today (for instance, a fence around your swimming pool). We see, then, that theonomic ethics is
sensitive to changes in application of the Old Testament law to a new age and
culture. Nowhere does the book argue
that everything in the Old Testament law is literally binding today, for that
would (1) assume a literalistic hermeneutic in general, (2) ignore the
typological element of the sacrificial system, etc., and (3) overlook the
illustrative nature of certain laws which must be applied to different “cases”
today. The editor has oversimplified
the theonomic interpretation of God’s law and thereby severely misrepresented
it. His readers will have been
drastically misled in their understanding of what Theonomy teaches. Of
course, criticisms which rest on such a mistaken conception of the position are
invalid from the outset.
With these
introductory remarks we can now get around to replying to the editor’s alleged
applications of the theonomic position.
He recognizes the book Theonomy in
Christian Ethics sets forth a theological argument for the general premise that God’s law is fully
valid today; for the most part it does not address particular laws (9-13, p.
91). Indeed the Preface to the book
clearly states: “I have not attempted to offer a commentary on the particulars
of God’s law as found in the Bible.
While such a discussion of the specific commandments of God would follow
naturally upon the conclusion of this study, it is not the primary purpose of
the study itself. Instead I aim to
demonstrate from Scripture that we have an ethical obligation to keep all of
God’s law. It is this formal
requirement, rather than the details of the law or even the procedure for
activating society and its rulers to observe that law, that I have taken as the
subject matter for analysis” (p. xiii).
The editor has not done anything to address the central thesis of the
book at all; he has offered no counter argument to it. He has not shown or even suggested that Theonomy fails to prove its particular
point. As long as he has not undermined
the general thesis demonstrated in the book, the editor’s questions about the
details are without force; if the word of God teaches their validity – as I
believe it does – then no human objection to them can stand up, even if they
appear odd or harsh to a twentieth-century mentality.
Having
admitted that Theonomy deals with the
general question of the law’s validity and not the detailed content of the law,
the editor nevertheless goes on to address the content of the law. He seems to realize that he is not touching
the central issue of the book at all.
But more importantly, we must observe that what he alleges to be the
application of God’s law today does not,
with rare exception, follow at all from the teaching in Theonomy. That is, not only
is the content of the law not the main issue here, but the editor has
mistakenly represented what the law’s content requires today. Consequently his critique is doubly weakened
in its effect.
For
instance, the editor has misrepresented what the law of God originally
required, saying that the lex talionix
(“eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . . “) calls for literal application: “The
appropriate punishment for the man who paralyzed George Wallace would be
something done to paralyze him in the same way” (9-13, p. 19a). But this is a
terrible misunderstanding of the law (found in Ex. 21:23-25, and expressed
again in Lev. 24:19-20), whether one believes that it is binding today or
not. As Kitto’s Popular Cyclopedia of Biblical Literature says, the lex talionis “was adopted by Moses as
the principle, but not the mode of
punishment” (p. 688b). Leon Morris
writes that the lex talionis “assures
an even justice . . . and a penalty proportionate to the crime” (Baker’s Dictionary of Theology, p.
430a). “The principle is not intended
to be vindictive or a basis for cruel or unusual punishment” (H. P. Hook, in Baker’s Dictionary of Christian Ethics,
p. 566b). Patrick Fairbairn clearly
shows that this principle was never intended for literal application, but
simply required appropriate compensation that was neither too lenient nor too
harsh (The Revelation of Law in Scripture,
pp. 102-105); he also remarks that the civil legislation of all Christian
countries depends on this principle of God’s law. Therefore, George Wallace deserves adequate compensation for the
injury done to him but the punishment is not the literal maiminf of his
assailant. I believe that it is not
untoward to say that the editor ought to know as much. Theonomy does not require us to distort the natural understanding
of God’s revealed law.
Likewise,
when the editor alleges that a theonomist must hold that an offending hand
ought to be literally cut off (Matt. 5:30), he attributes an interpretation of
Christ’s command to the theonomist which no evangelical expositor finds in the
passage to begin with. “These verses
(Matt. 5:29, 30) are highly figurative, and we must once more be cautious about
drawing inferences from metaphors” (Plummer, Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew, p.
81). “This command must not be taken
literally . . .. The eye and the hand
that lead a person into sin symbolize and represent ‘occasions of
stumbling,’ or if one prefers,
enticements to do wrong, beguiling allurements” (Hendriksen, Exposition of the Gospel According to
Matthew, p. 303). In these two
examples, then, the editor has distorted the Bible’s original teaching and
unfairly prejudiced his hearers against theonomic ethics by falsely suggesting
that it misreads the Bible in the same way.
God’s law does not require maiming by the lex talioni nor by Christ’s injunction for personal
sanctification. The editor’s
misrepresentations of the application of theonomic ethics here are particularly
distressing since the book Theonomy in
Christian Ethics happens to deal explicitly with the proper understanding
of these two details from God’s law (pp. 97, 438). It seems, then, that the editor ought to know better than to
attribute this literalistic understanding of the two commands to a theonomist. The editor’s criticism is actually directed
against a straw man.
The same
must be said with respect to the editor’s allegation that theonomic ethics
would require that we refrain from mixing types of cloth (9-13, p. 19a). Theonomy
does not teach that we must follow
the ceremonial shadows of the Old Testament today, and as explained above the
laws which taught and enforced Israel’s separation from the Gentiles (e.g., the
law prohibiting mixed cloth) are part of these shadows which are kept in a
different manner today after the saving work of Christ. Consistent with the Westminster Confession
of Faith XIX.3, Theonomy recognizes a
“ceremonial” category of laws in the Old Testament which prefigure Christ and
direct the redeemed community; these are restorative laws, and they are
discussed as such in chapter 9 of my book as well as in a previous section of
this essay. Once again, the editor has
simply misrepresented the theonomic position, even when there is adequate
material in may book to correct his portrayal of its alleged implications. We have seen, then, that the editor’s
examples of what theonomic ethics requires incorrectly interpret the word of
God and misrepresent the plain teaching of Theonomy. These two kinds of mistake are combined when the editor asserts that
theonomic ethics would require us to bar from the Christian church those who
have testicles crushed in an accident and those who have grandparents who were
born as illegitimate children (the reference is to Deut. 23:1,2). But in the first place the editor has
misconstrued the original teaching of God’s word, as consulting the
commentaries of Old Testament experts will indicate (e.g., Keil and Delitzsch,
Drive, Kline). The law here dealt with self-imposed mutilation or castration
(that is, eunuchs) and with children born of an incestuous union – not with those injured in an accident or those
simply born out of wedlock, as the editor suggests (9-13, p. 18c). Such laws as these point to the perfection
required of God’s people; they were not to be sexually blemished, for that was
contrary to the nature in which God created man. Accordingly no man could be a priest who had crushed testicles
(Lev. 21:20); such a blemish would profane the alter and sanctuary. No animal with crushed testicles could be
sacrificed unto the Lord (Lev. 22;24), for the sacrifices were to be perfect
and without blemish. These laws are part of a ceremonial system which typified
the unblemished perfection of the Savior, and only through the salvation He
secured can anyone become part of the redeemed community today. As ceremonial or restorative laws, these Old
Testament shadows would not be literally binding today according to the
teaching of Theonomy. Already the Old Testament indicated that the
day was coming when those who had been formerly excluded from the congregation
because of sexual blemishes (e.g., eunuchs) would be gladly received in God’s
house (Isa. 56:3-5); the New Testament inaugurated this joyous day (Acts
8:27-28) and no longer requires external, visible exclusion of the sexually
blemished. To allege that Theonomy calls
for such exclusion is a serious error, one which unfairly maligns its character
and its sensitivity to progressive biblical revelation.
One can now
readily understand why I said earlier that the editor’s purported examples of
theonomic ethics in practice are so mistaken.
The original requirement of God’s law has been misrepresented at points,
the position of theonomic ethics has been misconstrued in crucial ways, and
occasionally these two basic errors have been combined. As a result the reader is left with nothing
remotely resembling the genuine application of theonomic ethics today. We must preclude any criticism of theonomic
ethics which depends on the editor’s erroneous portrayal of that position, for
such criticism is merely jousting against a straw-man. However, I have even further problems in
trying to respond to some of the editor’s alleged illustrations of theonomic
ethics. His quick and easy manner of
dealing with a serious and extensively reasoned position in theological ethics
– with the editor’s avoidance of a detailed, qualified, and in-depth discussion
or criticism – leaves me often confused as to what he is attempting to
say. For instance, at one point he
claims that in God’s law those wives who were “family” before marriage had more
secure rights than wives who were “strangers” (9-13, p. 19a). The difficulty here is that he gives no
biblical citation for this claim, and I do not know or recognize what the
scriptural referent for such an assertion would be. I am not even sure of what the editor’s assertion maintains. Thus no response is possible (or perhaps
necessary). To take another example, at
one point the editor suggests that a probing question that could be put to
theonomic ethics is whether the law’s prohibition of charging interest to a
brother fits the law’s function as a schoolmaster bringing us to Christ (9-13,
p. 18c). The difficulty here is that I
just cannot discern what the critical thrust of such a question would be; that
is, the answer is so patent that I cannot help feeling that the editor has not
clearly communicated what he thinks is troublesome in this illustration for an
advocate of theonomic ethics. My
inability to keep this stipulation of God’s law shows me my need for Christ as
Savior; when I profit from a brother’s financial distress by loaning to him on
interest, the avarice of my heart and my lack of love is exposed, and I am
driven to Christ for cleansing and forgiveness. My examples here are meant to demonstrate the dangers inherent in
the hasty and undetailed manner of discussing a theological viewpoint found in
the editor’s treatment of theonomic ethics.
At best the analysis will be shallow, and at worst it will be confused
or misleading.
We move
into a different orbit of potential problems when the editor quickly mentions
two aspects of God’s law as it touches on the institution of slavery. Given the
social history of our nation, along with the emotional representation of it in
contemporary literature and drama, the very mention of slavery today will
usually carry negative connotations for a hearer or reader. Too often we hastily identify the practice
of slavery in this nation’s past (focusing on its cruel features) with the
institution laid out on God’s law for the Israelites. Apart from punitive slavery, the biblical notion of slavery is
closer to the practice of indentured servitude than it is to our general,
cultural image. The biblical concept
was a most blessed one and certainly an “ancient improvement” on the modern practice
of social welfare! Ordinarily a man
would become another man’s servant due to poverty (Lev. 25:39-40). If the servant was the same faith as the
master, the master was to be especially cautious not to rule with rigor over
him (Lev. 25:43, 46). The insolvent
debtor who became a servant only needed to serve a six year term (Ex. 21:2),
and upon becoming a freeman in society again he was financially well off
because he was given lavish provisions by his former master (Deut. 15:12-14). If the servant was ever mistreated, he went
free (Ex. 21:26-27); if he had to run away from his master, he was not to be
forcibly returned by those who found him (Deut. 23:15-16). I really cannot see any reason why we should
be emotionally prejudiced against this biblical practice as regulated by God’s
law. As John Murray wisely points out,
we must take care to distinguish between the institution of slavery as
presented in God’s word (basically, the convention of having property in
another person’s labor) and the abuses to which this institution has frequently
been subjected (Principles of Conduct,
pp. 95-98) – abuses which, we must note, violate
God’s law on slavery.
In dealing
with the editor’s examples pertaining to slavery in God’s law we should also
make note of the obvious need of discerning transitions from the society and
culture of ancient Israel (in terms of which the language of God’s law is
couched) to the situation in modern America.
