PT009
The Westminster Theological Journal, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Fall
1973, Philadelphia, PA, Covenant Media Foundation, 800/553-3938
Review of Method in Theology,
[Bernard J. F. Lonergan, (New York: Herder
and Herder, 1972, 405)]
By Greg Bahnsen
A two-fold
importance attaches to this timely volume.
In the first place it comes from the pen of the most philosophically
sophisticated writer within the Roman Catholic communion today, Bernard
Lonergan. Lonergan, a Canadian by
birth, has taught Dogmatic Theology at the Gregorian University in Rome, Regis
College in Toronto, and is currently Stillman Professor in the Harvard Divinity
School; nearing retirement, Lonergan has recently become a widely acclaimed
scholar both within and without Romanist circles. Method of Theology is
the theological culmination of Lonergan’s prodigious literary history, the magnum opus of which is undoubtedly Insight, A Study of Human Understanding
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1970, 1958).
In the second place, Method in
Theology is significant because of its subject matter. In recent years the theological world has
come to realize the need for rethinking and deeper analysis in the area of
metatheology, the study of the nature of theology and its proper methods. Because a competent discussion and critique
of Lonergan has yet to be produced within the Reformed community, and because
the subject of metatheology has not received treatment by a Reformed scholar
since Abraham Kuyper’s Principles of
Sacred Theology, there is a dual reason for interest in the latest volume
written by Lonergan.
The key
chapter of Method in Theology is
chapter 5, “Functional Specialties.”
There Lonergan explains that because contemporary theology is
specialized it must be seen as a series of interdependent operations; thus the
question of theological method is raised.
Of the three types of specialization that are possible, he favors a
functional specialization which can be the link between field specialization
(subdividing the data) and subject specialization (classifying the results of
investigation). Under a functional
specialization Lonergan would isolate eight distinct stages in the process of
doing theology; each separate process pursues different ends and employs
different means. Yet the entire process
is unified by the cognitional dynamic of the subject who is performing the
theological task. At this point it
becomes essential to understand the epistemology of Lonergan as he presents it
in Insight; the theory of cognitional
structure which he develops in Insight is
the key to understanding both the diversity and unity of the theological method
he presents in Method in Theology. Throughout his book on Method Lonergan continually expects insight to supply the background for ideas which he introduces.
Necessarily
digressing into Insight for a moment,
then, I would judge that Lonergan’s epistemology is best characterized by a
psychologism which he purports to defend as isomorphic to the proportionate
structure of being (metaphysics). In
this psychologism there are two key notions: the unrestricted, driving desire
to understand, and the theory of cognitional structure. Lonergan holds that a disinterested
epistemological desire is central to human nature; this desire initiates
inquiry and wonder in man, and then it drives him on to ask increasingly
intelligent questions until he arrives at the metaphysical theology of
Thomism. The learning process which man
is taken through by his driving desire to understand is characterized,
according to Lonergan, by a basic and common cognitional structure. This structure has three successive levels,
each higher level presupposing the lower: presentations (raw data) of
experience, intelligence (acts of understanding by means of insights), and
reflection (judgments as to truth and probability status). The knower is presented with certain
empirical situations which raise questions of intelligence; having formulated
an initial answer by means of an insight (the supervening act of organizing
intelligence which is facilitated by heuristic devices), the knower reflects
and then passes judgment upon the certitude of his formulation. Having arrived at this point, the knower
goes through a process of deliberation which ends in his decision to act in a
certain manner upon the knowledge obtained.
Thus the structure of consciousness can be schematized:
And each
individual is carried from stage to stage by the driving desire to
understand. (Certain aberrations result
should that driving desire be stifled by individual, group, or general
bias.) Lonergan holds that this
cognitional structure isomorphic to the structure of reality, and further that
it proves the existence of God (two interesting elements of Insight which I cannot discuss here).