That is, to put it simply, the case-law literary character of many Old
Testament laws must be taken into account in applying the commandments to the
contemporary world. Nobody is arguing
that the ancient culture of Israel mentioned illustratively in the case-laws
(e.g., fenced roofs, flying ax-heads, goring oxen) must be reenacted
today. Our moral duty is to discern
properly the underlying principles illustrated in the case-laws (even about
slavery), understand the facts of our own cultural situation, and apply God’s
word with accuracy. The transition from
Israel’s culture to modern America is sometimes not too easy, especially for
those of us who have little practice in using God’s word to this end. Those who are without experience in the word
of righteousness, those who do not by reason of use have their senses exercised
to discern good and evil, will be immature in putting God’s word to ethical use
(Heb. 5:1-14). Yet the job must be done
– even with respect to slavery laws – if we are to live by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God (Matt. 4:4, where
Jesus illustrates authority). Of
course, if not all of God’s law is binding today (which the editor’s discussion
suggests), then we have very little incentive to gain competence in using God’s
entire word in this way. Much of it, at
least in ethics, can be causally ignored (which, I believe, is quite contrary
to Paul’s point in 2 Tim. 3:16-17).
Remembering
the need to distinguish biblical slavery from historical abuses, and
remembering the need to make appropriate transitions from ancient Israel’s
culture to the modern world, we can now turn quickly to the editor’s alleged
illustrations of how strange or unacceptable God’s law would be today as it
touches on matters of slavery. When all
is said and done, I find very little in it by which to be embarrassed or feel
awkward; the editor has not turned up anything in God’s instructions pertaining
to slavery which is readily subject to human criticism. He first mentions the provision in God’s law
that a housekeeper could, at the end of his or her term of servitude, choose to
stay with the master in perpetual servitude (9-13, pp. 18c-19a). We read of this in Deuteronomy 15:12-18, and
I think that three factors in this situation are noteworthy. First, the servant would not have any
obvious complaint with this situation because his or her choice was entirely
voluntary. Second, this voluntary
decision to stay with the master would actually be made in the face of being
liberally furnished out of the master’s wealth if the servant chose his or her
freedom. Third and consequently, such a
free decision in the face of a financially beneficial option would obviously be
made out of a motivation of love for the master’s house. All three of these factors are clear in
God’s law, so I just cannot see what the editor could find objectionable about
such a blessed arrangement for servants.
This arrangement was a genuine expression of brotherly love – the
perpetual moral obligation of God’s people toward each other. If it is the ancient cultural manner of
indicating the servant’s decision to stay in perpetual servitude (viz.,
piercing the earlobe) which bothers the editor, let it simply be said that
theonomic ethics would allow (but not require) that a different kind of
indication be used today. If someone
wishes to argue that the pierced-ear feature of this law is essential to
obedience today, he would need to produce a convincing exegetical argument, but
more relevantly he would be going beyond
what is contended in Theonomy in
Christian Ethics. At present I
believe the pierced-ear indication reflects the case-law literary feature of
the commandment, being couched in the culture of ancient Israel. It could be used today as well, but is not
itself required by the law.
The
editor’s other illustration from the slavery laws of the Old Testament is
again, unfortunately, a misrepresentation of the law’s requirement. He says, “servants may leave their servitude
as free men after seven years, but it they do, they must leave their wives and
children behind” (9-13, p. 19a). But in
the first place, servants are to be released after six years service, not seven as claimed (Ex. 21:2). Secondly, the categorical claim that servants who are freed must leave their
families behind is simply false; this provision is not, as indicated by the
editor, generally applicable.
Ordinarily the servant would leave the master’s home with his family (Lev. 25:41). Not all servants who are freed leave their
families behind, but only those servants who gained their families in a special
way. If a man already married became a
servant, he left his servitude with his wife and family. If an unmarried man became a servant and
married during his servitude, he left with his family. If the servant married another servant
during his servitude, after his term of service he would leave with his family
upon completion of his wife’s term.
There was only one special case where his wife was a perpetual servant
of the master and given to him by the master (see Ex. 21:2-6; the assumption
must be that she was a perpetual servant because otherwise she would be free to
leave after six years herself). Since
the master owned her labor perpetually and gave her as a wife to his other
servant, it would be inappropriate for the servant to leave with his new wife
and thereby deprive his benefactor. It
should also be noted that “leaving his family behind” would not mean abandoning
them; he would become a freeman in society, free to labor as he would choose,
but they would remain servants to the master.
Nevertheless, this difference in social status would not preclude the
family’s living together, etc. More
importantly, the law itself encourages the servant to become a perpetual
servant (like his wife) out of love for his family and love for his master. Again, it is hard to criticize such a motivation. If the editor finds fault with this
provision of God’s law, he will have to specify what it would be. The provision appears loving, just, and fair
on an accurate reading of it.
Although Theonomy in Christian Ethics does not
set forth an argued commentary on the details of God’s law but maintains the
general premise that we are obliged to honor and keep them, and although that
premise cannot be defeated by a supposed test of the details of the law for
today (as demonstrated above), we have nevertheless responded in some fashion
to all but one of the editor’s alleged illustrations of the application of
theonomic ethics. As yet we have found
no hint of a reason to dispute with the theonomic approach to Christian
ethics. The only remaining, specific
illustration from God’s law to which some response should be given arises from
the editor’s remark that Theonomy
should not be tested by its claim that capital punishment continues to be valid
for murder, but by its endorsement of capital punishment for other crimes
specified in God’s law. The editor
says, “What one must come to terms with in a decision for or against Theonomy is not capital punishment for
murder but capital punishment for adultery.
Or for cursing one’s parents” (9-13, p. 18c). That is, if you do not feel that the death penalty should apply
to adultery or cursing one’s parents today, then you should not endorse
theonomic ethics. Of course we cannot
accept the editor’s theological method here, as noted earlier. The provisions
of God’s law cannot be decided for or against on the basis of one’s
preconceived notions, personal feelings, cultural traditions, or what have
you. The editor is not free to reject
some detail of God’s law just because it strikes him as somehow harsh or absurd
today; his obligation is rather to bring his feelings and thinking into
conformity with the word of God.
Scripture alone should
determine our theological convictions, not extraneous and unauthoritative human
reasoning. Therefore, it is time to
protest strongly the editor’s method of deciding for or against Theonomy – mind you, not for the sake of
theonomic ethics, but for the sake of faithful and God-honoring procedure in
all of our theology.
On the other
hand, if the preceding quotation from the editor means (without saying as much)
that the theonomic thesis must be weighed against the scriptural teaching about the continuation or abrogation of capital
punishment for adultery or cursing one’s parents, then the theonomist rejoices
for such a remark. This is precisely
the point of Theonomy in Christian Ethics:
we must explore God’s word to see what it authoritatively teaches about the
continuation or abrogation of God’s law – even its penal sanctions – in the age
of the New Covenant. Yet if this is the thrust of the editor’s
remark, it is surely strange and abortive that he does not follow it up with any suggestion as to how God’s word
teaches the abrogation of these penal stipulations. After all, Theonomy
argues at great length and with a large score of supporting indications from
Scripture that these penal sanctions are indeed binding today. The editor has not bothered in interact with
the theonomic argument here at all.
There are numerous reasons (many found in the preceding article) why we
cannot simply presume that some law or body of laws from the Old Testament is
invalid today. One of the strongest
is found in these words of our Lord: “whosoever breaks one of the least of
these commandments and teaches men so shall be least in the kingdom of heaven”
(Matt. 5:19). I cannot bring myself to
believe that the editor may choose to reject the outlook of Theonomy as it touches on the law’s
penal sanctions, therefore, without some exegetical defense for his
opinions. He does not have the
prerogative of rejecting God’s laws arbitrarily. So then, what reason does he offer his readers from God’s Word for disregarding the
penal sanctions of God’s law? To date,
none. Accordingly the argument of Theonomy is itself a sufficient answer
to the editor’s remarks.
This
challenge to the editor’s position can be further strengthened. The editor has strongly censured a bishop
for not correctly representing Christ’s attitude toward capital punishment
(9-20, p. 10; from this I surmise that he feels strongly that Christians should
advocate capital punishment for murder (since validity of the death penalty for
this crime is taken for granted in his article on Theonomy, 9-13, p.
18c). But how can the editor criticize
those who oppose capital punishment for murder without going to the Old
Testament to see what kind of “evildoers” toward whom the magistrate “bears not
the sword in vain” (Rom. 13:4)? And if
he appeals to the Old Testament penal code as valid today, how can he be
consistent and turn around to reject that same penal code for adulterers and
incorrigible delinquents? As a covenant
theologian, how would the editor pick and choose which commandments or
covenants of God he follows? If capital
punishment for murder is right, why is it not right for adultery? After all, both of these laws came from the
same unchanging, holy God; the Lord placed both of these laws in the statute
back of His people. How can a
theologian be biblically consistent and reject (or adopt) one without the
other? Moreover, if the editor does not
endorse God’s law as it pertains to the punishment of criminals (other than
murderers anyway), where will he find a more just, reasonable, and beneficial
penal code to follow? What justice would
the editor mete out, for instance, to a rapist or kidnapper? The theonomist
believes that the righteous Judge of all the earth has set down a standard for
social and penal rectitude that He expects His creatures to honor and obey. And not in a smorgasbord fashion. So then, we can challenge the editor to make
good on his assumption that the death penalty is valid for murder today; given
his assumptions, how can the editor defend that thesis? Given a biblical
defense of the death penalty for murder, how can the editor reject the biblical
social penalty for adultery or cursing one’s parents? He cannot have God’s law both ways, valid and invalid at the same
time. (And it should be added, before
someone begins to bark up the wrong tree immediately, that we cannot pick and
choose between the covenants of God; they are all held to be binding in the New Testament, including the Mosaic
covenant with its emphasis on law. Every scripture – and every jot and
tittle thereof – of the Old Testament is set forth as authoritative for the New
Covenant believer, for instance in 2 Tim. 3:16-17; Matt. 4:17-18).
It should
not be thought that the Old Testament penal code (just as any part of God’s
law) is rescinded in the New Testament unless otherwise indicated. God’s commandments are continuously valid
unless the lawgiver rescinds them, and that abrogation of the penal sanctions
has not been shown. Nevertheless, there
is positive New Testament teaching as well which supports and confirms the Old
Testament penal code. When Paul says
that the magistrate does not bear the sword in vain (Rom. 13:4), it is because
he is deemed God’s minister who
avenges God’s wrath (cf. Rom. 12:19) against evildoers – that is, against those
who violate His law (cf. Rom. 13:10).
The sword may not be wielded independently of God’s direction at the
arbitrary desire of the magistrate or populous. The sword is not used in vain when it is used in a way conforming
to the standards of special rectitude as found in God’s law. It only makes sense that God would require
“the minister of God” who is “ordained of God” be followed the
commandments of God rather than the whims of wayward man. If the Old Testament penal code is deemed
invalidated today, then what crimes are legitimately covered by Romans 13:4? The New Testament does not render an
explicit catalogue answering that question.
Do we infer, therefore, that any and all “evildoers” can be punished
with death? Do we infer that the answer
is open to varying human deliberation, apart from directives given by God? Or do we not rather, with Paul, find the
answer to such obvious questions in the already clear directions of the Old
Testament?
The law was
given, and is lawfully used, to restrain criminal behavior in society – as Paul
says in I Timothy 1:8-10. Accordingly,
when many serious accusations were
brought against Paul himself by adherents of the Old Testament law, he clearly
affirmed his submission to the moral authority of God’s penal code: “If I am an
evildoer and have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die”
(Acts 25;11). Note the fact that Paul
here again speaks of a (supposed) criminal according to God’s law as an “evildoer.”
He speaks of “anything” worthy of death (and not “the one and only thing now worthy of death”). He uses the standard Old Testament designation for capital crimes as those deeds which
are “worthy of death” (e.g., Deut. 21:22), and he insists that the punishment
ought to be carried out if any such criminal deed is proven. The New Testament perspective on the Old
Testament penal code is clear: “every transgression and disobedience received a
just recompense of reward” (Heb. 2:2).
That is why Paul spoke of capital crimes according to the Mosaic law as
deeds “worthy of” death – justice in such cases demands the death penalty,
according to the supreme Judge over the affairs of all men and nations.
Do New
Testament Christians want to do justice or injustice toward criminals in our
society? Obviously social justice must
be done. Then we must, with Paul, be
advocates of doing what the perfectly just law of God requires, and we must
praise God, as did Ezra, whenever God puts it into the heart of rulers (even
unbelieving rulers) to have God’s law enforced even to the point of its
stipulations for capital punishment (cf. Ezra 7:25-28). This is not a violation of the separation of
church and state, for that separation does not legitimately mean the separation
of the state from God and His directives to it. Both church and state
are morally responsible to God, contrary to the unbiblical and humanistic
doctrine of neutralism and pluralism in society. The New Testament, as well as the Old, requires all magistrates
to rule as God’s ministers, following
the model code of justice found in His law (cf. Deut. 4:6-8; Isa. 51:4; Ps.
2:10-12; 119:46; Prov. 16:12; 20:26).
Humanist society does not have a wiser and more beneficial way of
dealing with social problems than God’s – as history and present experience
make quite obvious to all but the ideologically blinded. (One does well to
reflect on the telling observation that current society is undergoing its most
devastating difficulties in connection with acts which are capital crimes
according to God’s inspired word.)
As Dabney
maintained, the precepts of God’s law “guide secular laws, and thus lay a
foundation for a wholesome civil society” (Systematic
Theology, p. 354). For Dabney that
obviously included the penal sanctions of the law, for instance against
adultery (p. 407). If the sanctions
were abrogated, the civil magistrate would be left with little positive
direction at all because his key function is the punishment of evildoers (Rom.
13:3-4). Martin Bucer maintained that
the penal sanctions of God’s law were binding on magistrates of his day in On the Kingdom of Christ (1557). Likewise John Cotton upheld those sanctions
in An Abstract of the Laws of New England
(1641). A prime participant in the
Westminster Assembly, Samuel Rutherford, held forth the same outlook in Lex, Rex (1644), as did Duplessis-Mornay
in A Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants
(1689). The conviction that God’s penal
code for societies has not become obsolete or unjust or invalidated is firmly
rooted in the Reformed tradition. The
Second Helvetic Confession enjoins magistrates to use penal sanctions according
to God’s word, and the Westminster Confession encouraged magistrates to follow
these sanctions, for instance, in executing idolaters and blasphemers. Influential Puritan authors such as Becen, Cartwright,
Perkins, Stubbs, and Shepherd commanded the penal sanctions of God’s law to
magistrates. Both Cartwright and
Shepherd, in England and New England, maintained explicitly that the
“equity of the judicial laws” of Moses
included the penal sanctions of the law (a perspective obvious also in Cotton’s
work, Moses, His Judicials); for them
the constant validity of those sanctions was biblically and theologically demonstrable if anyone disagreed. In Aaron’s
Rod Blossoming, George Gillespie (another prominent participant at the
Westminster Assembly) gave his support to the conviction “that the judicial law
of Moses, so far as concerneth the punishments of sins against the moral law,
idolatry, blasphemy, Sabbath-breaking, adultery, theft, etc. ought to be the
rule to the Christian magistrate.” Thus
we can see that when Theonomy argues
from Scripture that the penal sanctions of God’s law are binding today, it is
not adding anything astonishingly new to the history of Reformed thought on the
subject. (I have spoken purposely of
the history of respectable Reformed
thought, not of a mythological “mainstream of Reformed thought” because the
latter is usually found by gerrymandering a canal under one’s own feet.)
So then,
let us return to the editor’s remark that the acceptability of theonomic ethics
should be tied to one’s view of the death penalty for adultery and cursing
one’s parents. The burden of proof now
lies on the editor: is this biblically
acceptable or not? No reason has been
offered to think that it is not. Many
reasons have been offered to think that it is.
Accordingly, on the editor’s own platform, it appears that the theonomic
approach to ethics is acceptable – as it has been to many Reformed theologians
of the past. Many today who say
otherwise will be found to avoid the crucial question of biblical warrant for
their opinion and depend almost entirely on emotional appeals. But our emotions ought to conform to the
attitudes expressed by God in His word (of course, as it is accurately understood). If God sees adultery as so vile and socially
damaging that it morally requires the death penalty in civil courts, should not
our emotions match the true judgment of God on this issue? Who are we to think that we can be more
“compassionate” or “enlightened” in our modern mentality than the living and
true God who is characterized by justice and love? If you will overlook modern indifference to or encouragement of
the practice of adultery, reflection can readily disclose the severe
degradation and dire consequences of marital infidelity. Prior to our generation people have not been
universally indifferent to the social offensiveness of adultery. In Western Europe the death penalty for it
was common in the 16th century; it was defended by Martin Bucer,
upheld in Calvin’s Geneva, enforced for over a century in English law, integral
to the law codes of Puritan New England, and supported by various Reformed
theologians since then. For instance,
Dabney maintained that “The laws of Moses, therefore, very properly made
adultery a capital crime; nor does our Savior, in the incident of the woman
taken in adultery, repeal that statute, or disallow its justice” (Systematic Theology, p. 407); he went on
to attribute the approach of modern nations to adultery to “the grossness of
Pagan scuroes.” Can the editor or
anyone else plainly tell us what our “enlightened” modern scholarship has
turned up in studying Scripture that was completely unknown to, or incautiously
overlooked by, previous adherents of the penal code of God’s law? What new discovery has demonstrated their
previous error on this subject? The
sanctity of marriage has progressively declined in Western culture since the
abandonment of God’s law regarding adultery.
Biblically and pragmatically I see no reason to prefer the viewpoint of
modern secularism to that of the Puritans.
The
editor’s other illustration pertains to the death penalty for cursing one’s
parents. In responding to it we must
again set the record somewhat straight.
The editor has suggested that on theonomic principles “A Christian has
the duty to press the state for the
death penalty if he hears his neighbor’s son cursing his father” (9-13, p.
18c). this is not quite accurate. The state must first have a statute against
cursing one’s parents before any prosecution could be contemplated; the
advocate of theonomic ethics believes in the need for proper due process and
does not promote a selitious, vigilant, or ex
post facto use of the social laws of God’s word. Moreover, theonomic ethics does not teach that God’s law should
be imposed with force on a rea***citant people or society. Only when the majority of a society have
come to Christ as Savior and Lord, and only when those Christians work out
their adherence to God'’ son in their various life-involvements – including
social and political ethics – will the statutes of God’s law become the law of
the land. Therefore, the editor is
somewhat misleading when he suggests that a theonomist would presently urge
civil officials to execute a son who was overheard cursing his father. What we need at present is revival (on the
personal front) and legal reform (on the social front) if we are to anticipate
and work toward a day in which the kingdom of our Savior will be more manifest
in the state – which is not to say
that the state is the only or even most important focus for the expression of
Christ’s kingdom, but it is a legitimate and important one nonetheless.
A second
way in which the record must be kept accurate regarding the death penalty for
cursing one’s parents is this. The law
of God never did require, contrary to the emotional misrepresentation of some
antagonists today, the execution of small children for infrequent or minor
offenses against their parents. We must
pay close attention to what God actually commanded. The law here actually dealt with incorrigible delinquents, not with babies who cry too much or small
children who are naughty (as some shamefully say about God’s stipulation). The kind of person who is brought to the
elders for possible conviction and execution is one who smites his parents
(Ex. 21:17; Lev. 20:9), is a drunkard
and glutton who is stubborn and rebellious so as not to hearken to discipline
at all (Deut. 21:18-21). If one wishes
an illustration, you should envision here a nineteen-year-old delinquent who
drinks to excess, will not work, swears in a filthy fashion at his mother,
beats up his father, and cannot be made submissive or respectful by any form of
rebuke or discipline. When matters get
that far out of hand, so that there can be no law or order with certain
individuals, Scripture requires the civil authorities to guard the sanctity of
compliance with lawful orders by enforcing a just sanction against the
incorrigible delinquent. One has to have
fallen asleep not to realize that our society’s neighborhoods and prisons are
plagued with this very problem today.
God’s law prescribes a just answer, but secular humanism has none
whatsoever.
As
indicated already, some opponents of God’s law (or at least its social use)
seem to make a cavalier sport of this issue, attempting to persuade themselves
and others that the Old Testament commandments call for the execution of
delinquent “children.” However, it is
accordingly ironic that, as silent as the New Testament is on specific crimes
which carry the death penalty (primarily because the Old Testament word was
sufficient), one which receives explicit advocacy is the crime of cursing one’s
parents! Jesus specifically endorses
this Mosaic stipulation in Matthew 15:3-9, using it to indict the Pharisees for
suppressing God’s clear requirement in order to confirm to their own cultural
tradition and status quo. The same Lord who warned us against
diminishing any of God’s requirements (Matt. 5:17-19) declared, “God said, Honor
thy father and mother; and he who speaks evil of father or mother, let him die
the death (surely die).” Far be it from
us to speak in contradiction to the
authoritative pronouncement of our Lord and Savior! And if the death penalty is valid in the kingdom age of the New
Covenant for incorrigible children (which so many see as the most emotional
case of all), how much more can we expect the death penalty to continue valid
for the other deeds defined as capital crimes by God’s holy law! When we, without
biblical warrant, disregard God’s just, social sanction against
incorrigible children out of deference for the thinking, feeling, and ways of
our own culture or tradition, then we too will come under Christ’s condemnation
of the Pharisees.
It does not
seem to me, now, that the editor has made any telling criticism of theonomic
ethics by his “test by details.” Such a
test misses the precise kind of case being made in my book, cannot
theologically be carried out, much too often misrepresents the teaching of the
law and the outlook of theonomic ethics, and has not produced even one example
to which an adequate response cannot be given.
This type of critique has not stood up.
Nevertheless, before going on to the next area of our discussion, the
editor may still wish to have some concrete examples of what theonomic ethics
would mean in practice today; such examples could not settle the question of
acceptability of the theonomic thesis, but they would give readers something to
“get their teeth into” and reflect upon.
Theonomic ethics is not such an abstract point of view that it has no
clear, viable, concrete applications.
Just because God’s law is endorsed by theonomic ethics and that law has
undeniably relevant and useful applications, theonomic ethics will have useful applications that tend
to illustrate its beneficial character.
I hope that the following examples will be major ones, important enough
to show some advantages to following God’s law in the face of current problems. The novelty of these suggestions, if they be
deemed novel, arises from their contrast to recent practice, not from their
contrast to the history of Reformed thought iin ethics. Since the editor is anxious to have some
theonomic examples to evaluate, I will offer a few of my own, trusting that
they are true to God’s word. Study the
Bible and see if you agree with them.
Homosexuality
is not a civil right (Lev. 20:13).