Returning
to Method of Theology, we find out
that the eight functional specialties into which Lonergan divides the
theological task correspond to the cognitional structure outlined in Insight. Theology, says Lonergan, divides into two different phases. Mediating
theology encounters the past and challenges one to a decision; mediated theology begins with that
decision (i.e., conversion) and confronts the present. The first phase introduces us, while the
second phase is the knowledge of
God. Now each of these theological
phases further subdivides into four functional specialties (eight in all, then)
which operate on all four levels of the cognitional structure, but achieve the
end proper to one particular level of
it. Hence in the mediating phase of
theology we advance from research to interpretation to history to dialectic
(apologetically dealing with conflicting tendencies); in the mediated phase of
theology we descend from foundations (that which objectifies the process of conversion
that took place in dialectics) to doctrines to systematics (which
conceptualizes, clarifies, and removes inconsistencies) to communications
(i.e., practical theology). The
ascending and descending movements of theology are accounted for by the fact
that we begin with data which lead toward personal encounter, and then
reflecting upon this conversion experience we use it as a horizon within which
to move through doctrinal formulations to practical expressions on the pastoral
level. Schematizing Lonergan’s
epistemology and metatheology, we derive:
EPISTEMOLOGY: Experience Understanding Judgment Decision
THEOLOGY: MEDIATING: Research Interpretation History Dialectics
MEDIATED: Communications Systematics Doctrines Foundations
Such is the
heart of Lonergan’s metatheology. Because it is based upon the intentional
operations of the cognitional structure, he considers it to be a transcendental
method which is dependent upon the unrestricted epistemological dynamism
inherent in human nature.
The
chapters leading up to chapter 5 present the presuppositions of Lonergan’s
metatheological scheme; the chapters following chapter 5 go into more extensive
analysis of each of the functional specialties of theology. Each is a challenge in itself to Reformed
thinkers, but cannot be expositorily summarized in a review of abbreviated
scope. However, a highly selective
exposition of the presupposition (in particular) can be indirectly derived from
the critique provided below.
Because
Lonergan’s view of the theological process is dependent upon his
epistemological position as presented in Insight,
a discussion of the weaknesses of his metatheology can appropriately begin with
a criticism, albeit short, of Insight. Lonergan’s epistemology is vulnerable since
it is staked on a psychologism which could only be proved by one having
privileged access to the mental operations of a significant majority of all
men; otherwise he is arguing from the similarity of outward acts between human beings engaged in intelligent thought –
in which case his theory of cognitional structure is based upon an argument
from silence at best or the fallacy of false cause at worst. Moreover, the idea of a structure of
cognitional process is a metaphor built up from a misleading view of mental substance which has no support in
the Biblical view of the soul or in modern philosophy. Lonergan’s notion of a
cognitional structure is merely a “way of seeing” things; therefore, it cannot
bear the weight of proving the elaborate metaphysic (of Insight) or the metatheological process (of Method in Theology) which Lonergan thrusts upon it. In Insight
Lonergan develops his epistemology under the pretense of neutrality, claiming
to have no commitment to Thomism and its theism until they are proved in due
course. However, the epistemological
and methodological stance assumed by a philosopher is assumed for some reason,
and in order best to arrive at true conclusions about the states of affairs;
these reasons, as well as the ability to compare the success of competing
positions for engendering true conclusions, depend upon some metaphysical
understanding (though unrefined) of the world already. Being unable to ground a successful
interaction of synthetic facts and analytic laws in man’s thinking, autonomous
epistemology such as utilized by Lonergan amounts either to arbitrariness or to
a denial of a theoretically justified doctrine of knowledge (an epistemology
which is antiepistemic l). Further,
Lonergan’s philosophy calls for the complete intelligibility of the world as
the fulfillment of the driving desire to understand, but this has all the
characteristics of wishful thinking – especially when Lonergan admits that
there is mystery in the natural world!