Parents ought not to sell their children into the pornographic trade
(Lev. 19:29). Transvestite and unisex
clothing is prohibited Deut. 22:5).
Those who commit sexual acts with animals must be punished (Lev.
20:15-16). Rapists are to be executed
(Deut. 22:23-27). A young man who gets
a girl pregnant must at least pay a heavy fine to her father (Ex. 22:17). Those who intentionally murder another
should not be given reprieve from the death penalty (Ex. 21:14; Num. 35:31;
Deut. 19:11-13, 21). Incorrigible
criminal repeaters must eventually face the most stringent of punishments
(Deut. 21:18-21). Sky-jackers should be
executed (Ex. 21:6). Elective abortion
ought not to be a constitutional right (Ex. 21:22-25). Prisons should be replaced with a system of
restitution to the victims of theft (Ex. 22:1-4, 7-9). Those who are assaulted must be paid full
compensation by their attackers (Ex. 21:18-19). It is unjust to punish homeowners who injure or kill trespassers
at night (Ex. 22:2-3). People are
responsible to stop and help others who are in distress or who are facing
property loss, whether or not the person needing aid is an enemy or a brother
(Ex. 23:4-5; Deut 22:1-4). The
handicapped in particular are not to be ridiculed or taken advantage of (Lev.
19:14). Compensation should be made by
a company for its industrial pollution (Ex. 22:6)l Local building codes must incorporate regulations that protect
safety and life (Deut. 22:8). A
manufacturer’s knowledgeable negligence about a proven defect in an automobile
which leads to the death of someone using the car should be punished with death
or an open-ended monetary ransom (Ex. 21:29); if it leads to property damage,
the full replacement value should be paid (Ex. 21:36). When a man is guilty of damaging your
property, say by destroying your car in an accident he (or his insurance)
should make restitution from his best replacement material – for instance,
purchasing a car for you and not simply paying “Blue Book” value (Ex.
22:5). Malicious malpractice suits
against doctors should be punished with a fine equal to that the doctor would
have had to pay (Deut. 19:16-21).
Welfare to the poor through coercive taxation should be relieved by the
biblical system of charity, wherein the poor are protected with respect to
interest and collateral on loans (Ex. 22:25-27; Lev. 25:35-38; Deut. 23:19-20;
24:6, 10-13), can eat individual meals from the fields (Deut. 23:24-25), can
collect from the fields on the seventh years rest (ex. 23:10-11), can glean the
corners of the fields (Lev. 19:9-10; Deut. 24:19-22), have their debts remitted
in the seventh year (Deut. 15:1-6), and can gain financial security and relief
through indentured servitude (Lev. 1939-46; Deut. 15:7-18). Immigrants should be treated with dignity
(Lev. 19:33-34). The rich are not to be
favored or given special favors over the poor in the courts of the land (Ex.
23:6, 8; Lev. 19:15), and on the other hand the financial status even of the
poor should not affect the decisions or judgments of the Supreme Court (Ex.
23:3,6). In order to preserve just
weights and measures (Deut. 25:13-15), debased and inflationary currency should
be outlawed (Isa. 1:22). Lobbying which
amounts to bribery in Washington should be stopped (Ex. 23:8). The evening news should report established
facts and not dabble in innuendoes or tales of gossip that are “leaked” to it
(Lev. 19:16).
Well, the
examples really could go on and on. But
by now the point should have been made, even if the reader does not agree with
every one of my suggested applications of the Old Testament law. Theonomic ethics has relevant and important
alternatives to offer to humanist opinions.
If the above examples do not strike you as pertinent to our day, then
read a news magazine for six months and consider the examples again. If the critics of the social use of God’s
law disagree with the Lord’s requirements in the above cases (provided I have
interpreted them correctly), then what would they propose to do instead so as
to resolve the social problems addressed?
If the critics of theonomic ethics begrudge the choice of these
particular examples because they are so obviously just and right, then they
must be asked whether anything else but just and right laws could be expected
from the Lord! And finally, if
non-theonomists feel that some of the provisions of God’s law are binding, but
not the rest, then they must be challenged to explain how and why they “pick
and chose” among God’s righteous commandments (cf. Deut. 12:32).
Little
remains to be said in response to the editor’s misleading portrayal of
theonomic ethics or in answer to his critique of the position. I believe that the preceding discussion
replies to each of the editor’s remarks about or against the view that God’s
law continues to be binding, in detail, during the age of the New
Covenant. One final misrepresentation
of what theonomic ethics says about the use of the law will be reserved for the
discussion of eschatology below. I
would again thank the editor for raising the ethical issue of our standard for
ethics today to a level of visibility for his readers. While we at present differ in our views on
the subject, I agree with him that this question is not a touchstone of
modern-day orthodoxy or Christian fellowship; we all must remain teachable and
tolerant as the discussion continues, hopefully, to bring us closer to a clear
apprehension of the Lord’s will for our life together as believers. While defending our convictions, let none of
us draw the circle of doctrinal purity too closely around his own feet! Finally, I thank the editor for his gracious
compliment of the book Theonomy,
saying that it is “impressively biblical in its claims” (9-13, p. 19a) and
shows massive research and exegetical scholarship (9-13, p. 10b). He has affirmed in the same place that it
would take the work of a doctorate to reply adequately and criticize it. Seemingly he would intend for his readers to
temper his brief discussion and criticism with such remarks and to understand
his challenges to theonomists in that light.
He would want, even as we would expect him, to produce a reasoned
convincing, and biblical counter-argument
to theonomic ethics before the position would be considered in any adverse
light.
Let me now
change the subject completely and turn to a consideration of the editor’s
remarks about postmillennialism (9-6). Again,
certain misleading descriptions and weak criticisms call for a response so that
readers will have an adequate basis on which to evaluate and study this
important millennial position, either negatively or positively.
When Jesus
our Lord ministered among men, he made it dramatically clear that the kingdom
of God had arrived (Mk. 1:14-15; Lk.4:16-21; Mt. 12:28). The inauguration of that kingdom was also a
theme of the apostles (Acts. 2:25-36; 20:25; 28:23,31; Heb. 12:28; Rev. 1:5-6).
The kingdom of Jesus Christ is here, established, and a functioning
reality. Nevertheless, Jesus taught his
disciples to pray “Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth” (Matt. 6:10),
and the apostles anticipated future developments for the kingdom (Rom. 1:4-5; I
Cor. 15:24-28; Phil. 2:9-11; Col. 1:3-29; Heb. 2:8-9; Rev. 10:7; 11:2, 8, 13,
15; 19:11-21; 20:4-6). The kingdom is
developing, growing, and will not be consummated until the end of history. Postmillennialism is particularly concerned
with this dynamic element of growth and development for Christ’s kingdom before
the final judgment of mankind (after which, of course, the kingdom does not
increase but is complete).
The Bible
teaches us that although the kingdom starts out small like a mustard seed, it
will grow to large proportions (Mt. 13:31-32).
Like a divinely cut stone which consumes the world empires, Christ’s
kingdom will grow to be a mountain filling the whole earth (Dan. 2:31-45). All nations will flow into God’s exalted
house and be instructed in His law (Isa. 2:2-4), so that of the increase of
Christ’s kingdom there will be no end and justice will be established in the
earth (Isa. 9:7). The earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the
waters cover the sea (Isa. 11: 1-10), with appropriate effects being felt
throughout the various departments of life – every common thing will be devoted
to the Lord’s service (Zech. 14:20-210.
There will be, to speak in hyperbole, no need to evangelize because all
men will already know the Lord (Jer. 31:34); from the rising of the sun to the
going down of the same God’s name will be great among the nations (Mal.
1:11). Christ shall have dominion –
with its appropriate effects in the daily and social affairs of men – from sea
to sea, with all nations serving Him, and his enemies licking the dust (Ps.
72). The uttermost parts of the earth
will be His possession (Ps. 2:7-9) as He rules in the midst of His enemies and
makes them His footstool (Ps. 110:1-3).
All the ends of the earth will thus come to praise and reverence Him
(Ps. 67). He will not fail to establish
justice in the earth (Isa. 42:1-4), meaning that He will send forth judgment
unto victory as the Gentiles hope in
His name (Mt. 12:17-21). Presently the
Lord is reigning; He is progressively subduing every enemy so that He will be
Lord over all (I Cor. 15:24-28; Col. 1:18).
All nations are being brought to the obedience of faith (Rom. 1:4-5)
because Satan has been bound (Rev. 20:1-3).
Since all power and authority in heaven and earth belong to Christ, who
is with the church continuously, He has commissioned it to make all nations His
disciples and to teach them to observe whatsoever He has commanded (Matt.
28:18-20).
The
postmillennialist believes that these things will surely be accomplished in the
power of God’s Spirit prior to the great apostasy at the very end of history
which will trigger the Lord’s return in fiery judgment (Rev. 20:7-10; 2 Thes.
1:7-10; 2 Peter 3:3-13). There will be
no time or opportunity given for evangelism, conversion, or kingdom growth after that time; therefore, since no
word of God can fail of accomplishment, the kingdom will increase in the ways
described above prior to the Lord’s
return. In broad strokes, this is the
postmillennial confidence. We would
gladly hear the Spirit’s word to the churches, beckoning them to “be victorious
(or, overcome)” and thereby have an open door to missionary success (e.g., Rev.
3:7-13) and to ruling with Christ over the nations (Rev. 2:26-29;
3:21-22). God’s “kingdom of priests,”
the church (I Peter 2:9), reigns upon earth with Christ (Rev. 5:9-10; 20:4-6);
following her Lord, the church will conquer the nations with the preaching of
the gospel (Rev. 19:11-21). The
kingdoms of this world will indeed become the kingdom of our Lord and of His
Christ (Rev. 11:15). The Great
Commission is not a futile or impossible task laid on the church by her Lord;
it will be accomplished in covenant blessing upon “all the ends of the earth,”
who “shall remember and turn unto Jehovah; and all the kindreds of the nations
shall worship before thee” (Ps. 22:27).
The conversion (or “turning”) of the nations cannot take place after the
Lord returns in final judgment, for that day itself will settle the final
destiny of all men (Mt. 25:31-46).
With this
brief sketch of postmillennialism (and some of its biblical under-pinning) in
mind now, we can reply to the editor’s comments about it. The first and most important misconception
that I wish to set straight is the editor’s claim that, for the theonomist and
postmillennialist, “God’s law (is) the dynamic means of grace for the
transformation of the nations” ((-6, p. 14c).
Elsewhere he claims that for theonomic ethics, “The vehicle to
accomplish God’s ultimate purpose for humanity on earth is God’s law” (9-13, p.
9c); in particular, alleges the editor, the carrying out of the law’s penal
code by the state “is how the whole world ultimately will become obedient to
God” (9-13, p. 9b). But this is a
grotesque counterfeit of the actual position of theonomists and postmillennialists. It is so patently false that it can be
disproved by simply looking at one of the editor’s quotations from me in his own article: I have clearly stated
in print that “the church triumphs in the preaching of the gospel and
discipling the nations through the
supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit,” and the editor has quoted me to
that end (9-6, p. 9c). Moreover, in my
book Theonomy in Christian Ethics I
have gone to lengths to make explicit that the law of God is itself impotent to accomplish God’s saving
purposes or to bring about obedience in us (chapter 4 is entirely devoted to
those truths). The editor’s claims are
so terribly mistaken, I will take the space to quote some relevant points from Theonomy so as to eradicate completely
this false picture. I have written:
“Only the Holy spirit of God can bring power to obey to the sinner, and that
Holy Spirit was received not by law-works but by faith (Gal. 3:2). The law is simply not a quickening power; it
is without power because of sin (Rom. 8:3), and therefore unable to impart life
and righteousness (Gal. 3:21) . . ..
Grace grants the power which the law fails to provide. ‘But now we have
been released from the law, having died to that by which we were bound, so that
we serve in newness of the Spirit and not in oldness of the letter’ (Rom.
7:6). Because of the weakness of sinful
human nature the law could not overcome sin’s power, but in the believer the
power of the Holy spirit frees him from the power of sin unto death, thereby
enabling him to accomplish what the law demands (Rom. 8:1-4). The conclusion of the mater, then, is that a
man must trust in God’s grace and Christ’s righteousness rather than his own
works, which only condemn him under the law’s curse; the letter is unto death,
but the Spirit gives new life and spiritual power” (Theonomy, pp. 132, 135).
The same gracious truths are reaffirmed throughout chapter 7, whose
title itself tells the story: “Sanctification by the Holy Spirit”; one subtitle
in that chapter itself declares, “God’s Spirit as the Dynamic of
Sanctification.”
It is a
basic falsification to say that theonomic ethics or postmillennial eschatology
teaches that God’s law is a transforming means of grace or vehicle for the
coming of Christ’s kingdom to the nations.
I have taught contrary to that portrayal in many of my
publications. The power for changing
the hearts of men resides in the Holy spirit of God (Jn. 3:3-8; Ezek. 11:19-20;
Titus 3:3-7). The agency by which the
nations will be converted and believe the gospel will be, not God’s law, but
the pentecostal Spirit of power (Acts 2:1-47; I Cor. 2:4, 14-16; I Thes.
1:5). Revival is prerequisite for men
to come to a saving knowledge of Christ and thereby expand His kingdom; men
must be born again. And the law cannot
accomplish that: “the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor.
3:6). There has never been any
legitimate question about this conviction of those who advocate theonomic
ethics. The editor’s unguarded and
irresponsible misrepresentation is a real low point that prejudices readers
(quite understandably) against those of us who nevertheless praise God for His
grace in our salvation and the salvation of others (even the nations of the
world eventually). The law is not, for the theonomist or postmillennialist,
a transforming means of grace for the bringing in of Christ’s kingdom.
Furthermore,
the way that the world becomes obedient to God is not, as the editor alleges, by the state enforcing the penal
sanctions of the Old Testament. While
there might well be some favorable influence on it as a pedagogical device,
evangelism does not accomplish its goals through the state’s use of the
sword. Paul states quite directly that
“the weapons of our warfare are not of the flesh” (2 Cor. 10:4), for we rather
advance Christ’s kingdom with “the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of
God” (Eph. 6:17). This truth is again
belabored in my book, Theonomy in
Christian Ethics (see, for instance, pp. 1415 with its discussion of “The
Two Swords”). I believe that the editor
is responsible to be familiar with positions which he criticizes and ought not
to paint such an obviously inaccurate picture of them as we find here. Nowhere do I claim that the world will
become obedient to God through the use of the Old Testament penal sanctions.
The state’s
endorsement and use of those sanctions is the result of Christ’s kingdom spreading throughout a nation and it
striving to live in obedience to the king – not the cause for such advance. One almost gets the picture from the
editor’s portrayal that theonomists would bring in the kingdom by violent
means, harshly imposing an external law-code on an enemy people who resist it
in a widespread and vigorous way; they are then dealt with according to the
law’s penal sanctions. However the
picture is pure fiction and a complete reversal of the truth. The penal sanctions of God’s law will only
be enacted in a country where there has already been widespread turning to the
gospel and an appropriate nurturing period of personal and social
sanctification; those penalties are enforced (and can be enforced) only by a
populous that loves the Lord and His blessed direction for its well-being. That is, the theonomist believes that there
must be revival and pervasive success in evangelism; then those who are
believers will more and more attempt to live obedient lives in gratitude to
their Savior, and in time that sanctification will also be seen to call
believers to a distinctive and righteous lifestyle in social and political
matters. Eventually, graciously, and
willingly the sanctions of God’s law will come to be obeyed, just as faithful
believers will desire to obey all of God’s commandments. This will not be harsh eternal imposition
(although criminals will always make such self-serving claims) but the natural
outworking of an internal commitment and dynamic.
When and if
Christians have the positions and influence necessary to bring about social
change and establish public policy, they will naturally desire to gain as much
guidance as is available from God’s inspired word. Only at that point – at the end
of a period where God’s gracious Spirit has brought about kingdom growth and
its subsequent strengthening in righteous living – will the sanctions of God’s
law be popularly endorsed and enforced. The kingdom eventually brings obedience
to the penal sanctions; obedience to those sanctions does not bring in the
kingdom. The Great Commission requires
us to work toward the day when the nations will have been discipled to Christ
and taught to observe whatsoever He
has commanded, and as I have said above as well as in many publications the
Great Commission depends for its success on the gracious and powerful work of
God’s Holy Spirit.
The
editor’s contrary representation is a serious and disheartening misconstrual of
the theonomic position – a misleading error that could have and should have
been avoided. To use but one ready
example from Theonomy, note that a
fair reading of the book would have disclosed this and other statements: “The
serious alternative which the church offers to a dying world is to turn in
faith to Christ and keep His commandments; both elements are demanded by the
great commission. As obedience to it is
empowered by the Holy spirit, the law of God establishes righteousness in human
affairs and human hearts” (p. 489). Or
again: “The day is coming when, in the power of the Holy Spirit, all citizens and relatives, from the
small to the great, will know the Lord . . ..
The great commission will one day be fulfilled, a day in which all
nations (not just representative individuals in them) shall have been
disciplined . . .. The great commission
includes the first mentioned provision of the New Covenant as well: All nations
are to be taught to observe Christ’s commandments, in other words, all the law
of God (Matt. 28:19f.; cf. Matt. 5:17f.).
The power and presence of Christ is the seal and guarantee of the great
commission’s success . . .. The New
Covenant will bring with it the power to convert sinners to God; its prosperity
will be overwhelming – such is God’s promise, and if the Spirit can convert one
individual sinner, why should we hesitate to see Him having the power to effect
a world-wide revival?” (pp. 192-193). There is nowhere to be found even a hint of
the editor’s violent picture of imposing the penal sanctions of the law and
thereby advancing Christ’s kingdom; such a representation is unfair to the
thoroughly Spiritual character of the theonomic position.
The second
mistake in the editor’s description of theonomic ethics and postmillennial
eschatology is his assertion that the two perspectives require each other. According to him theonomy and
postmillennialism go “hand in hand” (9-6, p. 3a) and are “indispensable to each
other” (9-6, p. 14b). Of course, if
both positions are scriptural, then they would naturally complement and
strengthen each other as part of a unified system of truth (just as do, for
instance, the doctrines of sin and redemption). However such a harmony between
the two positions does not mean that people must choose them in tandem or
reject them as a pair. Logically there
is a distinction to be drawn between what will
in fact happen and what ought to
happen. Let me illustrate. Someone can readily believe that Congress
will increase the Social Security Tax, and yet not at all believe that Congress
ought to do so. On the other hand,
someone could believe that the church ought to develop a deaconal system for
relieving the poor, and still not believe that the church will actually do
it. What will happen, and what should
happen are (unhappily) very often quite contrary to each other. Accordingly the editor has committed a
logical lapse in saying that postmillennialism and theonomic ethics are
indispensable to each other.
Postmillennialism says that the nations of the world will be converted and come to enace
God’s law in their societies, while theonomic ethics maintains (among other
things) that nations ought to enact
God’s law in their societies. One can
believe one totally without the
other. Someone might believe that
nations ought to enforce God’s law, but never will do so. Someone else might believe that nations will
enforce God’s law, but ought not to do so.
Therefore, the two positions of theonomic ethics and postmillennial
eschatology are logically separate from each other. They are also psychologically separate from each other, for as a
matter of fact some postmillennialists are not theonomic in their ethical
outlook – just as some theonomists are not postmillenial in their
eschatological outlook. Many people
come to these positions separately, as did myself, without the one suggesting
or influencing the other. Again, I feel
that there is a beautiful harmony between the two positions, for I believe that
they are both the teaching of God’s word.
But logically and psychologically a person can surely hold to one
without the other.
Another
passing indication that postmillennialism and theonomic ethics do not require each
other is the existence of varying schools of postmillennial eschatology. Roughly speaking I can delineate at least
four distinct options proposed through history which might be (with greater or
lesser accuracy) designated “postmillennialism.” (1) Some have held that the gospel will prosper throughout the
world, bringing widespread revival so that the large majority of people are
believers; such gospel prosperity, with Christian nurture over time, is bound
to have public consequences (cf. “Ye are the salt of the earth . . .. Ye are the light of the world”). Thus revival will eventuate in Christ’s
commandments being obeyed in all walks of life. This is, I believe, the classic Reformed version of
postmillennialism (as evidenced in my article in the Journal of Christian Reconstruction, Vol. III, No. 2). (2) Others have maintained that the coming
of Christ’s kingdom is to be identified with social progress, public reform,
and better relations among all men; such goals will be accomplished through
humanistic but peaceful means of persuasion and reform movements. Here we have the typical “social gospel”
version of postmillennialism – a secularization and truncating of the Reformed
perspective. (3) Still others have laid
their stress on social reformation, but have advocated the means of violent
revolt, overt warfare, and external imposition of new social conditions. This might be deemed a kind of Anabaptist
version of postmillennialism, sometimes expressed in the Reformation period and
condemned by many Calvinists as “secitious” or “stupid.” (4) Finally we can mention the view that
many people around the world will come to believe the gospel so that our
churches will be overwhelmingly filled with Christians and the nations of the
world will worship God aright; however (amazingly) this gospel prosperity will not have distinctive and positive
consequences for social and political righteousness. It is hard to find a fair, descriptive label for this position
since it seems to me to truncate the Reformed view, to represent a retreat from
a scriptural world-and-life-view, and to be biblically implausible; thus to
label it pietistic postmillennialism or “purely revivalistic” postmillennialism
simply reflects an adverse personal evaluation – and does despite to the
full-orbed Reformed position by suggesting that it might be disinterested in
piety or that genuine biblical revival could be restricted to internal matters
of the heart and at best the church. So
recognizing the inherent problem in choosing a fair designation, I will be
content to call this fourth option ecclesiastical postmillennialism.
Thus it is
manifest that for the editor to make theonomic ethics and
postmillennialismindispensable to each other is unfair to those versions of
postmillenialism which – in contrast to the Puritans, who were vitally
interested in missions and the social
use of God’s law – are indifferent to the public consequences of Christian
belief (ecclesiastical postmillennialism), are indifferent to the revivalistic
foundation of social reform (the social gospel), or are interested in altering
social conditions in an antinomian fashion (Anabaptist postmillennialism). Not all postmillennialists would want to be
affiliated with the position of theonomic ethics. This is not the place to critique such versions of
postmillennialism (which I find biblically and theologically weak or
inconsistent), but simply to make the relevant observational point. Therefore, on logical, psychological, and
dogmatical grounds we must separate our consideration of theonomic ethics from
that of postmillennialism eschatology.
In what follows I will be defending postmillennialism in response to the
editor’s critique of it; what I say will not be directly germane to theonomic
ethics as such.
According
to the editor the fatal weakness of postmillennialism is that it has a problem
with the idea that the world will not
be righteous at Christ’s return (9-6, p. 10c).