Scripture says that no man seeks to understand God, and almost anyone
can find individuals in his community who are not at all interested in
understanding anything at all; Lonergan's epistemology simply embodies an
erroneous psychology of man, the intellect's primacy, and the noetic effects of
the fall.
It appears
that Insight does not have the resources to support Lonergan’s viewpoint in Method in Theology. The latter has its own peculiar problems as
well. Foremost among them is the fact
that Lonergan’s division makes conversion (the transition from dialectics to
foundations) irrelevant to historical investigation and hermeneutics
(interpretation); yet the beginning of understanding is the fear of the Lord,
not research and autonomous science.
Beyond this, Lonergan’s scheme comes off looking terribly arbitrary once
we reflect upon it. Why should
foundations correlate with decision, or history with judgment, or
communications with experience? There
appears to be no inner correspondence to me, and thus I fear that their
respective placements have been made merely to meet the needs of Lonergan’s own
system of thought. The whole idea of
splitting up these functions in the way Lonergan does is beset with
difficulties: e.g., is it possible to
divorce systematics from doctrine (i.e.,
understanding from judgment)?
Finally,
the presuppositions Lonergan brings to his metatheological scheme must be
questioned. First, Lonergan claims that
he is not doing theology but metatheology (xii); however, his views
of God, revelation, and authority are inextricably involved in his ideas about
theology and its proper method. He
assumes that ethical matters are based upon rational matters (e.g., p. 9); however, it should be noted
that one’s state of morality easily influences his use of reason and evaluation
of data. By basing the transcendental
precepts (e.g., “Be intelligent”)
upon the analysis of the dynamism of human consciousness (p. 20), Lonergan
commits a naturalistic fallacy. He
gives evidence of believing that the work of scientists is detached from, and
unaffected by, matters of “ultimate concern” (i.e., religion – p. 23).
Moreover, the transcendental method is basically a-religious (cf. p.
25). Dr. C. Van Til’s writings can be
consulted for a refutation of this chimera of neutrality. In addition to these problems in Lonergan’s
discussion of method, he has a
tendency toward mere categorizing or arranging of material instead of arguing
for a point of view (e.g., pp.
73ff.).
Lonergan’s view of meaning wrongly categorizes linguistic
meaning so that it cannot express intersubjectivity, as does a smile( p. 60),
puts common sense and ordinary language in a water-tight compartment separated
from theoretical thought and language (pp. 71f, 83ff.), and strangely posits
the priority of poetry in the development of language in history (p. 73). It is little wonder that, on his own views
of language, translation accuracy is a formidable problem (p. 71).
Lonergan’s
presuppositions on religion are
especially dubious. Human authenticity
amounts to love according to his viewpoint (cf. pp. 104-106), and love is a
different dimension from rational knowledge since love is a conscious, yet
unknown, experience on the level of
mystery and moralism (pp. 106-107).
Such an outlook and dichotomy (essentially Kantian) is sufficiently
criticized in current Reformed literature so as to need no further elaboration
in this review. Lonergan goes on to say
that love pertains to a world not mediated by meaning, and thus it receiveds
outward verbal expression only in a historically conditioned medium (p. 112);
this ploy becomes his explanation for the diversity of religious utterances (p.
114) and the salvation of the non-Christian (P. 123). Faith is taken to be love-knowledge (cf. p. 115) and distinguished from belief, which is verbally and
rationally qualified (p. 119); this allows for Lonergan’s strong support of
ecumenism, which looks for a deeper unity (p. 119) among differing creedal
expressions, a unity to be found in the realm of interiority (p. 115). And then, in good contemporary style (yet
lacking any cogency), Lonergan affirms that he is really expressing the same
thing as the orthodox statements of the magisterium – though not being
restricted to classical ways of expression (pp. 123f.). It is in just this sort of overwhelming drive toward unity and ecumenism that the Reformed theologian can see his own discontinuity with Lonergan’s
current-day Catholicism and theological method.