The editor says that the key question to be posed in the millennial
discussion is, “what does the Bible indeed have to say about the state of the
world at Christ’s coming?” (9-6, p. 10a); he returns again to this question as
something which, unlike other issues, is definitely not peripheral (9-6, p.
10c). However, the editor defeats his
own criticism and demonstrates by himself its fundamental invalidity by turning
around and admitting that postmillennialism can and does (for most adherents)
incorporate and accommodate the biblical truth that the world will be apostate
at the Lord’s return. That is, the
editor undermines his own critique for us.
Having said that postmillennialism simply ignores this biblical
teaching, the editor goes on to indicate that postmillennialism teaches that
the loosening of Satan at the end of the age will generate widespread apostasy
and set the conditions for Christ’s judgmental return upon an unrighteous world
(9-6, p. 10c-11a) – subject of postmillennialism (Journal of Christian Reconstruction, Vol. 3, No. 2: Winter,
1976-1977)! To say that some position fails to account for something, and then
to turn around and quote an adherent of the position so as to show that it does take account of that thing, is not
only inconsistent, but cripples the criticism so that no answer is necessary.
The editor
lightheartedly dismisses the postmillennial understanding of the passages which
legitimately teach a final apostasy (namely, by the loosening of Satan at the
very end of history), saying that this is “the best that postmillennialism can
do with those passages” (9-6, p. 10c) and that postmillennialists casually
“add” this explanation as an “afterthought” (9-6, p. 11a). But such an alleged criticism is completely
without meaning and force. Here in this
case “the best that postmillennialism can do” is completely adequate to account for the scriptural
teaching, and that is surely good enough!
What more does the editor hope for?
All millennial schools see the loosening of Satan at the end of the
millennium as creating the worldwide evil and apostasy that usher us into the
final judgment (cf. Rev. 20:7-10). If
this understanding of Scripture is a satisfactory handling of the text (and
explanation of further texts) for other schools of eschatology, why is it for the editor merely “the best that postmillennialism can do”? Does Mr. Taylor expect more of the other
schools of thought here? Does he have a
better interpretation of his own to offer us all?
Let me also
note that it is completely beyond me how
the editor could determine that my rehearsal of this element of postmillennial
thinking (taken from his quotation of my article) is a mere “casual
afterthought.” In what relevant and
interesting sense is this point in postmillennial doctrine “casual”? As long as it is true to the Bible, why
should this point be condemned even if it is (in some sense) casual? What is the editor maintaining here? Presently I find his criticism purely
connotive in character – without actual substance. Moreover, how does the editor know that this point in my
postmillennialism is merely an afterthought?
He has not asked me about it.
And as a matter of personal fact, I held the view that the loosening of
Satan would create a final apostasy long
before I became a postmillennialist.
It was not anything like a “casual afterthought,” then; I have always
taken it quite seriously. I have duly
emphasized this truth in my teaching and writing as well (for instance, in my
tapes on Revelation, which were reviewed in the Presbyterian Journal a few years ago). There is no suspicious de-emphasis of this doctrine in my
postmillennial expositions. But even if
there were, that would be a personal observation and totally irrelevant to the
theological adequacy of the position itself.
The editor simply has no ground for complaint at this juncture. Postmillennialism is innocent of his charge
against it.
Before
moving on it should be added that, while postmillennialism teaches and fully
accommodates the apostate condition of the world at the end of history (read,
for instance, M. Kik on Rev. 20), not all
of the texts which are cited by the editor should be understood as legitimately
supporting that truth. That is, as an
exegetical point (not intending to deny the theological conclusion drawn) we
should recognize that some of the texts chosen by the editor do not after all
deal with the subject of the final apostasy.
For instance, the editor mentions Revelation 13, but this chapter deals
with the fall of the ancient Roman beast (cf. Jay Adams, The Time is At Hand). The
editor mentions 2 Timothy 3:13; however, this text is referring to Paul’s own
day, posing a limit to the personal debauchery (not the mass numerical
apostasy) of individual men (cf. the discussion of this passage in Iain Murry, The Puritan Hope). While I agree with the editor that Christ
will return upon an apostate world, I do not agree with the interpretation
offered for particular texts by the editor.
(In passing, I would also wonder if the editor – or any adherent of
premillennial or amillennial thought – can meaningfully speak of a final
“apostasy” in the world if there has never been, as postmillennialists expect,
an accomplishment of the Great Commission so that the world nations have a
spiritual condition of Christian belief from
which to fall in the generation of Satan’s release. Given the downward trend postulated by
premil and amil writers, the release of Satan is almost “business as usual” or
at best an intensification of the already
declining state of spiritual affairs in the world. But this question must await a future discussion.”
Another
alleged supreme “fatal flaw” in postmillennialism, according to the editor, is
that the scriptural support cited by this position is also the backbone of the other eschatological views; this indicates
to the editor that it is one’s personal theological presuppositions that make
the final difference between eschatological schools and not the biblical
teaching itself (99-6, p. 10a). The
editor writes at some length, saying that this constitutes an “illegitimate
hermeneutic” (9-6, p. 10b) – even giving an entire editorial to the subject
under that title (9-6, p. 14-15). The
example which he offers to show that theological presuppositions make the
difference in one’s eschatology, and to evidence that all schools of thought
can accommodate the passages cited by postmillennialists, is Psalm 22:27. He says, ‘There’s nothing in that verse which adds ‘. . . before Christ returns’”
(9-6, p. 10a). What is his
inference? That postmillennialists must
of course add that qualification from their system of doctrine.
Well, is
that so? Must postmillennialists add this qualification from their system of
doctrine? And if so, is that to be deplored? I think the answer to both questions is a plain no. If we look at the verse itself we will
notice that it speaks of the nations “remembering and turning unto Jehovah” –
phraseology which typically points to conversion from unbelief and
rebellion. Therefore, since conversion
cannot take place after the return of Christ in final judgment (granted by all
schools of eschatology), I believe that the verse itself implies the qualification “before Christ returns.” So postmillennialists do not need to read their distinctive
eschatology into the verse to make it support that distinctive eschatology in
return. But, someone may challenge, do
you not after all add this qualification from your presupposed system of
doctrine? The premise that there will
be no opportunity for conversion after the Lord’s return is, you see, taken
from one’s system of doctrine and not the verse itself. So now we must ask how deplorable this fact
is. It all depends on what the source
of one’s “system of doctrine” is! In
the case before us I believe that the verse refers to some millennial period
prior to Christ’s return precisely because
Scripture elsewhere teaches that there will be no room to insert a
millennial period of successful evangelism between the return of Christ and the
last judgment of all men. That is, my
“system of doctrine” – drawn from the Bible – will not allow me consistently to
attribute a worldwide “turning” of the nations to the Lord to a period
subsequent to Christ’s return (cf. Westminster
Confession of Faith XXXII.2; XXXIII.1-2; Larger Catechism 87-90). So
then, what we have is a case where Scripture
(informing the system of doctrine) is brought to bear on Scripture (which is interpreted in the light of the system of
doctrine previously gained). This is
simply an illustration, therefore, of the cardinal rule of hermeneutics that
Scripture must interpret Scripture (see Westminster
Confession of Faith I.9). The
editor’s taunts about an “illegitimate hermeneutic” are thus misplaced or
without proof. This is the most legitimate of hermeneutical
procedures – sanctioned by our Confession itself (which, in turn, is grounded
in the words of Scripture on this point).
If,
however, the editor is saying something else in criticism of postmillennial
hermeneutics – namely, that postmillennialism “may be reading into Scripture
conclusions drawn from his theological system of doctrine” (9-6, p. 10b) so
that it will “bend Scripture to fit the system of doctrine” (9-6, p. 15a) –
then he would indeed be describing an illegitimate hermeneutic. But it would also be one which no
postmillennialist that I have read or known of propounds or approves of. Reading things into the Bible which are not
there and distorting it teachings are deplorable theological crimes, to be
sure! But that point hardly needs to be made generally. Is the editor actually suggesting that such
disgraceful procedures characterize postmillennial expositions of
Scripture? If not, his discussion is
irrelevant. But if so, his discussion
is irresponsible, for he gives absolutely no proof or documentation that this
is the case. Even if the editor is not
personally convinced by the expositions offered by postmillennialists, he has
no warrant to accuse the school of thought (containing, mind you, such notables
as Owens, Fairbairn, Alexander, Hodge, Dabney, Warfield, Terry, Murray, and others)
of being characterized by such an illegitimate hermeneutical procedure. The allegation would be groundless,
unspecified, and frankly untrue. We
must have a responsible theological method in dealing with positions which are
unagreeable to us. When criticisms are
to be made, they cannot be pontificated without supporting evidence. Since the burden of proof lies on the
accuser, if he offers no substantiation of his charges, then his critique is
simply crippled under the load. This
is, it seems, the case with the editor’s charge of “illegitimate hermeneutics”
against postmillennialism. What does he
exactly mean, and why should he believe it is so? To date, his charge cannot stand.
Finally, I
must say that it was disheartening to see the editor make an effort to defend a
qualified “newspaper exegesis” approach to interpreting the Bible (9-6, p.
10a). Similarly I was discouraged to
find the editor saying that the question of why
postmillennialism is resurfacing at this particular time is “perhaps more
important” than the question, “Can it be supported by Scripture?” (9-6, p. 14b). These are sympathies and tendencies which unwittingly move us
away from the principle of sola Scriptura
and the imperial authority of God’s word over all human endeavors.
In his
attempt to defend “newspaper exegesis,” the editor has – I believe –
misconstrued the Copernican Revolution’s effect on scriptural interpretation, a
subject of much study for me as an apologist.
Scientific discovery forced biblical interpreters to ask themselves
whether they had indeed been letting Scripture speak for itself or whether
Aristotelian physics had been read into the Bible. The “newspaper” (we might say) made men study the issue again, and some of course gained infamy by refusing
to do so honestly. However the church
did in time respond sensitively to the question of whether the Bible was making
a claim about the earth’s planetary location or speaking in figures of speech. The newspaper did not, however, determine
what the Bible could be allowed to say – as it does when, with Bultmann, the
results of modern science experienced in an appliance like the refrigerator
“make it impossible” to believe in a bodily resurrection of Jesus. At the time of the Copernican Revolution, if restudy and responsible exegesis had
turned up the same conclusions (which, of course, they did not), then God’s
word would have necessarily been preferred to the word of men (cf. Rom.
3:4). As it actually came about,
however, the Bible was not abandoned to the newspaper; rather, what had been
assumed to be in the Bible was abandoned as the result of restudy – restudy
stimulated by an apparent contradiction with the “newspaper.” This is not newspaper exegesis. The newspaper exegesis that disturbs the
postmillennialist proceeds to delimit what the Bible can teach on the basis of
events reported in history books or newspapers – in particular, saying that two
world wars (etc.) show that the postmillennial confidence that Christ’s kingdom
will prosper prior to His return cannot be the proper interpretation of the
Bible, for the newspapers show it is not (presently) happening.
Men may be
influenced by extrascriptural opinions (the “newspaper”) to reconsider what they have claimed to be taught
in the Bible (cf. Lk. 24:18-27) and they may be encouraged by extrascriptural events as a confirmation of what the
word of God claims (cf. Deut. 18:22; Jn. 14:29), and not be guilty of newspaper
exegesis. The outcome of the Copernican
Revolution illustrates the first, and the assertion by the editor that past
postmillennialists were encouraged by the progress of their day (9-6, p. 9b-c)
illustrates the second, I believe.
These are not examples of extrascriptural events or opinions determining
whether the Bible can or cannot be teaching on a particular doctrine; for
instance, the Puritan postmillennialists and the professors at old Princeton
Seminary did not insist that missionary successes in their day precluded a premillennial or amillenial
understanding of prophetic Scripture.
When men discard postmillennial teaching or will not even give it a
hearing because of unhappy world events in our century, this is a categorically
different thing; it is delimiting what God’s word can say on the basis of extrascriptural
considerations.
That many
modern believers have misconstrued what Reformed postmillennialism essentially
teaches is illustrated and hopefully corrected in my article, "“he Prima Facie Acceptaboility of
Postmillennialism"”(cited earlier).
As it happens, there is nothing in basic postmillennial premises which
precludes the unhappy events of our century taking place prior to (or
hypothetically, even after) an age of widespread gospel prosperity. Consequently the “newspaper” critics of
postmillennialism apparently do not realize that they have no logical basis for
their attempted refutations. Such
events as those to which they typically make reference do not contradict any
legitimate inference from postmillennial teaching in the first place. There is no biblical basis for claiming that
the wonderful success of the Great Commission predicted throughout the bible
will become the case in our own
generation. Nor does the
postmillennialist claim that there will be nothing but systematic, constant, progress
in the prosperity of the gospel; there is nothing to preclude up’s and down’s
along the way. Therefore the newspaper
criticism of postmillennialism is itself invalid, even if we overlook the
impropriety of such a theological method.
Again, I am discouraged to see the editor attempting to sympathize with
it.
The last
criticism made by the editor of postmillennialism is that its supporters “have
unimpressive church growth statistics to support it” (9-6, p. 11c). Such a criticism is without point for many
reasons. In the first place we can
question whether the editor is in a position to know just who are and who are
not postmillennial preachers in the various churches of the land; it is equally
questionable whether he knows off-hand all of their church growth
statistics. Moreover we can readily
point to counter-examples which disprove the editor’s allegation; for instance,
the PCA church with a postmillennial pastor which quadrupled in two years time
would be an embarrassment to the editor’s remark. But more importantly, even if
every postmillennial pastor to the man today had “unimpressive” church growth
statistics, that would not constitute anything like a valid criticism of their
eschatological position – since that position does not itself make its every
adherent a gifted evangelist, nor does it predict impressive church growth in
any particular locality at any particular time. It may be that the impressive growth will take place in non-postmillennialist
churches (nevertheless in fulfillment of postmillennialist teaching!) or in
another age or generation. So how does
that undermine postmillennial eschatology in any way? Finally, contrary to their use by some modern believers, church
growth statistics are not the be all and end all of theological disputes for
those with a Reformed outlook (sola
Scriptura apparently cannot be repeated enough); statistics may be a recent
and man-pleasing fad, but they do not give us a test of truth – other-wise the
rapid growth of certain heretical cults would be evidence of their
veracity. Again, the editor’s critique
is not credible upon reflection.
It turns
out, then, that the editor has not raised a substantial criticism of either
theonomic ethics or postmillennial eschatology. He has, however, painted enough of a misleading picture of both
positions that it has taken far more space to set the record straight than to
put it askew. I have attempted to
respond to each of his basic misrepresentations and to give a reply to each of
his separate criticisms. To make the
long story short, his descriptions have strayed from accuracy at important
points and his critical thrusts have not been on target. There has been no reason advanced by the
editor which should make any reader hesitant to give an open and diligent
hearing to theonomic ethics and postmillennial eschatology. The initial biblical support that can be
marshaled for both of these perspectives makes them worthy of careful and
responsible investigation by any Christian.
I have found them to be scripturally sound and theologically defensible
after painstaking scrutiny. I have also
found them to be uplifting and beneficial to my walk with the Lord. Two very important issues in any person’s
life are explicitly addressed in these theological positions: one’s outlook on
history and its direction, and one’s final ethical standard for the decisions
and attitudes that make up his behavior.
I am
thankful for the editor’s critique of the positions, even though it may have
misfired. It is valuable to examine the
issues again and to think through their theological strength, of which one can
be sure only through cross-examination and challenge. I am also thankful for the editor’s insistence that these
theological questions are definitely not
“something over which Christian should have reason to part company” (9-6, p.
91). A charitable, teachable, and
tolerant spirit would adorn well all of us who have intramural disagreements as
Reformed Christians. It is a telling observation that in those few places where
these theological questions are being used to generate dispute and broken
relations, it is the opponents of theonomic ethics and/or postmillennial
eschatology who are stirring up the trouble and evidencing an intolerance in
practice. Whether or not this
represents a zeal inspired by unwitting ignorance or a reflex to being
idealogically threatened, adherents of these two positions would do well to
hear again the editor’s words and heed them.
Let not those who support the full validity of God’s law or who are
convinced that the gospel will see marvelous prosperity around the world not be
party to any attitude or behavior which would unethically be an obstacle to the
harmonious relationship and work of fellow believers. Our ethical growth and kingdom advances are corporate
matters. Finally, at the end of this
response, I am especially grateful for the editor’s suggestion as to why
theonomic ethics and postmillennial eschatology are thriving today. He explains that this reflects a strong
Reformed revival in our day (9-6, pp. 12b, 14c). I can only respond that I prayerfully hope this is so!
Postscript: (A very brief summary of the above
article was published in the Presbyterian
Journal, December 6, 1978. It was submitted
as a short reply to the editor’s earlier criticisms of theonomic ethics. Since the editor published his own response to my reply in the same
December 6 issue, and since he has endeavored to terminate the discussion at
this point by speaking “A Last Word” on the subject – as he says in an
editorial of the same issue – I will append here an answer to his further
response. This answer expands upon a letter which I have sent to the editor.)
As before,
I appreciate the complimentary and supportive words that can be found in the
editor’s most recent article and editorial.
He has said some most gracious things.
Moreover, on many things we obviously agree (for instance, that
theological questions must be faced responsibly, that believers should not become
preoccupied with nothing else but one theological point, etc.). Nevertheless certain errors and
misrepresentations in his remarks should not go unanswered; the need to respond
further comes in the following areas.
(1)
The editor cannot shake off his preconceived and erroneous
notion that theonomic ethics simply “must” be offering something new. He previously claimed this, arguing that
otherwise Theonomy would not have
needed to be published. That is hardly
cogent reasoning, as indicated in the above article (which reminds us that
sometimes books are published to rehearse and defend older perspectives against
modern opposition). This time around
the editor insists that Theonomy
“must be new because previous adherents of an apparently similar view did not
create controversy in their day as Theonomy
has today. Dubious reasoning
again. First, it is just historically
inaccurate to claim that such views did not previously generate controversy;
they were disputed and debated by others, sometimes vigorously. Second, even if they did not previously cause
controversy, the “new” controversy today could easily be explained by the new secular environment of opinion and society into which theonomic views have
come – rather than by the alleged novelty of such views.
The fact is
that the editor is mistaken both
about the originality of theonomic views and about any church-rendering
controversy being caused by them. As
seen in the above article, theonomic distinctives are firmly embedded in the
Reformed tradition and are expressed (sometimes more, sometimes less,
consistently) by notable theologians of Reformed persuasion. An undisputed champion of that theological
school is John Calvin, and his ethical outlook is noteworthy here (even if he
might not agree with every last detail of my book). With theonomists, Calvin maintains that “a perfect pattern of
righteousness stands forth in the law’ which is our “one everlasting and
unchangeable rule to live by” – not restricted to the Old Testament age, “for
it is just as applicable to every age, even to the end of the world” (Institutes 2:7:13). Against those who deny an obligation to the
Old Testament law, Calvin appeals to Matthew 5:17-18, saying that Christ
“sufficiently confirms that by his coming nothing is going to be taken away
from the observance of the law . . ..
Therefore through Christ the teaching of the law remains inviolable”
(2:7:14). With theonomists, Calvin
teaches that the judicial (extra-decalogical) commandments of the Old Testament
have a divestible outward form or
constitution that can be altered with
circumstances, but that these commandments are founded on an underlying
“equity” in each case which expresses a perpetual
duty that must be the same for all men (4:20:15, 16): “this equity
alone must be the goal and rule and limit of all laws,” he said. All men in every nation today are obligated
to obey the underlying requirements expressed by the case-laws of the Old
Testament, then, and this explains Calvin’s extensive use of those laws in
explaining and setting forth the moral duties of the decalogue. Wherever possible and relevant, the
extra-decalogical commandments of the Old Testament must be observed by
us. Speaking of two such laws, Calvin
said “Who can deny that these two things apply as much to us as to the Jews?”
(2:8:32).
Furthermore,
with theonomists, Calvin argued that the duty of civil magistrates extends to
both tables of the law – to religious as well as interpersonal matters touching
society (4:20:9). In the French
Confession of 1559 he wrote, “God put the sword in the hand of the state to
resist not only sins against the second but also against the first table of the
law.” One major function of God’s law affirmed on the other hand the
appointed end of civil government
includes forming “our social behavior to civil righteousness” (4:20:3). Although earlier writings might seem to
vacillate regarding the penal sanctions of the law, Calvin’s most mature,
extensive, and explicit treatment of God’s law – found in his 1563 commentary
on a Harmony of the four last books
of the Pentateuch, written a few years after even the last edition of the Institutes and only a year before his
death – speaks plainly and boldly in favor of them. For instance, he asserts “Capital punishment shall be decreed
against adulterers” (Commentary at Deut. 13:5), and “it appears how greatly God
abominates adultery, since He denounces capital punishment against it . .
.. Conjugal faith should be held too
sacred to be violated with impunity” (Commentary at Deut 22:22). Calvin is hard on Christians who do not
believe the law’s penal sanction should be enforced today: “By the universal law of the Gentiles, the
punishment of death was always awarded to adultery wherefore it is all the
baser and more shameful in Christians not to imitate at least the heathen. Adultery is punished no less severely by the
Julian law than by that of God; whilst those who boast themselves of the
Christian name are so tender and remiss, that they visit this execrable offense
with a very light reproof” (Commentary at Deut 22:22). He goes on immediately to answer those who
attempt “to abrogate God’s law” by spurious appeal to the example of Christ,
concluding that “their relaxation of the penalty has flowed from gross
ignorance.” Calvin is zealous here to
defend the validity of the Old Testament penal sanction, just as he is
elsewhere regarding blatant and subversive apostasy: “in a well constituted
polity, profane men are by no means to be tolerated” (Commentary at Deut.
13:5). In that place he openly mentions
the opposition of some men to the law’s penal requirement, saying “God commands
the false prophet to be put to death . . ..
Some scoundrel or other gainsays this, and sets himself against the author
of life and death. What insolence is
this!” In his last years Calvin’s
conviction that the law’s penal sanctions ought to be utilized took an
obviously firm form; he defended the honor and validity of such sanctions with
vigor. Magistrates are obligated to
obey God’s law, held Calvin, and God’s penal commandments (just as all of the
law) cannot be altered; thus if God said that capital punishment applied to
some crime, then that settles the matter.
Calvin wrote: “What is the meaning of this madness, in imposing a law
upon God, that He should not make use of the obedience of magistrates in this
respect? And what avails it to
question about the necessity of this, since so it pleases God? . . . It is superfluous to contend by argument,
when God has once pronounced what is His will, for we must needs abide by His
inviolable decree” (ibid). With
theonomists, Calvin saw that God’s just laws – when even once pronounced, in
the Old Testament – could not be arbitrarily put aside in the Christian era;
even magistrates must honor the punishments for crime decreed in the law of the
Lord.
I have
taken some space to summarize at least one dominant strain in Calvin’s thought
and writings to emphasize indisuptable terms what is already manifest in the preceding
article: namely, that whether theonomic ethics is right or wrong, its
distinctives are anything but novel (contrary to the editor’s insistent
claim). Surely Calvin stands in the
classic Reformed tradition, and as we have seen, elements of his writings
openly propound theonomic themes: (1) the whole Old Testament law is applicable
today since Christ’s coming took nothing away from it; (2) the judicial or
case-laws of Israel express an underlying equity which is our perpetual duty;
(3) civil magistrates today are obligated to obey the law of God in its civil
demands; and (4) the penal sanctions of the law are still valid and to be
enforced in the present Christian era.
Calvin may not always have been consistent with these teachings (just as
I am not thoroughly consistent with them either), but they are definitely part
of his corpus and stand in agreement with Theonomy
in Christian Ethics. Theonomic
ethics is anything but new in the
Reformed tradition! Yet the editor
continues to advance his preconceived notion of its novelty – in the absence of
cogent supporting reasons and in the face of contrary historical evidence
(e.g., John Cotton’s Abstract of the Laws
of New England).
Not only
are the editor’s remarks about Theonomy’s
originality without backing, so are his claims about it causing disruptive
controversy (as alleged “evidence” that its perspective must be new). He asserts that theonomic ethics ha produced
controversy and problems in the churches, tearing some apart. Is that the case? Where are these churches?
When did such disruption occur?
Was it theonomic problems? Have
whatever controversies that have been generated of the healthy or unhealthy
kind? These are relevant and important
questions, but the editor has offered no answers at all; his claim might very
well crumble under cross-examination.
Just where are the churches that have been “torn apart” by unhealthy
controversy generated by advocates of theonomic ethics as such? I think the editor’s allegation is baseless
– at best vague, unsubstantiated, and an unfair argumentative device. But even if
it were true, such a claim would come nowhere close to demonstrating that the
theonomic perspective is new-fashioned theology. Novelty and controversy are logically separate matters that do
not require or imply each other.
Somewhat
like Columbus, the editor wants to insist on his preconceived opinion even in
the face of obviously contrary evidence.
Columbus insisted that the new land to which he had sailed was India;
accordingly throughout history we have mistakenly called native Americans
“Indians.” Likewise the editor insists
that my book must be presenting something new, and throughout his treatment of
my viewpoint this preconceived – but equally mistaken – opinion will lead him into
further and further mistakes, as we will note.
(2)
A second facet of his article which calls for a response is
the resort – always hazardous for scholarship – to presuming to know another
author’s position better than the author knows it himself. The editor claims that my article in the
Journal modifies, rather than
defends, the position taken in my book – namely (according to the editor’s
misreading) that the explicit details of the law are without exception to be
literally applied today as they always were.
His claim is simply false. Theonomy nowhere calls for crass
literalism in interpreting the Bible; it throughout recognizes the illustrative
and typological character of many Old Testament laws, as any adequate study of
the book will indicate. The allusions
and quotations from the book which the editor uses do not even come close to
verifying his misleading claim. He has
simply misread the book with a previously formed bent concerning it. Theonomy
is not “literalistic”; it never
was. You can take the author’s word for
it.
When I
teach the O.T. laws regarding sacrifice were preparatory shadows of the coming
Savior’s work of atonement (pp. 207-209) and are not kept today in the same
fashion as before, when I teach that O.T. dietary laws or laws against mixing
seed or animals are no longer observed in the same outward manner (pp.
209-210), when I teach the obvious and traditional truth that the O.T.
case-laws are applicable beyond their original, literal cases to new situations
(p. 26) because such laws are meant to illustrate an underlying principle (p.
313), how can the editor responsibly portray my view as being that every detail
of the law is to be literally applied today just as it was in the past? By caricaturing the theonomic viewpoint the
editor only reveals the impoverished character of his own case against it; his
criticisms apparently require a distorted view of the theonomic position in
order to survive at all.
(3)
As might be expected, given the previous two errors, the
editor is now led to claim that he cannot “pin down” what Theonomy is saying. Indeed,
he excuses himself from presenting a biblical
argument against it on the incredible ground that Theonomy does not have enough substance to grasp! Numerous readers from varied backgrounds (social,
educational, ecclesiastical) have accurately grasped the substance of the
theonomic position. Why shouldn’t the
editor be able to do so? Contrary to
his claim, Theonomy stakes out a specifiable and clear alternative in
ethics, one that makes major theological assertions and has definite
distinctives. Otherwise, why would the
editor be spending so much time criticizing it? Does he think it worthwhile to shoot at nothing at all? Why previously did he claim it was a “new”
position if it has no substance or a
position at all? The editor must make
up his mind on where he will stand; he cannot have it both ways! Theonomic ethics has substance. What the editor is finding hard to put his
finger on is a biblically based, legitimate criticism of the position.
Misguided
though it is, the editor’s “logic” should not be overlooked. He began with the mistaken preconception
that Theonomy simply “must” be new
and literalistic in perspective. It was
thus natural that when he received an article from me which showed its
historical roots and non-literalistic interpretation of the law the editor was
forced to conclude that the (allegedly) original position had now been
“modified.” And if this was the case,
then finally the theonomic position could not be “pinned down,” thereby lacking
substance. The whole discussion,
however, has been an extended exercise in the “Columbian fallacy” – remaining
undauntedly true to faulty preconceptions.
Theonomy is no more new, subsequently modified, or
unsubstantial than native Americans are “Indians”!
When all is
said and done, we still await the editor’s scriptural
refutation of theonomic ethics. Sola Scriptura must be our governing
principle regardless of the opinions (even the ridicule or persecution) of
men. Surely the editor must agree.
(4)
Let me also respond to some misrepresentations or
misunderstandings on the editor’s part.
Contrary to his objection, to recognize the ceremonial nature of an O.T.
law is not to “pick and choose” which
of God’s commands we will obey today.
It is to recognize the theological
nature of that particular requirement and thus the way in which such a command is appropriately observed by us
today.
The editor
elsewhere misunderstands me if he thinks that I would deny that O.T. case laws can
ever be applicable today in terms of their very wording (for instance,
about rooftops). It is certainly possible (and thus a few
years ago I put a railing around our rooftop sun-deck while living in Manhattan
Beach). My point is that the language
of the O.T. case-laws, being illustrative
from an ancient culture, is not necessarily
directly applicable today. People with
sloped rooftops are not required to have a railing around them, even though
they are required by the Old Testament
case law (as the Catechism says at Q. 135) to avoid all occasions which tend
unjustly to jeopardize the lives of others.
This is to pay attention to the intention of the law’s jot and tittle
details. My remark about ancient
Israel’s “rooftops, oxen, and ax heads” in the previous article was simply
expressing our obligation to recognize the literary
nature of the laws we seek to obey – precisely so that we can obey them correctly.
The last
misrepresentation to note is the editor’s paraphrase of my understanding of the
thrust of “fulfill” in Matthew 5:17.
That Jesus confirms the full measure of the law against
pharisaical perversions of it – the sense I give the word – means much more
than the editor’s rewording lets
on. Competent new Testament scholars do
not dismiss my conclusion as somehow inappropriate or indefensible: “The word
translated ‘fulfill’ can mean to ‘establish, confirm, cause to stand’ and need
mean only that Jesus asserted the permanence of the law and his obedience to it
. . .. In terms of Jesus’ total message
‘fulfill’ probably has the meaning of bringing to full intent and expression”
(George Eldon Ladd, Theology of the New
Testament, p. 124). Moreover, the
editor’s alternative explanation of “fulfill” is already dealt with in an
adequate manner in my book.
Nevertheless it is noteworthy that if, as the editor suggests, Jesus is
here saying that he came “to put the law into effect,” then the Lord thereby presupposes the validity of the
law in exhaustive detail – precisely the point
of theonomic ethics!
(5)
Finally I must mention a few areas of direct dispute with
the editor. He is wrong to ridicule me
at one point for failing to comment on one of his alleged illustrations of the
application of O.T. law today. I did
not avoid comment at that point. Rather
the editor would not grant me enough space to reply to his every alleged
example. That does not strengthen his
attack or give support to his position.
When the editor
claims that some of my own examples of the application of theonomic ethics do
not represent Theonomy because
fair-minded men have agreed with such ethical points in the past, we can only
chuckle. Where does he derive the rule
that, in the nature of the case, theonomic applications must be outlandish and objectionable to fair-minded men! (Another “Columbian fallacy” is looming
here.” What else would we expect from
the Lord except fair laws? The
difference between theonomists and anti-theonomists is that the former see all of God’s laws (where applicable) as
fair and just today, while the latter think only some are.
Against my
explanation of Deut. 23:1 as dealing with those who are made eunuchs the editor
objects that the passage says nothing about self-mutilation. (Of course it says nothing about accidental mutilation either, which his
interpretation demands.) In reply I
need only recommend that he read it in the original Hebrew and consult a few
exegetical commentaries.
Contrary to
what he says at another point, Romans 2:12-15 firmly supports my earlier observation that without the law there would be
no sin (and thus no need for the Savior).
The Gentiles who do not have a written revelation of the law are still
guilty before God, says Paul, because the work of the law is written on their hearts. They know the ordinance
of God which they violate (e.g., Rom. 1:32).
In
conclusion I must dispute the editor’s last remark that the two precepts of
love laid down by Christ are better ethical guidance today than the details of
the O.T. law. The fact is that these
two love precepts are themselves
precisely quotations of details of
the O.T. law! Moreover, we could not know what love
requires and prohibits without the law.
(The mistake made by Fletcher’s “situational ethic” of “love” is just to
overlook this fact.) Scripture
authoritatively teaches that “This is
love, that we walk after His commandments” (2 John 60. And in the view of Christ and the apostles,
that includes all of God’s Old Testament commandments. The popular attempt today to restrict the
continuity of the law in the New Testament to the ten commandments is simply
contrary to biblical practice, as an inductive study of the New Testament use
of Old Testament law will indicate. As
already noted, when Christ wishes to summarize the entire thrust of the law, He
authoritatively quotes Old Testament case-laws, not being confined to the
decalogue. Moreover, without any excuse
or apology, the New Testament writers readily apply Old Testament laws that go
beyond the decalogue as though they are currently valid – for instance, laws
pertaining to legal evidence (Deut. 17:6; 19:15; Matt. 18:16; I Tim. 5:19),
prompt pay for workers (Lev. 19:13; Deut. 24:14-15; I Tim. 5:18; James 5:4),
respect for ruling authorities and parents (Ex. 21:17; 22:28; Matt. 15:4; Acts
23:5), securing a livelihood to laborers (Deut. 25:4; I Cor. 9:9; I Tim. 5:18),
putting away resentment and revenge (Lev. 19:17-18; Matt. 18:15; Rom. 12:19),
and caring for your enemies (Ex. 23:4-5; Matt. 5:44; Rom. 12:20). Any attempt to restrict the standard of Christian ethics to the summary commands
of love, or even to the summary commands of the decalogue, is thwarted over and
over again by the patent practice of the New Testament – a practice which is
but the consistent application of the Lord’s words, “I have not come to
abrogate the Law or the Prophets, for until heaven and earth pass away not one
stroke of the law will become invalid; therefore, whoever breaks the least of
those commandments and teaches men so will be called least in God’s
kingdom!” (Matt. 5:17-19).